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The establishment of a seamless electricity transmission system and the completion 
of a single market for electricity in Europe are currently hindered by the lack of 
adequate answers to several, often basic, questions concerning the coordination of 
actions and decisions, the sharing of costs and benefits, and solidarity beyond costs 
and benefits. 
This research report, prepared by the Florence School of Regulation, looks at the 
development of the past decades and identifies the existence of three core ‘missing 
pillars’ which explain, at least partially, why the European electricity system is 
affected by numerous blocking factors.  
The report presents two case studies that show the importance and utility of looking 
at what is blocking the integration and the decarbonisation of the European electricity 
sector through the lens of coordination, sharing and solidarity. By doing that, the 
report offers a set of non-technical recommendations that points out key roles, tasks 
and responsibilities at national and European level for removing the two ‘roadblocks’ 
represented, on the one hand, by redispatching costs and, on the other, by capacity 
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The purpose of this research report prepared by the Florence School of Regulation is 
to revisit the development of the European electricity system over the last decades 
and offer an analytical framework, showing where the EU has not yet achieved its 
target of creating a single market for electricity in Europe.1 The report consists of two 
parts and five chapters overall. 
The first part of the report provides the context of the research and develops the 
analytical framework.  
Chapter 1 shows that several ‘basic questions’ related to the establishment of a 
liberalised and integrated electricity system at European level have either not been 
addressed by policy-makers or have received scant attention. The absence of 
adequate and timely answers to these questions reveals the existence of three 
fundamental ‘missing pillars’ to the realisation of a European seamless electricity 
transmission system and the corresponding single market for power. These core 
missing pillars are: 
1) Coordination of actions and decisions; 
2) Sharing of costs and benefits; 
3) Solidarity beyond costs and benefits. 
First, coordination of the actions and decisions undertaken at national and supra-
national level by market players, network operators and regulatory bodies is 
necessary to achieve consistent infrastructure development, reliable system 
operation and efficient commercial transactions. Second, sharing the costs and 
benefits of electricity production and delivery among the multiple stakeholders is 
essential to promote the efficient use of available resources and the acceptance of 
public policies like market integration and decarbonisation. Finally, solidarity beyond 
costs and benefits is needed when abnormal conditions materialise, when usual 
coordination and sharing mechanisms no longer apply, and continuity of supply 
becomes the main concern. 
Chapters 2 and 3 confirm the need to adequately consider the three missing pillars 
and to adopt clear and coherent decisions. This is achieved by providing an 
extensive check-list of 12 critical issues that may represent just as many ‘blocking 
factors’ to the integration and decarbonisation of the electricity industry in Europe. In 
particular, Chapter 2 delineates eight problems strictly related to the issue of 
coordination. They are:  
1) Lack of comprehensive coordination of system planning; 
                                            
1 The authors would like to thank the support of three European transmission system operators (APG, 
TenneT and Swissgrid). They would also thank them for the fruitful and free exchange of views on the 
issues addressed by this report. 
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2) Lack of comprehensive coordination of cross-border investments; 
3) Lack of comprehensive coordination of system operation; 
4) Lack of a common redispatching approach; 
5) Lack of a common reserve contracting and cost allocation; 
6) No intraday cross-border allocation with auctions; 
7) Lack of harmonised load shedding coordination; 
8) Lack of comprehensive coordination for solidarity. 
Chapter 3 presents four barriers related to the issue of harmonisation. They are: 
1) No harmonisation of congestion rent allocation schemes; 
2) Lack of harmonisation of capacity remuneration mechanisms; 
3) Absence of transmission tariffs harmonisation across European countries; 
4) Lack of harmonisation of ‘State aid’ to large energy consumers. 
On some of these 12 critical issues, Europe is moving forward, while on others it is 
not. Indeed, the massive deployment of renewables and the overall impressive wave 
of technological innovation in ICT (digitalisation) are introducing new challenges – 
but also new opportunities – for which prompt policy response is urgent. 
The second part of the report narrows the focus, offering a detailed analysis of two 
critical issues to illustrate how the methodology developed in the first part concretely 
works and to show how the creation of a seamless European transmission system 
for electricity can be blocked. The two ‘roadblocks’ discussed here are: 
1) Redispatching actions; 
2) Capacity adequacy and crisis management. 
Chapter 4 analyses them, describing the issues at stake, the reasons why they were 
not tackled before and explains why they are currently hampering the process of 
Europeanisation. 
First, redispatching actions are implemented by TSOs following market closure to 
relieve network congestions and ensure that the outcome of market transactions is 
compatible with the secure operation of the system. The fast deployment of RES and 
the growth of trade in electricity across borders over the last few years have 
increased the need for TSOs to implement redispatching actions and the 
corresponding costs. The lack of a common definition and actual data on costs, the 
potential redistributive impact of any allocative mechanism and the national liability of 
each TSO make the development of proper sharing mechanisms a sensitive topic. In 
turn, this slows down the development of coordination and cooperation of TSOs on 
redispatching actions and the optimal operation of the European interconnected 
system. 
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Second, the assessment of capacity adequacy and the management of ‘electricity 
crises’ are affected by the progressive deployment of variable renewable energy 
sources and by the growing interdependence among strongly interconnected power 
systems where Member States retain the right to choose their energy mix. Targeted 
adequacy policies adopted at national level run the risk of distorting the internal 
market and ‘picking the winner’ in the investment process. Similarly, the national 
responsibility of each TSO for the continuity of supply in its own country and, at 
times, national distrust in neighbours explain why solidarity, although most needed, 
is not always shown during emergency situations and ex-ante rules for that are not in 
place.  
Looking at the two roadblocks through the lens of the three core missing pillars, 
Chapter 5 takes an additional step and suggests a set of seven concrete 
recommendations illustrating how the methodology proposed in the report could help 
to unlock the situation. Three suggestions target the removal of the roadblock 
attached to redispatching actions, while the remaining four target the one attached to 
capacity adequacy and crisis management. 
 
----------------------------------------------  Nota Bene  ------------------------------------------------ 
The proposed recommendations do not pretend to offer a fully-fledged roadmap or a 
comprehensive set of technical solutions to the two critical issues. Their more 
modest but fundamental goal is to show the necessity and the utility of framing any 
of the problems blocking the integration of the European electricity system in terms 
of (i) coordination, (ii) sharing and (iii) solidarity. Fundamental questions on roles, 
tasks and liabilities must be addressed first. Technical solutions, coherent with the 
answers provided to these fundamental questions, can be properly identified only at 
a later stage. 
In the context of the current discussion on the legislative proposals presented by the 
European Commission in late 2016, different Member States, industry stakeholders 
and the society at large can have alternative and even opposing views on how to 
address the critical issues and the roadblocks defined in the report. Depending on 
their understanding of such a complex thread of interrelated problems and their 
specific visions or interests, they can support different solutions. Nevertheless, if they 
all acknowledge the necessity to address, in their proposals, the missing pillars and 
provide a clear answer to the basic issues of coordination, sharing and solidarity, 
then concrete progress in the integration of the electricity system will be possible to 











January 2017 will be remembered as one of the coldest months in the recent history 
of Europe. Even if not as low as those recorded in February 2012, temperatures 
were from five to ten degrees below the historical average. Rivers in Central Europe 
were frozen and snow fell heavily in Istanbul and South East Europe. 
Electricity consumption skyrocketed, especially in countries like France that deeply 
rely upon it for heating households and offices. Despite general discussions of 
overcapacity in electricity, available generation in Europe was rather limited in those 
weeks for several reasons: low hydropower capacity due to frozen rivers and empty 
reservoirs, lack of wind and short sunny days, exceptional maintenance and security 
checks on some French nuclear reactors. 
The overall supply and demand balance was tight in many European power systems. 
On 11 January RTE, the French Transmission System Operator (TSO), announced 
that demand could exceed domestic supply and import capacity during the following 
week: emergency actions like load shedding could not be excluded. The situation in 
Belgium and Italy was not much better. 
At the same time, the Romanian government introduced emergency measures, 
allowing the curtailment of electricity export in case of need. Affected by severe 
capacity shortages, Bulgaria and Greece imposed reductions in export capacity as 
well. In some areas electric load had to be occasionally shed. 
Citizens and firms in Central West Europe were luckier. Close coordination by the 
respective TSOs and an improvement in weather conditions enabled the system to 
overcome the worst moments without curtailing demand. By the end of the third 
week of January, the tight balance between supply and demand had eased 
somewhat and prices, which had reached record levels in most of the European 
power exchanges, began to decrease. 
What does this story tell us? What can we learn from it? 
It basically tells us that more than 20 years since the beginning of a European 
energy policy – the first Directive on an internal market for electricity was adopted in 
1996 – issues like solidarity, coordination and cost and benefit sharing are still not 
well established in the EU, at least as far as the electricity sector is concerned.  
Solidarity, for instance, is still missing because emergency plans and actions remain 
mainly national in focus. Supply to internal customers is considered to be the priority 
and support is not always provided to neighbours facing hard times. Coordination 
among the different actors of the energy system remains difficult, especially when a 
national border lies between them. 
                                            
2 The authors of the research report would like to thank APG, TenneT and Swissgrid for their support 
and the valuable exchange of views. They would like to thank Anne Marie Kehoe as well, for the 
revision of text and the useful comments on previous drafts. 
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However, coordination is not only missing under exceptional conditions. It is often 
missing under normal conditions as well. Many factors can be blamed for this 
absence: lack of information transparency, poorly defined roles and a lack of general 
rules on how to share costs and benefits.  
The ‘electricity crisis’ of January 2017 teaches us that the risks behind the still 
missing ‘pillars’ of the European edifice are relevant, and not only in narrow 
economic terms. Simply imagine how a blackout affecting several countries arising 
from issues with cross-border coordination can be exploited to negatively fuel the 
current strained debate over the future of Europe. Or the resentment that can arise 
from households left in darkness due to the decision of a neighbouring country to 
curtail cross-border capacity to avoid, during a period of major capacity shortage, 
price spikes in its domestic market. 
* 
This report, building on the results of a previous study,3 aims to analyse the issues of 
coordination, sharing and solidarity in the context of the European electricity sector 
and to provide some concrete recommendations about the necessary short-term 
evolution of the functioning of the European transmission system. 
Our work is divided into two parts, the first of which consists of three chapters, while 
the second of two. 
In Chapter 1, the analytical framework is presented and the issues of coordination, 
sharing and solidarity are described in detail. Looking back at the development of the 
European energy policy, the chapter shows that these three ‘missing pillars’ are 
related to policy questions, sometimes very basic ones, that have not been clearly 
addressed at the appropriate time or not addressed at all in the past two decades. 
Chapters 2 and 3 then provide an overview of 12 ‘blocking factors’, which are 
impeding the integration process, the transition to a low-carbon economy and the full 
embrace of the current digital revolution. Their existence, the chapters show, can be 
mainly explained in terms of the missing pillars presented in Chapter 1. 
Building on this background, the second part of the report zooms in and examines 
two major topics that are particularly relevant in the recent development of the 
European power sector: i) redispatching actions and ii) capacity adequacy and crisis 
management. Chapter 4 provides a description of these ‘roadblocks’ and shows how 
they are the direct consequences of the missing pillars mentioned above. 
Finally, Chapter 5 takes an additional step and suggests a few practical 
recommendations on how to handle and ‘remove’ those roadblocks to further the 
Europeanisation process of the electricity industry. 
* 
                                            
3 Glachant J.M., V. Rious and J. Vasconcelos (2015), A conceptual framework for the evolution of the 
operation and regulation of electricity transmission systems towards a decarbonised and increasingly 
integrated electricity system in the EU, Florence, EUI. 
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The exercise proposed in this study is particularly relevant after the publication of the 
so-called ‘Winter Package’ by the European Commission (EC).4 However, our report 
does not aim to analyse all the numerous proposals put forward by the EC. Its 
purpose is more modest and more fundamental.  
Our work illustrates that the existing EU electricity ‘building’ is still fragile and suffers 
from some weaknesses due to questions that were avoided or not properly 
answered in the past and the ensuing missing pillars of coordination, sharing and 
solidarity. 
Our study shows how this analytical framework concretely works in the case of 
redispatching actions and in that of capacity adequacy and crisis management. It 
offers, for these two specific issues, some coherent recommendations that are not 
technical in nature but rather indications of how to identify and allocate important 
roles and tasks, so that some of the basic, long overdue questions can finally be 
addressed. 
Different stakeholders in or around the power industry and different European 
countries may have alternative and even opposing views on the solutions proposed. 
It is natural in a public debate concerning complex questions, where significant and 
conflicting interests are at stake. However, what the report wants to highlight is the 
relevance of the issues we raised and the need to address these core structural 
failings. If there is a desire to proceed with the Europeanisation of the electricity 
sector, this must be done: by you the readers, by us the Europeans. 
If any practitioner, decision-maker or scholar is particularly keen on this ultimate 
objective, she or he is very welcome to follow in the spirit set out in this report and 
perform a similar exercise on some other important topics that are blocking the 
development of the European power sector. By doing that, she or he will certainly 
feed the debate on the Winter Package and improve the quality of the current policy 
decision-making process. 
* 
A final remark. Our study is quite long and not always easy to read. It is the price to 
pay for a comprehensive view and detailed analysis. However, time-constrained 
readers will get all our main points simply by reading the short executive summaries 
provided at the beginning of each chapter. Each summary, in three minutes reading, 
summarises the key points and conclusions of the respective chapter and gives the 




                                            
4 The official name of the Package published by the EC on 30 November 2016 is “Clean Energy for All 







Part 1 – “Some unanswered questions – too basic or too 
difficult to tackle?” 
 
The ongoing EU ‘energy transition’ requires the electricity industry to simultaneously 
accomplish the supra-national integration of European energy markets and 
contribute to a low-carbon economy, while embracing the current digital revolution.  
As we mentioned in a previous report, “because there are many uncertainties and 
some degrees of freedom as regards policy choices and their implementation, 
diverse future scenarios are conceivable”.5 Consequently, we did not – and we do 
not – suggest or recommend any particular scenario. In place of offering 
recommendations, we provided a conceptual framework, which assessed and 
compared different options, showing the impact of different structural changes upon 
the governance and regulation of electricity systems and markets. In order to enable 
a timely, organised and efficient transition, it is crucial to recognise that “although 
several alternative paths may lead to decarbonisation and integration of present 
electricity systems, each path presents its own governance and regulatory 
challenges and it commands specific actions”6. In other words, the previous report 
stressed that whatever policy and technology choices are made, it is crucial to 
ensure the internal consistency of the selected path, in particular as regards the 
governance architecture and regulatory strategy; otherwise, the energy transition will 
be unnecessarily costly and protracted. 
In the present report, we go beyond the comparative analysis of alternative 
governance and regulatory requirements – we provide more concrete 
recommendations about the necessary short-term evolution of the functioning of the 
European transmission system. These recommendations illustrate that any sound 
way for the EU to progress has to be based, to a large extent, on the critical analysis 
of past failures observed during the transition from national monopolies to liberalised 
and increasingly integrated electricity markets in the EU. 
The failure to provide clear and timely answers to some basic questions is one of the 
reasons why full integration of national EU electricity markets has not yet been 
achieved and large price differences persist across the EU Member States. 
Since the beginning of electricity liberalisation in Europe, some basic questions have 
been persistently avoided. Very often, the explanation given for this attitude was that 
these were too basic questions that markets would solve in the best possible way, 
hence legislative or regulatory interventions were not necessary. 
                                            
5 Glachant J.M., V. Rious and J. Vasconcelos (2015), A conceptual framework for the evolution of the 
operation and regulation of electricity transmission systems towards a decarbonised and increasingly 
integrated electricity system in the EU, Florence, EUI. 
6 Ibid. 
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Twenty-one years after the first Directive on an internal market for electricity, several 
issues remain, which neither the markets nor legislators or regulators have managed 
to resolve. It has had a marked effect upon the completion of the Internal Energy 
Market (IEM) and is making the transition to low-carbon electricity systems more 
difficult and costlier. Therefore, it is imperative to directly and comprehensively 
address these issues and the underlying difficulties and associated implications. This 
is the main aim of the present report. 
In some cases, unanswered questions result from the fact that various roles, 
responsibilities and obligations are not well enough, or even not at all, defined in the 
current legal framework governing the EU electricity market. In the ‘old system’ of 
voluntary agreements among monopolies, roles and responsibilities were a matter of 
gentlemen’s agreement. When the process of liberalisation commenced, these 
agreements were not transposed into law. However, 21 years later, it is crucial to be 
more explicit and lay down the terms of those agreements more transparently in 
legislation.  
There has been much confusion surrounding the functions and responsibilities of 
certain bodies, especially in the past decade. We have seen EU legislators avoiding 
basic political questions, but imposing instead detailed technical solutions that would 
have been better addressed by regulators and system operators, had these political 
questions been answered. We have observed system operators and market 
operators taking decisions that should have been addressed by legislators and 
regulators, because without some of these decisions their operational duties could 
not be properly fulfilled. We have seen regulators forgetting their legal duties to 
promote “a competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable internal market in 
electricity within the Community” and to eliminate “restrictions on trade in electricity 
between Member States, including developing appropriate cross-border transmission 
capacities to meet demand and enhancing the integration of national markets which 
may facilitate electricity flows across the Community”, because they feared negative 
reactions from national consumers, undertakings or politicians.  
As the European Commission recently launched a comprehensive set of legislative 
proposals (“Clean Energy for All Europeans”), it is the right moment to revisit these 
unanswered questions and to consider some possible solutions. This is necessary, 
not just to come closer to a truly Internal Energy Market, which is transparent, 
efficient and reliable, thus fulfilling a long-established political goal, but also in order 
to speed-up the efficient transition towards low-carbon energy systems in the EU.  
The first part of this report provides a short ‘check-list’ of critical issues that should 
be used as a yardstick to assess the usefulness of any legislative proposal aimed at 
answering the fundamental questions and solving the essential problems that have 
hampered the realisation of the Internal Electricity Market. We hope this list helps to 
focus the debate on the most crucial topics, thus avoiding premature discussions 
about important but ‘second-order’ issues, i.e. issues that, from a logical viewpoint, 
should be addressed only after the fundamental questions got a clear answer.  
19 
* 
The ‘unanswered questions’ addressed in this report will be divided into three 
groups, corresponding to three basic concepts: coordination, sharing and solidarity. 
They represent the ‘missing pillars’ of the Internal Energy Market for both electricity 
and natural gas.  
 
Coordination 
Whenever market mechanisms are introduced for the electricity industry, the need 
for new forms of coordination inevitably arises. Whenever a supra-national electricity 
market is established by law in interconnected systems, it becomes necessary to 
coordinate the functioning of the supra-national market. As described in the present 
report, neither of these issues is adequately addressed in present legislation. 
Coordination is critical at two levels: 
1) system planning 
2) market and system operation, in particular as regards: 
− system operation in general; 
− remedies policy in general and redispatching in particular; 
− reserve contracting (and cost allocation procedures); 
− intraday auction-based cross-border allocation; 
− load shedding. 
Although important progress has been achieved, namely as regards the coordination 
of system planning and of system operation under normal conditions, it is urgent to 




The design of coordination schemes for normal market conditions involves choices 
about how to share costs and benefits on a permanent basis. Sharing requires, first 
of all, a clear identification of purpose (‘where the system should go’ in terms of 
increased efficiency, expansion, adaptation to new policy goals, etc.), followed by a 
clear identification of costs (including rents, the ‘cost of non-Europe’, etc.). It is only 
afterwards that meaningful and coherent economic signals can be designed. 
Cost allocation and incentive design may be based upon sophisticated scientific 
principles and complex software tools. However, this regulatory paraphernalia should 
not work against the legal and political principle of “improving and integrating 
competitive electricity markets in the Community”.7 
Explicit sharing solutions are urgent in several areas, namely:  
                                            
7 Article 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
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− congestion rent allocation; 
− capacity remuneration; 
− remedial actions in general and redispatching in particular. 
 
Solidarity 
Under abnormal market conditions (e.g. when non-EU primary energy suppliers 
interrupt their export flows or when extreme weather conditions cause massive 
outages in a given area), special coordination mechanisms are needed. In these 
circumstances, burden (and benefit) sharing procedures usually derogate from the 
standard rules; continuity of supply is then the main concern. However, for the 
effective functioning of systems and markets, it is necessary to establish ex-ante 
how to operate the system and how to share costs and benefits during the transient 
period. The general principle of ‘solidarity’, enshrined in the EU Treaty and in EU 




Chapter 1 – Overview 
 
Executive Summary 
In the last 25 years, the European Union has embarked on a transition from national, 
publicly owned electric monopolies to liberalised and increasingly integrated 
electricity markets. However, since the beginning of this long journey some basic 
questions have been persistently avoided by policy-makers or have received mainly 
partial and untimely answers. The failure to properly address these issues has meant 
that some of the building blocks to the Europeanisation of the electricity industry are 
still missing. In turn, this has slowed down the completion of the Internal Energy 
Market and is making the drive towards a low-carbon economy more difficult and 
expensive.  
The first chapter of the report sets out the analytical framework and the context of 
the research. In particular, it identifies and describes three core missing pillars: i) 
coordination of actions and decisions; ii) sharing of costs and benefits; and iii) 
solidarity beyond costs and benefits (a list of 12 blocking factors will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters). 
First, coordination in the electricity industry is required to achieve consistent 
infrastructure development, reliable system operation, and efficient commercial 
transactions. Each of these three major objectives are interdependent, requiring a 
holistic analysis of the specific coordination mechanisms to adopt among the 
different available possibilities.  
In the 1990s, the transition to liberalised national markets and their integration at 
supra-national level called for the revision of the existing solutions and, in some 
cases, for their adjustment or outright substitution. Unfortunately, EU legislation 
provided little or no concrete guidance for the definition of new coordination 
mechanisms. Member States adopted different market models, while TSOs and 
market operators carried on with legacy contracts or initiated new ad hoc bilateral 
transactions. Old rules were adapted in a piecemeal way, mainly on a voluntary 
basis. ‘Bottom up’ initiatives, like that of market coupling, tackled only partially and 
slowly the fragmented landscape which had emerged from the misapplication of the 
subsidiarity principle and the underestimation of the relevance of coordination. 
Recently, some important issues have been addressed through Commission 
Regulations. This represents a step forward, but it will not be enough to achieve the 
necessary degree of coordination mentioned above. 
Second, sharing costs and benefits is essential and is not a trivial problem in real 
world electricity systems and markets. Limited resources, like the capacity of 
congested transmission lines, must be allocated to the different network users. 
Actors responsible for the provision of public goods, such as frequency regulation 
and voltage support, must be identified and remunerated. In general, appropriate 
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incentives and penalties are necessary to promote the efficient use of available 
resources and the effective achievement of public goals. 
The liberalisation and the integration of electricity markets launched in the 1990s, 
together with the energy transition pursued since the end of the 2000s, called for 
clear decisions on how to share the profits and the costs of cooperation. This did not 
always occur, because clear decisions would have required the identification of 
legitimate winners and losers among different categories of market actors and 
network users, and among different Member States. Regrettably, the reluctance to 
openly discuss redistributive principles often slowed down the decision-making 
process or led to the adoption of inefficient solutions. 
Lastly, solidarity is a key principle in the European Treaties. Member States are 
supposed to express it to their peers under abnormal conditions, when continuity of 
supply is the main concern and the usual coordination and sharing mechanisms are 
suspended. It requires the ex-ante definition of roles and operational rules for the 
management of emergencies as soon as they materialise. 
After the ‘gas wars’ of the last decade, the importance of solidarity has been 
acknowledged in relation to natural gas, while in the electricity sector it is for the 
moment still a vague reference, lacking concrete substance. The Directive on 
electricity security of supply, drafted after the 2003 Italian blackout, is almost useless 
from a practical point of view and even the current draft of a Network Code on 





This Chapter presents a list of several unanswered questions, describing the 
organisational context and historical perspective through which they must be 
analysed. In some cases, these issues were completely avoided; in other cases, 
insufficient or imperfect answers were provided. These have led to failings which can 
be grouped under three different categories: 
 
1) Coordination 
Whenever market mechanisms are introduced in the electricity industry, the need for 
new forms of coordination inevitably arises. In particular, it is necessary to 
coordinate: 
a) economic transactions and  
b) market operation with system operation. 
Furthermore, it becomes necessary to review the way technical coordination (i.e. 
system operation) is performed. 
On the other hand, whenever a supra-national electricity market is established by 
law in interconnected systems, it becomes necessary to coordinate the functioning of 
the supra-national market. Furthermore, it becomes necessary to review the way 
technical cooperation among the interconnected Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs) is performed. 
 
2) Sharing 
The design of coordination schemes for normal market conditions involves choices 
about how to share the costs and benefits on a permanent basis. Distinct choices 
affect Member States and/or particular groups (generators, consumers, network 
operators, etc.) in different ways. Answering these questions related to sharing 
requires the implementation of redistributive actions – someone will ‘give’ and 
someone else will ‘receive’; someone will benefit ‘today’, others ‘tomorrow’; etc. In 
democratic and market-based polities, these choices are based on fundamental 
(economic, ethical, etc.) principles of burden and profit sharing, not on the threat of 
force, arguments of authority or other means of coercion. 
The reluctance to openly discuss these principles and to explicitly address these 
questions means that redistribution has either been done implicitly or it has been 
avoided in order to go ahead, maintaining the status quo. This has been the cause of 
many conflicts, inefficiencies and unfair situations; and it delays the necessary 
adoption of new agreements. 
The question of ‘sharing’ has often been avoided not only at EU level, but also at 
Member State level. Sharing requires, first of all, a clear identification of purpose 
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(‘where the system should go’ in terms of increased efficiency, expansion, adaptation 
to new policy goals, etc.), followed by a clear identification of costs (including rents, 
the ‘cost of non-Europe’, etc.). It is only afterwards that can meaningful and coherent 
economic signals can be designed. 
 
3) Solidarity 
Under abnormal market conditions (e.g. when non-EU primary energy suppliers 
interrupt their export flows or when extreme weather conditions cause massive 
outages in a given area), special coordination mechanisms are needed. Under these 
circumstances, burden (and benefit) sharing procedures usually derogate from the 
standard rules; continuity of supply is then the main concern. However, for the 
successful functioning of systems and markets it is necessary to establish ex-ante 
how to operate the system and how to share costs and benefits during the transient 
period. The general principle of ‘solidarity’, enshrined in the EU Treaty and in EU 
energy legislation, must be translated into very concrete operational procedures. 
 
Each of these three issues – coordination, sharing, and solidarity - are core building 





1.2 The three ‘missing pillars’ 
 
1.2.1 Missing Pillar 1: Coordination in electricity systems 
 
1.2.1.1 Why coordination is important 
Coordination is a prerequisite for the fulfilment of three major objectives: 
− Consistent development of cross-border and national infrastructure 
(networks), i.e. efficient infrastructure investment; 
− Reliable system operation, i.e. the secure and safe use of the available 
infrastructure and other resources; 
− Trade development, i.e. efficient markets. 
These three aspects are not independent: in fact, they build a precedence chain (see 
Fig. 1.1). If electricity could be traded like shares on the stock exchange, without an 
underlying physical network, the space of possible transactions would be 
considerable. However, the physical infrastructure (i.e. topology, transmission 
capacity, electrical and mechanical characteristics of the different components, etc.) 
represents a severe restriction on the way energy can flow in order to be exchanged 
and the system can be safely and reliably operated, when implementing these 
exchange-related flows. System operation is further bound by the location and 
characteristics of generators, consumers and other facilities such as pump storage 
plants. The combined effect of infrastructure and operational restrictions clearly limits 
the type and volume of commercial transactions that can be carried out. Finally, 
market rules themselves may further limit the space of feasible electricity 
transactions (for instance, by giving precedence to power plants based on some 
primary energy sources). 
Because these three ‘spheres’ (infrastructure, system operation, market operation) 
are interrelated, coordination within each sphere should be open to interaction with 
coordination with the other spheres. In other words: although for practical reasons it 
is convenient to treat each of these three forms of coordination separately, from time 
to time (e.g. when considering a substantial market reform) it is useful – even 
indispensable – to look in detail at the whole system dynamics over time, within a 




Fig 1.1: Successive restrictions of the electricity transactions space 
 
1.2.1.2 How coordination can be implemented 
Coordination is always crucial in order to ensure the proper functioning of 
interconnected electricity systems, both at planning and at operational stage.  
At the level of planning, it is obvious that the construction of any cross-border line, as 
well as related infrastructures on both sides of the border, requires coordination 
between the respective TSOs. It is not only rights-of-way and equipment 
specification that must be agreed between the TSOs, but also commissioning 
procedures and the very timing of the project need to be jointly decided by the 
concerned parties. Somehow, cross-border lines must fit within the national 
transmission network expansion plans of the neighbouring countries. Therefore, their 
existence implies a certain degree of network planning coordination between 
countries, also taking into account merchant lines. If the interconnected network is 
supposed to physically support the functioning of a single, supra-national integrated 
electricity market, then all relevant aspects related to the expansion, operation and 
maintenance of cross-border lines should be collectively discussed and agreed by 
the concerned interconnected TSOs. Finally, one should recall that planning means, 
by definition, the coordination of different resources “to achieve or do something”8 – 
not only at EU level, but also at national or local level. 
 
If we now turn to the operational level, four different types of coordination are 
actually required (see Fig. 1.2): 
                                            
8 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/planning. 
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1. Technical coordination between generators (injections) and loads 
(withdrawals), controlling physical flows throughout the whole system – known 
as ‘system operation’; 
2. Commercial coordination between supply and demand, directing financial 
flows – known as ‘market operation’; 
3. Coordination between the technical/physical and the commercial/financial 
processes – i.e. between system operation and market operation; 
4. International coordination among actors from different countries inside an 
interconnected electricity system (international coordination can be organised 
in different ways, corresponding to different types of interaction at each level 
of coordination: technical, commercial and technical/commercial). 
 
 
Fig 1.2: Operational coordination in interconnected electricity systems and markets 
 
There are many different possible ways of organising coordination. We will briefly 
discuss here how international coordination can be arranged. 
If the TSOs of the interconnected system merged into one Single System Operator 
(SSO) and the different existing market operators merged into one Single Market 
Operator (SMO), the outcome would be a situation similar to the one currently 
existing at national level (although in some countries several TSOs coexist). Indeed, 
we will end up with a single system operator and a single market operator throughout 




Fig 1.3: Single Market Operator / Single System Operator 
 
Coordination between system and market operators would be a straightforward 




Fig 1.4: Coordination between SSO and SMO: an iterative process 
 
Another conceivable architecture consists of one Single Market Operator (SMO) 
coexisting with Multiple System Operators (MSOs), as depicted in Fig. 1.5. The 




Fig 1.5: Single Market Operator / Multiple System Operators 
 
In this case, two alternative coordination strategies could be implemented, as 
indicated in Figures 1.6 and 1.7 – respectively, parallel and sequential coordination. 
In the ‘parallel’ case, each system operator interacts bilaterally and simultaneously 
with the single market operator; in the ‘sequential’ case, first there is a horizontal 
coordination process among system operators and then, once their coordination is 
accomplished, a vertical coordination process with the single market operator. In 




Fig 1.6: Parallel coordination 
 
 
Fig 1.7: Sequential coordination 
 
30 
Conversely, it is conceivable to have one Single System Operator (SSO) coexisting 
with Multiple Market Operators (MMOs), as described in Fig. 1.8. 
 
 
Fig 1.8: Single System Operator / Multiple Market Operators 
 
As in the previous case, which was characterised by a single market operator and 
multiple TSOs, both parallel and sequential coordination strategies could be 
implemented between the individual TSO and the many MOs (it suffices to exchange 
the words ‘market’ and ‘system’ in Figures 1.6 and 1.7 above to visualise how they 
would work). 
The present situation in the European Union is not as integrated as the above-
portrayed scenarios. It still corresponds to a very fragmented landscape, with 
numerous national system operators and market operators – see Fig. 1.9. Technical 
and economic concerns vary from country to country and, as George Orwell would 
say, all operators are equal, but some operators are more equal than others. 
 
 
Fig 1.9: Multiple System Operators / Multiple Market Operators 
 
Under the current circumstances in Europe, several coordination strategies are 
possible, combining functional (market/system operation) and geographical 
dimensions according to different sequences. For example, one may give higher 
priority to the geographical (e.g. regional) approach or to the functional (e.g. market 
coupling) method.  
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It should be pointed out that, in the analytical framework of this chapter, ‘market 
operation’, ‘system operation’ and ‘coordination’ are ‘information processing entities’: 
they act basically as algorithms with their associated data inputs and outputs. From 
the point of view of information and complexity analysis, ownership of these entities 
is not the key point. However, while ownership can be irrelevant from the 
computational point of view, it plays a very important role in terms of accountability, 
liability and incentives.  
From the complexity analysis point of view, the ‘two single’ scenario is the ‘best’ one. 
With only one TSO and only one MO, we get the lowest degree of complexity and 
therefore the fastest computational performance. Conversely, the ‘multiple/multiple’ 
scenario, with multiple TSOs and multiple MOs, requires more computational 
resources and, therefore, is slower. Computational time becomes less critical as the 
performance of processors and storage devices increases; however, there is a cost 
factor to be considered and, moreover, the more time that is available for market 
agents and system operators to perform their tasks, the better. In practice, time is 
still very critical for real-time applications, when reliability and control of the 
interconnected system are at stake.  
In summary, Fig 1.10 shows the possible combinations of system and market 
operators. 
 
MMO: Multiple Market Operators MSO: Multiple System Operators 
SMO: Single Market Operator SSO: Single System Operator 




1.2.1.3 The different issues being arranged by coordination 
Coordination in electricity systems and markets deals with four types of issues: 
‘roles’, ‘rules’, ‘infrastructure assets’ and ‘enforcement’: 
1) Roles, clearly defining the rights and duties of each party involved in the 
process: the coordinators, the coordinated and the supervisors/regulators; 
2) Rules, establishing the methods and procedures and implementing the 
corresponding ‘software’ for all forms of agreed coordination, including rules 
for cost and benefit allocation; 
3) Infrastructure assets, providing the necessary ‘hardware’, regarding both 
electrical facilities and the information and communication systems which 
are needed to implement the ‘software’ of the rules (this requires coordinated 
investments and maintenance protocols); 
4) Enforcement, establishing the necessary procedures for monitoring, dispute 
settlement, etc. 
Although coordination is also feasible among heterogeneous parties (for example, 
interconnected transmission networks may exhibit different sizes and voltage 
structures at national level, while coupled wholesale markets may exhibit different 
volumes and numbers of associated agents), a certain degree of harmonisation is in 
principle required. For example: 
1) The harmonisation of gate closure times enables more efficient market 
coordination among coupled markets; different closure times make 
coordination more complex, more expensive and more prone to opportunistic 
behaviour; 
2) Non-harmonised transmission tariffs introduce a certain degree of distortion of 
competition among generators/suppliers located in different countries; 
considerable differences in transmission tariff structures may de facto inhibit 
cross-border trade, hence making the coordination of cross-border trade 
impossible for economic and not for technical reasons. 
The lack of appropriate harmonisation may lead to inefficient and unfair outcomes 
(as in example 1 of gate closures) or even to the disruption of coordination and its 
eventual collapse (as in example 2 of tariffs). Therefore, it may be stated that a 
certain degree of harmonisation is a precondition for coordination – and even for the 
existence of supra-national electricity systems and markets. 
Associated with the coordination issue, two typical harmonisation questions usually 
arise: 
a) What should be harmonised? 
b) To what extent should it be harmonised? 
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In some cases, harmonisation itself may be seen as a form of coordination (e.g. 
harmonising transmission tariffs may be considered as tariff setting coordination 
across several jurisdictions). 
However, different coordination strategies lead to different redistributional effects. 
Different coordination mechanisms imply different ways of sharing costs and benefits 
resulting from the interconnection of national systems and from the coupling of 
national markets. Therefore, the two concepts of ‘coordination’ and ‘sharing’ are 
closely related in actual decision-making.  
In our analysis of these unanswered questions, we distinguish between intrinsic or 
first-order coordination issues (Chapter 2) and more harmonisation-related, second-
order coordination topics (Chapter 3). 
First-order coordination is more focused on procedures, from a technical/functional 
point of view. On the contrary, second-order coordination is more focused on an 
economic point of view. This distinction is useful for a clearer writing of the report 
while real life frequently mixes them up. 
 
1.2.1.4 Operational coordination and liberalisation in the European Union legal 
framework 
Within a vertically integrated monopoly, operational coordination, including all 
relevant aspects, is performed by a single ‘control centre’ (although some functions 
may be delegated to regional centres). Consumers ‘participate’ in system operation 
by switching on and off their devices, but they cannot choose which generator 
supplies them. The control centre decides, taking into account, simultaneously, 
economic and technical criteria.  
In continental Europe, in the old days of national monopolies, international 
coordination of the system operation was performed on a voluntary basis through a 
self-regulated body (UCPTE), set up by the national transmission operators (almost 
all of them part of a vertically integrated undertaking) in 1951.This body defined both 
technical and commercial conditions for cross-border transactions (exclusively 
between national monopolies).9 
Liberalisation introduces a new set of agents free to decide how much, when and 
where to produce, to sell and to buy electricity. However, this commercial freedom 
must remain compatible with the safe and reliable operation of the whole system; in 
some cases, technical constraints may limit the freedom of individual agents. 
Obviously, being more decentralised, with many more players, a liberalised system 
requires more – and more complex – coordination than a vertically integrated 
monopoly. 
                                            
9 A similar voluntary organisation was created in 1963 in the Nordic countries (NORDEL). On the 1st of 
July 2009, all existing European technical coordination associations merged into the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). 
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The first electricity Directive, approved in 1996,10 simultaneously liberalised national 
markets and cross-border trade. However, it did not provide any guidance on 
coordination, leaving it to the Member States to decide how to design and implement 
new coordination mechanisms. All that the Directive offered as practical rules for the 
organisation of the sector were a few vague statements (see Box 1.1). 
As regards cross-border coordination, the Directive just stated, in an incredibly naive 
way, that “the system operator shall provide to the operator of any other system with 
which its system is interconnected sufficient information to ensure the secure and 
efficient operation, coordinated development and interoperability of the 
interconnected system”. 
 
Box 1.1: Common rules for the organisation of the EU electricity industry, 1996 
Directive 
 
− Member States shall ensure, on the basis of their institutional organization and 
with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, that (...) electricity undertakings 
are operated in accordance with the principles of this Directive, with a view to 
achieving a competitive market in electricity, and shall not discriminate between 
these undertakings as regards either rights or obligations. The two approaches to 
system access referred to in Articles 17 and 18 [regulated, negotiated or single 
buyer] must lead to equivalent economic results and hence to a directly 
comparable level of opening-up of markets and to a directly comparable degree 
of access to electricity markets. 
− Member States shall ensure that technical rules establishing the minimum 
technical design and operational requirements for the connection to the system of 
generating installations, distribution systems, directly connected consumers' 
equipment, interconnector circuits and direct lines are developed and published. 
These requirements shall ensure the interoperability of systems and shall be 
objective and non-discriminatory. They shall be notified to the Commission (...). 
− The system operator shall be responsible for managing energy flows on the 
system, taking into account exchanges with other interconnected systems. To 
that end, the system operator shall be responsible for ensuring a secure, reliable 
and efficient electricity system and, in that context, for ensuring the availability of 
all necessary ancillary services. 
− The system operator shall not discriminate between system users or classes of 
system users, particularly in favour of its subsidiaries or shareholders. 
− The transmission system operator shall be responsible for dispatching the 
generating installations in its area and for determining the use of interconnectors 
with other systems. 
                                            
10 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, Official Journal, L 27/20, 30 January 
1997. 
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− The dispatching of generating installations and the use of interconnectors shall 
be determined on the basis of criteria which may be approved by the Member 
State and which must be objective, published and applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner which ensures the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. 
They shall take into account the economic precedence of electricity from 
available generating installations of interconnector transfers and the technical 
constraints on the system. 
 
This is a clear case of misapplication of the subsidiarity principle. If there was no 
physical interconnection between electricity systems, each Member State might 
freely define the technical and commercial coordination mechanisms in its own way. 
In an interconnected system, however, cross-border transactions are only possible if 
there is a certain degree of harmonisation of technical and commercial rules among 
Member States. Even worse: in an interconnected system, if a suitable cross-border 
coordination mechanism is not agreed, the decision of one Member State concerning 
its internal coordination mechanisms may have a negative impact upon coordination 
– and performance – in neighbouring systems. 
In interconnected network industries, subsidiarity requires some rules (not all rules!) 
to be collectively established at supra-national level, because that is the only place 
where these rules can be agreed and enforced. Politically and statistically, it is fair to 
state that parallel decisions of individual Member States will not deliver, 
spontaneously, the kind of supra-national coordination that enables the functioning of 
a Single Energy Market. 
For example, if one Member State sets up a mandatory power pool and in one of its 
neighbours the market is exclusively based on bilateral contracts, there is a problem 
of coordination and the outcome will be the absence of cross-border transactions 
until some degree of harmonisation and coordination is achieved (this situation 
happened actually at several EU internal and external borders).  
Managing different forms of coordination with each neighbour is not a very efficient 
way of promoting cross-border trade. Moreover, it creates insurmountable obstacles 
for agents located in different, non-adjacent Member States, wishing to enter into a 
business relationship. The only logical way out of this patchwork jungle is to agree 
on appropriate coordination mechanisms and some degree of harmonisation at 
supra-national level. In interconnected network industries, “due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity” means addressing and explicitly solving, at EU level, issues 
that can only be solved at EU level, not leaving Member States with problems that 
they cannot solve individually.  
The lack of coordination mechanisms in the first European electricity Directive led to 
two parallel movements: 
− At the national level, Member States adopted different market models and 
different coordination mechanisms. A few Member States had liberalised their 
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respective markets before 1996, while in other Member States the Directive 
was transposed with considerable delay and reluctance. In 1998, for instance, 
England was about to abandon the power pool introduced eight years before, 
Spain had just introduced a mandatory power pool, Germany opened the 
market to competition without any regulation or normative market model and 
in France the electricity ancien régime would still last two more years. The 
combined absence of harmonisation and appropriate coordination created 15 
parallel national markets (this number obviously increased with the 2004 and 
successive EU enlargements). Each Member State adopted different national 
coordination mechanisms, according to its basic market model choices. 
− At EU level, a certain void was created, since the old UCPTE rules were not 
compatible with liberalised markets and no new rules had been enforced – not 
even designed! Legacy contracts were further carried out, some new bilateral 
ad hoc transactions were initiated and transmission network operators 
succeeded in ‘keeping the lights on’, adapting the old rules in a piecemeal, 
‘pragmatic’ manner and keeping their communication channels and 
coordination procedures in place as long as these were not challenged by 
regulation or the courts. A few market operators took the lead in promoting 
‘market coupling’ in their realm through voluntary agreements and received 
support from TSOs, regulators and the European Commission. 
The ‘operational coordination’ issue was not properly addressed by EU legislation for 
twenty years, i.e. until 2015. It is the ‘Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 
July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion 
management’ which established the foundations.11 Until then, it was mainly a non-
regulated, contractual TSO relationship. 
The 2009 ‘Third Energy Package’ was more concerned with breaking coordination 
within vertically integrated undertakings through ‘unbundling’ than about the design 
and enforcement of suitable new forms of coordination among TSOs and market 
operators, as revealed by the following statement: 
“Without effective separation of networks from activities of generation and supply 
(effective unbundling), there is an inherent risk of discrimination not only in the 
operation of the network but also in the incentives for vertically integrated 
undertakings to invest adequately in their networks”.12 
As regards operational coordination, the 2009 electricity Directive maintains the 
same laissez-faire approach of the 1996 Directive. Each TSO is responsible for 
“managing electricity flows on the system, taking into account exchanges with other 
interconnected systems” and for “providing to the operator of any other system with 
which its system is interconnected sufficient information to ensure the secure and 
                                            
11 Official Journal, L 197/24, 25 July 2015. 
12 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, Official 
Journal, L 211/55, 14 August 2009. 
37 
efficient operation, coordinated development and interoperability of the 
interconnected system”. The word ‘coordination’ never appears – although the 
Directive devotes one full article with 623 words to the “Independence of the staff 
and the management of the transmission system operator” and an even longer 
article to the “Compliance programme and compliance officer”. 
The lack of importance attached to operational coordination by the 2009 electricity 
Directive is further highlighted by the description of the relevant tasks assigned to the 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs): “eliminating restrictions on trade in electricity 
between Member States, including developing appropriate cross-border transmission 
capacities to meet demand and enhancing the integration of national markets which 
may facilitate electricity flows across the Community”. 
Trade is here related to investments in cross-border capacity and to market 
integration, but the crucial role of operational coordination as the basic enabler of 
efficient trade is completely overlooked. 
In fact, the 2009 Directive implicitly acknowledges the importance of operational 
coordination, but it decides not to address the subject, leaving it entirely to TSOs and 
NRAs, without providing any specific guidance: 
“Regulatory authorities shall cooperate at least at a regional level to:  
(a) foster the creation of operational arrangements in order to enable an optimal 
management of the network, promote joint electricity exchanges and the allocation of 
cross-border capacity, and to enable an adequate level of interconnection capacity, 
including through new interconnection, within the region and between regions to 
allow for development of effective competition and improvement of security of 
supply, without discriminating between supply undertakings in different Member 
States; 
(b) coordinate the development of all network codes for the relevant transmission 
system operators and other market actors; and 
(c) coordinate the development of the rules governing the management of 
congestion”. 
It is remarkable that the Directive is so concerned and so prescriptive about the 
independence of TSOs’ staff and, at the same time, so unconcerned about the 
crucial issue of operational arrangements that decisively influence the whole EU 
market architecture and exhibit a larger potential for discrimination. 
The 2009 European electricity Regulation follows the same light approach on 
operational coordination, although it provides more guidance to TSOs than the 
Directive.13 In particular, the Regulation establishes that: 
“The ENTSO for Electricity shall adopt:  
                                            
13 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, Official Journal, L 211/15, 14 August 2009. 
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(a) common network operation tools to ensure coordination of network operation in 
normal and emergency conditions, including a common incidents classification scale, 
and research plans”. 
This is the only place, in all current primary EU electricity legislation, where explicit 
reference to the coordination of network operation is made. However, nothing is said 
about the substance of such cooperation, nor about the relationship between 
network operation and market operation. 
The 2009 Regulation also defined the procedures for the preparation and approval of 
a new set of Network Codes. These documents “shall be developed for cross-border 
network issues and market integration issues and shall be without prejudice to the 
Member States’ right to establish national network codes which do not affect cross-
border trade”. 
Annex I of the 2009 Regulation (Guidelines on the management and allocation of 
available transfer capacity of interconnections between national systems) devotes 
several paragraphs to coordination. Although in this context ‘coordination’ is mainly 
seen as a means to determine and to allocate interconnection capacities, it is also 
recognised that coordination needs to go beyond that narrow scope:  
“With a view to promoting fair and efficient competition and cross-border trade, 
coordination between TSOs within the regions set out in point 3.2 shall include all the 
steps from capacity calculation and optimisation of allocation to secure operation of 
the network, with clear assignments of responsibility. Such coordination shall 
include, in particular:  
(a) the use of a common transmission model dealing efficiently with interdependent 
physical loop-flows and having regard to discrepancies between physical and 
commercial flows,  
(b) allocation and nomination of capacity to deal efficiently with interdependent 
physical loop-flows, 
(c) identical obligations on capacity holders to provide information on their intended 
use of the capacity, i.e. nomination of capacity (for explicit auctions), 
(d) identical timeframes and closing times, 
(e) identical structure for the allocation of capacity among different timeframes (for 
example, 1 day, 3 hours, 1 week, etc.) and in terms of blocks of capacity sold 
(amount of power in MW, MWh, etc.), 
(f) consistent contractual framework with market participants, 
(g) verification of flows to comply with the network security requirements for 
operational planning and for real-time operation, 
(h) accounting and settlement of congestion-management actions”. 
In spite of the above-mentioned provisions, which clearly go further than the 2009 
and previous Directives, the 2009 Regulation is still very vague on operational 
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coordination. Proceeding along a line of endless recursions, the 2009 Regulation 
foresees the possibility for the European Commission to issue Guidelines: 
“This Regulation should lay down basic principles with regard to tarification and 
capacity allocation, whilst providing for the adoption of Guidelines detailing further 
relevant principles and methodologies, in order to allow rapid adaptation to changed 
circumstances”.14 
Although this sounds very technical and specifically related to tarification of cross-
border transactions, the 2009 Regulation then establishes in Article 18 that: 
“Where appropriate, Guidelines providing the minimum degree of harmonisation 
required to achieve the aim of this Regulation shall also specify:  
(…) 
(b) details of rules for the trading of electricity”. 
This little, almost unnoticed, opening was in fact used in the Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management to establish the basic structure of a new coordination model 
among market operators and TSOs. These apparently minor and very ‘technical’ 
Guidelines go so far as to create new entities like the ‘market coupling operator’, a 
key actor in the organisation of market coupling, not foreseen in any previous piece 
of legislation. 
From a political point of view, the Commission Regulation, being a delegated act, is 
always weaker than a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
From a legal point of view too, it is a lower-level piece of legislation. Therefore, it is 
surprising – and questionable – that one of the most important cornerstones of the 
Internal Energy Market was produced so late and only through the most obscure and 
opaque of all the EU decision-making procedures, the so-called ‘Comitology’, as a 
Commission Regulation. 
On the one hand, it is very positive to have, at last, effective coordination rules 
clearly defined in a piece of EU legislation which are being implemented, 
independently of their legislative ‘status’. On the other hand, however, the 2015 
Commission Regulation does not address some key issues and it introduces new, 
difficult problems, namely as regards governance. And it is doubtful that this 
document has the political and legal force to provide the most suitable solutions. 
One of the most delicate problems is the coordination between market operators and 
system operators. The proposal submitted by market operators to regulators in April 
2016,15 specifying how to jointly set up and perform the Market Coupling Operator 
(MCO) function (the ‘MCO Plan’) deserved criticism and a ‘request for amendment’ 
                                            
14 Ibid., Whereas 10. 
15 See the All NEMO proposal for the MCO Plan, 14 April 2016, available on the Ofgem website. 
NEMOs are the Nominated Electricity Market Operators according to Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 
2015/1222. 
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by regulators.16 TSOs were sceptical as well.17 In diplomatic language, TSOs rightly 
pointed out that trying to fix the broad EU coordination problem through the narrow 
angle of cross-border capacity allocation is a fundamental mistake:18 
“Developing, operating, and governing market coupling is a highly complex task at 
the heart of cross-border trade and capacity allocation. Even more, market coupling 
is an essential infrastructure for wholesale market functioning as well as for system 
operation and ultimately for security of supply. As markets integrate further and 
move closer to real time, there is an increasing need for TSOs to get involved in how 
power exchanges design and operate market coupling operation functions”. 
In the meantime, market operators enhanced their organisation at EU level, creating 
a new body, predestined to play an increasingly important role in the construction of 
the IEM.19 Because EU legislators did not want to explicitly address ex-ante the key 
coordination question and the related governance issues, a solution must be 
engineered ex-post. Given the intricate nature of the current legal and decision-
making framework, the quality of the outcome is far from guaranteed.  
 
1.2.2 Missing Pillar 2: Sharing 
Coordination mechanisms – of all sorts: planning/investment, system operation, 
market operation, and system/market interaction – inevitably lead to choices about 
how to share (future or already available) resources. 
In the planning phase, public policies, market needs and security of supply concerns 
must be taken into account (see Fig. 1.11). These inputs, together with some internal 
planning criteria, such as reliability standards, adequacy level and efficiency 
indicators, provide the necessary ingredients for infrastructure (and in particular 
network) planning.  
Any network plan encloses a large number of trade-offs among diverse, and 
sometimes contradictory, goals, as it organises a comprehensive set of resources 
and processes necessary to achieve these desired goals. If this network is 
interconnected with other networks, some degree of planning coordination among 
the respective planning bodies is necessary, for obvious reasons; this may require 
further trade-offs. Besides dealing with all these inevitable, more or less explicit 
trade-offs, network planning must also cope with several uncertainties like demand 
growth and the location of new generating units. 
                                            
16 See the Request for amendment by all NRAs agreed at the energy regulators’ forum on all NEMOs’ 
proposal for the plan on joint performance of MCO functions (MCO Plan), 26 September 2016, 
available on the Ofgem website. 
17 ENTSO-E, Governance of the market coupling operation functions transmission system operators’ 
perspective, July 2016, available on the ENTSO-E website. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The NEMO Committee has been established to manage joint responsibilities of NEMOs under 
CACM. See the joint press release on the Epexspot website. 
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Once a network plan is approved, it needs to be implemented through appropriate 
investments. The resulting network provides the necessary physical resources to 




Fig 1.11: Schematic description of network planning 
 
In the ideal world of perfect planning, absolute certainty and flawless networks, it 
would be relatively easy to share the available network assets among all network 
users in a perfectly efficient and fair way. However, in the real and imperfect world it 
is more difficult to ensure efficiency and fairness to all network users, at all times. 
The compound effect of planning mistakes and unintended consequences, 
unexpected delays and uncertainties create situations where some network users 
are better off than others and situations where inefficiency is persistent. Under these 
circumstances, sharing the available network resources, i.e. allocating costs and 
benefits to different network users, becomes a less trivial regulatory problem. The 
definition of appropriate incentives or penalties to be applied to network owners and 
operators is another key, but hard regulatory challenge. 
Once a network is built, it must be operated. System operation takes into account 
two different kinds of inputs: 
− Market requirements, i.e. a description of what all market agents want to do 
and how their transactions impact upon (are mapped onto) the network; 
− Regulatory constraints, i.e. rules imposed by legislation and/or sector 
regulation such as giving priority dispatch to power plants using some types of 
primary energy. 
Basically, system operation is an attempt to fulfil market requirements while 
respecting regulatory constraints, as well as the intrinsic, physical network 
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constraints. System operation transforms a passive set of physical resources (lines, 
cables, substations, etc.) into an active system that enables the continuous 
performance of successive electricity transactions among network users.  
The use of the network is associated with four main technical electricity 
characteristics (see Fig. 1.12):  
− Capacity, available transmission volume (global and at each network branch) 
changes according to different use patterns by generators and loads; 
− Frequency, frequency of the electrical current must be kept within very strict 
limits around 50 Hz; 
− Voltage, at each network node, voltage must be kept within given limits; 
− Security, to each operating point (characterised by a well-defined set of node 
voltages and power flows) corresponds a certain quantitative degree of 
stability for the electricity system as a whole. 
Three of these electricity characteristics (frequency, voltage and security) are ‘public 
goods’, i.e. they are characteristics of electricity which are non-excludable and non-
rivalrous when being consumed by network users. They are equally available for 
these network users. Capacity, on the other hand, has a different nature. It is a ‘club 
good’, i.e. its consumption by network users is non-rivalrous only up to a point (as 
long as congestion is absent). Capacity is also excludable because if one network 
user – or a limited number of – is/are allowed to take the full capacity of a power line, 




Fig 1.12: Schematic description of network/system operation 
 
As regards the three public goods – frequency, voltage and security – there are two 
main questions that also impact network users: 
− Who should be allowed and who should be obliged to provide the necessary 
‘system services’ (or ‘ancillary services’) that create these public goods? 
− How should those providing the required system services be remunerated? In 
particular, to which extent can/shall a fair remuneration be established 
through market mechanisms? 
As regards capacity, how to share the available transmission capacity among 
network users is a fundamental regulatory challenge in liberalised markets. In 
Europe, as in many other places, the complexity of the problem was too often 
underestimated, in spite of early warnings, such as the paradigmatic position 
expressed by William Hogan from Harvard University in his submission to the US 
Federal regulator FERC in 1991: 
“Of course, it is difficult to separate good access from bad access, or to separate the 
calls for reasonable transmission limitations designed to protect reliability from 
unreasonable barriers designed to protect vested interests. Furthermore, the policy-
makers have heard it all before elsewhere in the defense of heavy regulation and 
limited access in the case of airlines, trains, trucks, telephones, natural gas, and so 
on. The instinct of many reformers is to get the prices right, provide access to the 
transmission system and let the new competitors enter. 
In the broad policy debate, therefore, natural suspicion arises when utility industry 
executives and system operators (the insiders’ insiders) warn of the complexity of 
the transmission grid and the dangers of open access. Pressed by the desire to 
move ahead, it is easy to dismiss the arcane features of transmission grids – 
including loop flow, reactive power compensation, frequency control and contingency 
analyses – as mere operational details. Given the experience in other industries, it is 
tempting to assume that these details can be ignored for purposes of the grand 
policy design. 
In the case of electric power transmission, however, the details do matter and they 
have a potentially dramatic impact on the character of possible reforms. The detail in 
electric power transmission may not be so easy to dismiss – much that seems 
obvious isn’t.(…) 
At a minimum, existing congested transmission systems will complicate the transition 
to a new electricity market. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the transmission 
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grid needs new rules that replace a reliance on the familiar fictions with a respect for 
the unfamiliar facts”.20 
Unfortunately, Bill Hogan’s assumption proved right: details were “ignored for 
purposes of the grand policy design” not only in the USA, but also in Europe and in 
other parts of the world. 
In the European Union, the three founders of European energy regulation clearly 
pointed out the importance of operational details shortly after the first energy 
Directives were approved, at the First European Electricity Regulation Forum, in 
Florence. The importance of coordination and fair sharing of costs and benefits was 
also underlined in a joint statement they presented in October 1998, at the Second 
European Electricity Regulation Forum: 
“Although the basic duties of system operators and the way they manage 
transmission networks are the same everywhere, the way system operators interact 
with producers, customers and other agents depends on the organisation of 
electricity trade. Transparency of transmission access, use – including pricing – and 
operation rules is a key factor for the success of the internal electricity market. In 
particular, it is important to have a clear distinction between the following functions 
and their associated costs: 
a) operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system; 
b) technical system co-ordination; 
c) commercial co-ordination”.21 
The same European regulation pioneers even indicated the crucial operational 
details missing in the first electricity Directive: 
                                            
20 Hogan W.W. (1991), Transmission capacity rights for the congested highway: A contract network 
proposal, Testimony submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, available on the 
Harvard website. 
21 This statement was later published in Vasconcelos J., M. Ordóñez and P. Ranci (1999), 




Although significant progress has been achieved on the “use of inter-connectors”, 
first on a voluntary basis (agreement reached at the Florence Forum in early 2000), 
then through the 2003 and 2009 electricity Regulations, and subsequent Network 
Codes, progress on the other topics has been extremely slow: for instance, no 
general solution for cross-border balancing has been implemented yet. 
 
1.2.3 Missing Pillar 3: Solidarity 
In his 2016 ‘State of the Union Address’, President Juncker recalled that “the word 
solidarity appears 16 times in the Treaties which all our Member States agreed and 
ratified”.22 This section investigates the use of ‘solidarity’ in relevant EU energy texts. 
A quick analysis already shows that the concept of solidarity is more applied and 
much more developed in the natural gas industry than in the electricity sector. In 
                                            
22 Junker J.C. (2016), State of the Union 2016, available at the European Union website. 
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electricity, until now, solidarity is just a vague reference lacking operational 
substance. 
 
¤ Third Energy Package 
In the 2009 electricity Directive the word solidarity appears only once, in the 
preamble, related to unbundling: 
“To ensure, in addition, respect for the international obligations of the Community, 
and solidarity and energy security within the Community, the Commission should 
have the right to give an opinion on certification in relation to a transmission system 
owner or a transmission system operator which is controlled by a person or persons 
from a third country or third countries”. 
It the 2009 electricity Regulation the word solidarity does not appear. It also does not 
appear in the twin natural gas Regulation.23 However, it appears seven times in the 
2009 natural gas Directive,24 namely in the preamble and in a dedicated article, 
besides in a reference similar to the one in the preamble of the electricity Directive. 
The gas preamble explains that: 
“In order to contribute to security of supply whilst maintaining a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, notably in the event of an energy supply crisis, it is 
important to provide a framework for regional cooperation in a spirit of solidarity. 
Such cooperation may rely, if Member States so decide, first and foremost on 
market-based mechanisms. Cooperation for the promotion of regional and bilateral 
solidarity should not impose a disproportionate burden on or discriminate between 
market participants”. 
The subsequent Article 6 of the 2009 natural gas Directive reads as follows: 
“Regional solidarity 
1. In order to safeguard a secure supply on the internal market in natural gas, 
Member States shall cooperate in order to promote regional and bilateral solidarity. 
2. Such cooperation shall cover situations resulting or likely to result in the short term 
in a severe disruption of supply affecting a Member State. It shall include:  
(a) coordination of national emergency measures referred to in Article 8 of Council 
Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of 
natural gas supply (1); [OJ L 127, 29.4.2004, p. 92.] 
(b) identification and, where necessary, development or upgrading of electricity and 
natural gas interconnections; and 
                                            
23 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1775/2005, Official Journal, L 211/36, 14 August 2009. 
24 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, Official 
Journal, L 211/94,14 August 2009. 
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(c) conditions and practical modalities for mutual assistance. 
3. The Commission and the other Member States shall be kept informed of such 
cooperation. 
4. The Commission may adopt Guidelines for regional cooperation in a spirit of 
solidarity. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this 
Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 51(3)”. 
 
¤ Energy Security Strategy 
In the 2014 Commission’s Communication on a ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ 
the word solidarity appears 14 times.25 This document recalls that: 
“For most citizens, energy is available ‘on tap’, it is ubiquitous and un-intrusive. This 
has a major influence on the factors that affect national decisions on energy policy, 
with security of supply not being on par with other considerations.  
Nevertheless, in the winters of 2006 and 2009, temporary disruptions of gas supplies 
strongly hit EU citizens in some of the eastern Member States. This was a stark 
‘wake up call’ pointing to the need for a common European energy policy”. 
The document then indicates that:  
“Too often energy security issues are addressed only at a national level without 
taking fully into account the interdependence of Member States. The key to improved 
energy security lies first in a more collective approach through a functioning internal 
market and greater cooperation at regional and European levels, in particular for 
coordinating network developments and opening up markets, and second, in a more 
coherent external action. (…) 
In the long term, the Union's energy security is inseparable from and significantly 
fostered by its need to move to a competitive, low-carbon economy which reduces 
the use of imported fossil fuels”. 
The proposed strategy “is based on eight key pillars that together promote closer 
cooperation beneficial for all Member States while respecting national energy 
choices, and are underpinned by the principle of solidarity”. 
The second pillar of this strategy is labelled “Strengthening emergency/solidarity 
mechanisms including coordination of risk assessments and contingency plans; and 
protecting strategic infrastructure” and its goal is “to ensure that the best possible 
preparation and planning improve resilience to sudden disruptions in energy 
supplies, that strategic infrastructures are protected and that the most vulnerable 
                                            
25 European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on a European Energy Security Strategy, COM(2014) 330 final, Brussels, 28 May 
2014. 
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Member States are collectively supported”. In this context, the Commission 
announced that it would: 
“Propose to Member States and industry new contingency coordination mechanisms 
and plans to deliver energy to countries in times of need, based on risk assessments 
(energy security stress tests). The immediate focus should be on all Member States 
on the eastern border of the EU”. 
 
¤ Energy Union 
As a follow-up to the ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ Communication, but within 
the new Energy Union framework, parallel initiatives on gas and electricity were 
launched. In 2015, the European Commission launched a public consultation on a 
‘new market design’ and, as a complement to it, another public consultation on risk 
preparedness, aimed at exploring the need for a new legal instrument for electricity 
security of supply.26 According to the Commission: 
“A large majority of respondents is in favour of requiring Member States to draw up 
risk preparedness plans, covering results of risk assessments, preventive measures 
as well as measures to be taken in crisis situations. Whilst acknowledging the need 
for a common approach and more regional co-operation, a significant number of 
stakeholders also state that there should be sufficient room for tailor-made, national 
responses to security of supply concerns, as there are substantial differences 
between national electricity systems”. 
As a follow-up to the consultation, the Commission presented, on November 30, 
2016, a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC.27 
In the Communication from the Commission on ‘A Framework Strategy for a 
Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’ (February 
2015) the word solidarity appears eight times.28 In this document, the very first of the 
five dimensions describing the new Energy Union is “Energy security, solidarity and 
trust”. It is because “the spirit of solidarity in energy matters is explicitly mentioned in 
the Treaty and is at the heart of the Energy Union”. Therefore, according to this key 
Energy Union document, “our vision is of an Energy Union where Member States 
see that they depend on each other to deliver secure energy to their citizens, based 
on true solidarity and trust, and of an Energy Union that speaks with one voice in 
                                            
26 Information on the results of the consultation are available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations/public-consultation-risk-preparedness-area-security-
electricity-supply. 
27 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC, COM(2016) 
862 final, Brussels, 30 November 2016. 
28 European Commission (2015), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Investment Bank on a Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015) 80 final, Brussels, 25 February 2015. 
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global affairs”. However, this document does not provide concrete guidance as 
regards electricity; it only mentions that: 
“Member States, transmission system operators, the energy industry and all other 
stakeholders have to work closely together to ensure a high-level of energy security 
for European citizens and companies”. 
In addition, it also recognises that: 
“Many Member States currently have inadequate security of electricity supply 
frameworks in place and they use outdated and inconsistent approaches to 
assessing security of electricity supply. Working together with Member States, the 
Commission will establish a range of acceptable risk levels for supply interruptions, 
and an objective, EU-wide, fact-based security of supply assessment addressing the 
situation in Member States. This will take into account cross-border flows, variable 
renewable production, demand response and storage possibilities. Capacity 
mechanisms should only be developed to address security of supply if a regional 
system adequacy assessment points to such a need, taking into account the 
potential for energy efficiency and demand-side response”. 
 
¤ Security of supply Directives 
The Commission’s preoccupation with security of supply mainly concerns natural 
gas. This is evident now, when comparing the ‘weak’ electricity consultation process 
with the ‘strong’ legislative proposal on the security of gas supply presented by the 
Commission in February 2016.29 To be fair, this difference was already apparent in 
the first security of supply Directives: Directive 2005/89/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 concerning measures to 
safeguard the security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment30 has no 
mention of solidarity, while Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning 
measures to safeguard the security of natural gas supply acknowledges that “The 
establishment of genuine solidarity between Member States in major emergency 
supply situations is essential, even more so as Member States become increasingly 
interdependent regarding security of supply”.31 This Council Directive was replaced 
in 2010 by a Regulation that mentioned the word solidarity 13 times.32 
Directive 2005/89/EC was proposed shortly after the September 28, 2003 blackout 
that left Italy in the dark for several hours. However, the initial proposal presented by 
the European Commission was watered down by the Council to such an extent that 
                                            
29 The word solidarity appears 13 times in the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010, COM(2016) 52 final, Brussels, 16 February 2016. 
30 Official Journal, L 33/22, 4 February 2006. 
31 Official Journal, L 127/92, 29 April 2004. 
32 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 
concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 
2004/67/EC, Official Journal, L 295/1, 12 November 2010. 
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the final product is almost useless, from a practical point of view. In fact, this 
Directive is a mere “framework within which Member States are to define 
transparent, stable and non-discriminatory policies on security of electricity supply 
compatible with the requirements of a competitive internal market for electricity” 
(Article 1.2). Its Article 3.1 recommends that: 
“Member States shall ensure a high level of security of electricity supply by taking 
the necessary measures to facilitate a stable investment climate and by defining the 
roles and responsibilities of competent authorities, including regulatory authorities 
where relevant, and all relevant market actors and publishing information thereon. 
The relevant market actors include, inter alia, transmission and distribution system 
operators, electricity generators, suppliers and final customers”. 
 
¤ Network Codes 
In April 2014, ENTSO-E was mandated to draft the Network Code on Emergency 
and Restoration according to the requirements set out in framework guidelines by 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). The final draft was 
submitted to ACER in March 2015. ACER recommended adoption of this code in 
June 2015. The draft is still awaiting validation by the European Parliament and the 
Council, as per the arcane Comitology procedures.33 This draft Network Code34 lays 
down minimum requirements on the following matters:  
“a) the management of Emergency, Blackout and Restoration States; 
b) the coordination of European system operation in Emergency, Blackout and 
Restoration States in a common and coherent way;  
c) simulations and tests for the purpose of reliable, efficient and fast restoration from 
Emergency or Blackout System States; and 
d) the tools and facilities needed for the purpose of reliable, efficient and fast 
restoration from Emergency or Blackout System States”. 
The word solidarity does not appear in the draft Network Code on Emergency and 
Restoration. The Code also does not contain the words ‘sharing’,35 ‘benefit’, ‘profit’ or 
‘burden’. There is an article on ‘Recovery of Costs’ but all it says is that “The costs 
borne by regulated Network Operators stemming from the obligations laid down in 
this Network Code shall be assessed by the competent regulatory authorities”. 
This Network Code on Emergency and Restoration, although addressing some very 
relevant issues for the proper functioning of the European interconnected electricity 
                                            
33 Information on the validation process of the Network Codes is available on the ENTSO-E website. 
34 https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/Network%20codes%20documents/NC%20ER/150325_ENTSO-
E_NC%20ER_final.pdf. 
35 The word ‘share’ only appears once in the context of frequency management: “During system 
Restoration, each TSO shall identify and monitor: (...) 
b) the TSOs with which it shares a Synchronised Region or Synchronised Regions”. 
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system, clearly does not provide a substantial (or even procedural) operational 




1.3 European blocking factors 
The lack of appropriate, sufficient and explicit coordination, sharing and solidarity 
rules has created many obstacles in the development of the internal energy market 
and it is hindering the transition towards a low-carbon economy. The list of issues 
which are blocking the process is, unfortunately, long and ranges from short-term 
operation to long-term issues; from system operation to grid tariffs, planning and 
building; from mundane day-to-day or intraday to infrequent events or hazards. 
In our report, 12 different blocking factors are analysed. They are grouped into two 
chapters: Chapter 2 deals with inherent coordination problems, while Chapter 3 
addresses topics more related to the lack of harmonisation. 
As explained in Section 1.2.1, both the well-functioning of supra-national markets 
and the reliable operation of interconnected systems require some forms of tight 
coordination among the relevant stakeholders, in particular among TSOs. A certain 
degree of coordination is a necessary pre-condition for the very existence and 
functioning of supra-national infrastructures. Electricity markets too, at any level 
(regional, national or supra-national), also require a certain degree of coordination 
between system and market operation. Obviously, and logically, the functioning of 
supra-national electricity markets requires more extensive and complex types of 
coordination than isolated national markets. 
Effective coordination implies, first of all, sharing responsibilities, agreeing on role 
distribution as well as on common rules. Coordination also implies direct and indirect 
costs: 
− Direct costs are related to the establishment and operation of the associated 
infrastructures. They are both the coordinated infrastructure (e.g. 
interconnectors in interconnected electricity networks) and the coordinating 
infrastructure (e.g. information and communication networks connecting 
system operators in order to enable proper monitoring and control). 
− Indirect costs result from the act of coordination, e.g. coordination between 
market and system operation may lead to the redispatching of some power 
plants with obvious costs for their owners. 
The reluctance to explicitly define comprehensive benefit and cost sharing 
mechanisms, especially as regards indirect costs and benefits, usually leads to 
insufficient or imperfect forms of coordination, thus affecting the respective markets. 
The lack of harmonisation may be the result of insufficient cooperation and 
coordination among the responsible stakeholders. However, unlike the issues to be 
addressed in Chapter 2, the issues to be handled in Chapter 3 are not, per se, 
intrinsic coordination problems. Efficient coordination requires a certain degree of 
harmonisation; however, the need for harmonisation goes beyond coordination 
issues: a well-coordinated system is not necessarily a level playing field. 
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The following tables indicate the blocking factors handled in the coming Chapter 2 
and the following Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 2 – ‘First-order coordination’ blocking factors 
Blocking factor Section 
Lack of comprehensive coordination of system planning, 
further to the TYNDP 
2.1 
Lack of comprehensive coordination of cross-border 
investments 





Lack of a common redispatching approach  
Lack of common reserve contracting and cost allocation 
Lack of intraday cross-border allocation with auction  
Lack of harmonised load shedding coordination 
Lack of comprehensive coordination for Solidarity 2.3 
 
Chapter 3 – ‘Second-order coordination’ blocking factors 
Blocking factor Section 
No harmonisation of common congestion rent allocation 
scheme 
3.1 
No harmonisation of capacity remuneration mechanisms 3.2 
No harmonisation of transmission tariffs across countries and 
TSO zones 
3.3 
No harmonisation of ‘State aid’ to big energy consumers 
(through reduced network tariffs) 
3.4 
 
For each of these issues, we will discuss the following aspects:  
a) Purpose and need for coordination; 
b) Formal process and current status in defining methodologies, codification and 
implementation; 
c) Analysis of probable reasons as to why it took so long to get to the present 
situation and, where applicable, why there is some progress now; 
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d) The focus of current stakeholders in completing and implementing all foreseen 
procedures and methodologies; 
e) Beyond liberalisation and integration, are the implemented/foreseen solutions 









On the basis of the analytical framework developed in Chapter 1, the second chapter 
of the report deals with problems related to coordination. Eight factors which are 
blocking the integration of European electricity systems and the transition to a low-
carbon economy are delineated. 
First, in the past few years, there have been improvements in the level of 
interconnections between national grids, but a lack of comprehensive coordination of 
system planning and a lack of comprehensive coordination of cross-border 
investments are still observable. The Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) 
aims to ensure the necessary transparency regarding the evolution of the entire 
transmission network in Europe. In addition, EU legislation foresees the definition of 
a list of Projects of Common Interest, identified as priority projects benefiting from 
special permitting procedures and funding. ENTSO-E has been committed to the 
TYNDP process and is working on its continuous improvement. However, the current 
coordination mechanisms cannot overcome delays due to lengthy authorisation 
processes or opposition at local level. Clear decisions on how to share 
interconnection costs and benefits are needed. 
Second, the lack of comprehensive coordination of system operation is presently 
detectable. Regional Security Coordinators (RSCs), recently established all over the 
continent, are expected to promote cooperation in system operation, with the TSOs 
remaining in charge of the final decisions and liable towards their NRAs. Significant 
efforts will be required in the next years to align national legislation and fully develop 
RSCs’ functionalities and governance. 
Additionally, the lack of a common redispatching approach is leading to the 
fragmentation of the electricity markets at the closing loop. At present, remedial 
measures like redispatching are taken mainly on the grounds of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements that often rest on oversimplified cost sharing principles and 
insufficient data exchange. Unfair and inefficient decisions are frequently the result, 
while congestions on transmission lines are sometimes pushed to the national 
borders. The CACM Commission Regulation aims to overcome these problems by 
establishing clear rules but, for the moment, fragmentation and inefficiencies are still 
visible. 
In the meantime, the lack of common reserve contracting and cost allocation is 
increasing the burden for the TSOs to procure spinning reserve and other ancillary 
services. To date, progress in the integration of electricity balancing markets has 
been limited due to both the wide array of solutions adopted in the past at national 
level and the importance of balancing arrangements for security of supply. A 
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Commission Regulation is expected to be issued in 2017, but no common model for 
the procurement of ancillary services, possibly open to the participation of demand 
resources, has emerged yet. 
Currently, there is no intraday cross-border allocation with auctions. Indeed, there is 
still no consensus on the way to design intraday markets and the XBID Project has 
not been implemented yet, due to the complexity of developing an IT platform that 
links several markets and allows trading up to one hour before real time. 
The EU also suffers from the lack of harmonised load shedding coordination. The 
drafted Network Code on emergency and restoration aims to establish a formal 
framework and general principles. Participation of demand side resources should be 
considered and explicit choices should be taken on how to share the costs and how 
to deal with the consequences of load shedding. Clear ex-ante rules are much 
needed. 
Finally, there is a lack of comprehensive coordination for solidarity, which may limit 
the possibility for the whole system to deal with exceptional events threatening 
energy supply. In the past, European TSOs usually showed solidarity with each other 
and ensured an effective and strong level of coordination, but that happened mainly 
on a voluntary basis. The drafted Network Code on emergency and restoration 
establishes procedures to be applied in states of emergency, blackout and 
restoration, directly calling for a duty to support neighbouring systems in difficulty. 
Nevertheless, no concrete solidarity mechanism or any explicit ex-ante guidance on 




2.1 System planning 
Since the electricity systems are supposed to serve one single supra-national 
electricity market, their planning must be well coordinated – much more coordinated 
now than in the past, when interconnections were just seen as a means to enhance 
overall reliability and explore bilateral complementarities.  
 
2.1.1 Purpose and need for coordination 
If enough interconnection capacity were available, liberalisation would have led to a 
reasonable degree of ‘price convergence’ (if not a single wholesale price across the 
entire EU, at least small differences between price zones). Unfortunately, 21 years 
after the first electricity Directive, we are still very far from price convergence, as the 
figure below clearly shows,36 and regulators point out that “in recent years, despite 
investments in the transmission networks and some improvements in capacity 
calculation methods, the volume of tradable cross-zonal capacities in the EU and 
Norway has remained relatively limited”.37 
 
 
Fig 2.1: Day-ahead wholesale electricity prices in seven European markets (2008 – 2015) 
 
If markets and regulation had worked as expected, new transmission capacity, both 
internal and cross-border, should have been built in order to enable more trade 
across the EU. However, this did not happen, as Fig. 2.2 and 2.3 clearly illustrate. 
 
                                            
36 ACER/CEER (2016), Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity Markets in 
2015, p. 7. 
37 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Fig 2.2: 220 kV circuit length variation in selected countries where data is available 
(2000 – 2015). Source: ENTSO-E 
 
 
Fig 2.3: 400 kV circuit length variation in selected countries where data is available 
(2000 – 2015). Source: ENTSO-E 
 
Beyond market integration, interconnection capacity also contributes to increase 
security of supply. Two blocking factors were identified on reaching the necessary 
interconnection capacity:  
1) The lack of comprehensive coordination of system planning, further to the Ten 
Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP), prepared by the ENTSO for 
electricity; and 
2) The lack of comprehensive coordination of cross-border investments. 
In order to better understand these two issues, a description is provided in the 
following sections of how system planning is performed in Europe and which levels 
of coordination currently exist, both for planning and for investment. 
 
2.1.2 System planning in Europe 
System planning is a central task of all TSOs in Europe. Studies conducted by 
national TSOs identify the necessary reinforcements to provide adequate 
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fulfilling a set of planning criteria and rules that are applicable and established at 
national level. At this stage, the analysis of possible cross-border impacts is usually 
coordinated with neighbouring systems.  
The Nordic countries38 provide an example where systemic coordinated planning 
among the involved TSOs from a regional perspective has a long tradition, all 
following agreed planning rules and methodologies, within a clear mandate from 
governments and in close cooperation with a well-established regional market. 
However, to ensure the optimal management of the European interconnected 
electricity system and the development of an efficient internal, supra-national 
electricity market, which takes into account European policies on decarbonisation, 
tight coordination needs to be implemented at a full European scale and not just at 
the bilateral or regional level. 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 laid the foundations for EU-wide network planning 
coordination. It established the creation of the ENTSO for Electricity and assigned to 
it, as one of its core tasks, the adoption of “a non-binding Community-wide ten-year 
network development plan (Community-wide network development plan), including a 
European generation adequacy outlook, every two years” (Art. 8). This “Community-
wide network development plan shall include the modelling of the integrated network, 
scenario development, a European generation adequacy outlook and an assessment 
of the resilience of the system”. 
This ten-year network development plan (TYNDP) ensures the necessary 
transparency regarding the evolution of the entire electricity transmission network in 
the EU. It should be also underlined that the TYNDP is associated with a European 
adequacy outlook that, “shall build on national generation adequacy outlooks 
prepared by each individual transmission system operator”. 
According to the 2009 electricity Regulation, 
“The Community-wide network development plan shall, in particular: 
(a) build on national investment plans, taking into account regional investment 
plans as referred to in Article 12(1), and, if appropriate, Community aspects of 
network planning including the guidelines for trans-European energy networks 
in accordance with Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (OJ L 262, 22.9.2006, p. 1.); 
(b) regarding cross-border interconnections, also build on the reasonable needs 
of different system users and integrate long-term commitments from investors 
referred to in Article 8 and Articles 13 and 22 of Directive 2009/72/EC; and 
(c) identify investment gaps, notably with respect to cross-border capacities”. 
Four years later, in the 2013 Regulation on guidelines for trans-European energy 
infrastructure, strong doubts were expressed about the effectiveness of the TYNDP 
and associated mechanisms to deliver the necessary interconnection capacity: 
                                            
38 These countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
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“Despite the fact that Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity (2) and Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural 
gas (3) provide for an internal market in energy, the market remains fragmented due 
to insufficient interconnections between national energy networks and to the 
suboptimal utilisation of existing energy infrastructure. However, Union-wide 
integrated networks and deployment of smart grids are vital for ensuring a 
competitive and properly functioning integrated market, for achieving an optimal 
utilisation of energy infrastructure, for increased energy efficiency and integration of 
distributed renewable energy sources and for promoting growth, employment and 
sustainable development”.39 
However, instead of reinforcing the existing mechanisms within the existing 
governance structure, that Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 introduces a new concept, 
the Projects of Common Interest (PCIs), and proudly creates a new, parallel 
governance structure, the twelve Regional Groups. It also makes its supremacy 
clear: 
“Projects of common interest included on the Union list pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
this Article shall become an integral part of the relevant regional investment plans 
under Article 12 of Regulations (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 and of the 
relevant national 10-year network development plans under Article 22 of Directives 
2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC and other national infrastructure plans concerned, as 
appropriate. Those projects shall be conferred the highest possible priority within 
each of those plans”.40 
In order to ensure some coherence within a transparent framework, the 2013 
Regulation assigned to ENTSO-E the responsibility for establishing “methodologies, 
including on network and market modelling, for a harmonised energy system-wide 
cost-benefit analysis at Union level for projects of common interest”, to be used also 
in the biennial TYNDP, thus allowing a transparent and objective comparison of the 
projects of common interest. 
In Spring 2014, the European Commission recognised that: 
“Europe needs to achieve a better functioning and a more integrated energy market. 
Priority projects should be accelerated to join up existing energy islands and ensure 
delivery of the existing interconnection target of at least 10% of the installed 
                                            
39 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on 
guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and 
amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009, Official Journal, 
L 115/39, 25 April 2013. 
40 Ibid. 
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electricity production capacity by 2020. By 2030, Member States should be on track 
to meet a 15% interconnection target”.41 
In the meantime, these quantitative interconnection targets have been endorsed by 
the European Council (October 2014).  
The following figure describes the relationship among different tools of network 
planning and investment coordination in the EU. 
 
 
Fig 2.4: European planning coordination from national development plans to projects 
of common interest 
 
2.1.3 Current status in Europe 
This Section describes the evolution of coordinated network planning and investment 
since the creation of ENTSO-E and TYNDP through Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, 
seven years ago. 
 
¤ TYNDP 2010 
The first TYNDP was published in 2010 by ENTSO-E,42 only one year after the 
publication of the 2009 electricity Regulation. This fact clearly showed ENTSO-E’s 
commitment to fulfil the Regulation objectives. TYNDP 2010 was defined as a pilot 
project initiating a learning-by-doing process to prepare the ground for the next 
releases. Some of these building foundations were defined as part of its objectives, 
namely: testing the necessary processes using for the first time Europe-wide 
                                            
41 European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on a European Energy Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 20. 









methodologies and getting feedback from stakeholders regarding content and future 
collaboration. 
In general terms, the methodological aspects considered in TYNDP 2010 were 
related to the selection of projects to be included in the plan and how they were 
evaluated based on a selection of foreseen scenarios for given time-scales. 
Additionally, TYNDP 2010 also provided descriptions of future conditions of the 
electricity power system in Europe and the challenges related to the development of 
the transmission network. Those were considered very important recommendations 
from the industry to the EU energy and climate change policy debate. 
For the first time, this network development report provided in a single document the 
most up-to-date information about all major planned or envisaged transmission 
investment projects of European importance as proposed and assembled by national 
TSOs.  
Although evaluations were mainly of descriptive and qualitative nature, TYNDP 2010 
also indicated, for the first time, future methodological needs.  
This report represented an important step towards a new European planning 





Table 2.1: Overview of methodological aspects and principles considered in TYNDP 
2010. Adapted from: “Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2010-2020, ENTSO-E, 
June 2010” 
Topic Description Methodological context 
Included projects Projects proposed by TSOs for inclusion 
Projects background is given on a description of 
investment needs provided by all six TYNDP regional 
groups. The investment needs are sorted into main 
categories which include generation and demand 
evolution, cross-border capacity, reliable grid operation 
and equipment ageing. Subsequently, the projects are 
listed within the context of each regional group. 




(TSOs predict the 
evolution of the 
generation and 
demand based on 
current observations 
and their assessment 
of future evolution) 
Two Generation/Load bottom-up scenarios highlighting 
trends for the coming 5-15 years, with assessment of 
Generation Adequacy and compared to EU 2020 targets. 
The interest of top-down scenarios has been 
demonstrated, highlighting the need for stakeholders’ 
support and cooperation. 
Market studies Not performed 
Market studies are considered necessary in all European 
regions in order to have a global view on the investment 
needs and acquire the necessary input elements for the 
evaluation of the projects. TYNDP 2010 focuses on 
regions and states in which this work has already been 
initiated. 
Network studies Presentation of grid planning principles 
A comprehensive description of the grid planning 
principles commonly used by TSOs is provided in the 
annex to TYNDP 2010. In general terms, this would mean 




First sketch of 
economic analysis 
and criteria for 
prioritisation is 
discussed 
The parameters that the TSOs need to take into account 
in order to accurately assess the socio-economic value of 
an investment are presented. 
Cost-benefit analysis with respect to social welfare is 
performed for every transmission project, but using 
different metrics from country to country, based on the 
respective regulatory regimes and national/regional 
requirements. 
Large-scale market studies are required for a consistent 
assessment of investment needs and provide basic inputs 
to project evaluations. 
Common evaluation criteria for projects of European 




A stakeholder consultation was performed after the first 
draft release to get the feedback from stakeholders on 
contents and future involvement. 
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¤ TYNDP 2012 
TYNDP 2012, the first official network plan, introduced some improvements, namely 
as regards the use of both top-down and bottom-up definition of scenarios. For the 
first time, projects from non ENTSO-E members, so-called third party projects, were 
introduced. The cost benefit analysis of every project was presented through a multi-
criteria assessment scale. 
TYNDP 2012 introduced the monitoring of the TYNDP 2010 projects and this 
practice has been maintained since then in the years between successive TYNDP 
reports. The monitoring exercise, according to the ENTSO-E website, represents “an 
effort to further increase transparency and usability of the TYNDP, and responding to 
the recommendations of ACER (…). The content of the monitoring reports have 
been extended over time. The report publishes quantitative data (e.g. percentage of 
project commissioned / delayed) along with the reasoning for changes in the status 
of projects”.43 
The 2012 report described the need to develop specific top-down coordination 
“relying on common standards and subsidiarity to take advantage of TSOs’ local 
expertise and workforce”. Indeed, several working groups of TSO experts for a total 
of about 200 people across Europe contributed to prepare the TYNDP 2012 
package.44 
The complexity of the first official release demonstrated the need to improve 
background work and some procedures and methods: 
“ENTSO-E is already building on the gathered feedback to strengthen all the 
involved procedures and further improve the methodology implementation. The goal 
is threefold: 
1. To accelerate and strengthen data collection, consistency checks and processing, 
2. to facilitate common model calibration and 
3. to coordinate regional groups, articulate pan-European and regional assessment 
and merge all results consistently”. 
 
  
                                            
43 https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/ten-year-network-development-plan/tyndp-
monitoring/Pages/default.aspx. 
44 TYNDP 2102 Package main contents: TYNDP 2012 report; the six regional investment plans – 
Baltic Sea (NO, SE, DK, FI, EE, LV, LT, PL, DE); Continental South East (HU, SI, RO, RS, BG, MK, 
ME, BA, HR, IT, EL); Continental Central East (AT, HR, CZ, DE, HU, PL, RO, SK, SI); Continental 
South West (FR, PT, ES); Continental Central South (FR, DE, CH, AT, IT, SI); North Sea (IE, NI, GB, 
NO, DK, NL, BE, LU, DE, FR); the Scenario Outlook and Adequacy Forecast (SO&AF) 2012 – 2030. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of methodological aspects and principles considered for TYNDP 
2012. Adapted from: “10-Year Network Development Plan 2012, ENTSO-E, July 
2012” 
Topic Description Methodological context 
Included projects 
Projects proposed by 
TSOs for inclusion 
Third party projects 
(non ENTSO-E 
members) 
The background of the projects is given on a description 
of investment needs provided by all six TYNDP regional 
groups. The investment needs are sorted into main 
categories, which include generation and demand 
evolution, cross-border capacity, reliable grid operation 
and equipment ageing. Subsequently, the projects are 
listed within the context of each regional group. 





The Scenario EU 2020 has been built top-down, based on 
the European 20-20-20 objectives and the NREAPs 2) (it 
is the reference scenario). 
The Scenario SAF-B extrapolates information from market 




The market study 
answers the question 
“which generation 
(location / type) is 
going to serve which 
demand (location)?” 
Based on a 1-node-per country (or price zone) principle 
with simplified transmission capacity limitation modelling 
between the nodes. 
TYNDP 2012 provided the possibility to run in parallel 
several market study tools at regional levels, in order to 
better adapt to the specifics of every region. All 
simulations derived from a single database depicting the 
scenarios to ensure consistency between all six European 
regions. 
Network studies Performed 
Inputs to common network studies are default pan-
European Power Systems Models, where the specific 
generation and load dispatch stemming from the market 
studies is blended. 
Network studies answer the question “will the dispatch of 
generation and load given in every case generated by the 
market study result in power flows that endanger the safe 









Assessment of the grid transfer capability increase is 
provided for every project. 
All other dimensions are assessed via three-level 
indicators: social and economic welfare, RES integration 
and improved security of supply. 
Stakeholder 




¤ TYNDP 2014 
TYNDP 2014 was defined by Regulation 347/2013 as the sole basis for the second 
Union list of PCIs. It maintained the top-down and bottom-up approach in scenario 
definition. A new procedure for the inclusion of third party projects and an improved 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) methodology were included. A monitoring update of 
earlier TYNDP investments was maintained and the Long-Term Network 
Development Stakeholder Group (LTND SG) was established. 
The stronger interaction with stakeholders was added due to the perception of 
“increased relevance in the European energy industry and the need to enhance 
common understanding about the transmission infrastructure in Europe” and the 
need “to create an open and transparent environment in which all involved parties 




Table 2.3: Overview of methodological aspects and principles considered for TYNDP 
2014. Adapted from: “10-Year Network Development Plan 2014, ENTSO-E, July 
2014” 
Topic Description Methodological context 
Included projects 
Projects proposed by 
TSOs for inclusion 
Third party projects. 
New procedure for the inclusion of third party projects. 
Time horizon 2030 
Four Visions for 2030 representing possible extremes of 
the future so that the pathway realised in the future falls 
with a high level of certainty in the range described by the 
Visions.  
Different concept from the 2020 scenarios used in the 
TYNDP 2012; these aimed to estimate the evolution of 
parameters under different assumptions, while the 2030 
Visions are designed to estimate the extreme values 






Two visions build from the bottom-up based on each 
country's energy policy, while the other two visions 
assume a top-down approach, with a more harmonised 
European integration. 
Market studies Pan-European and regional 
Pan-European market studies introduced to improve both 
the scenario building and the assessment of projects. 
They aim to provide the boundary conditions for the 
regional market studies necessary to ensure a consistent 
and harmonised framework for the regional assessment 
of the projects with the CBA methodology. 
Regional market studies deliver bulk power flows and 
pinpoint which specific cases need to be further studied 
via network studies; they also deliver the economic part of 
the CBA assessment. 
Network studies Regional network studies 
Analyse how the grid handles the various cases of 
generation dispatch identified during the regional market 






throughout the whole 
TYNDP 2014 portfolio 
even before the 
validation of the CBA 
methodology end 
2014 
CBA implemented in the TYNDP 2014 for four 2030 
Visions. Goal to have a system wide cost-benefit analysis, 
allowing a homogenous assessment of all TYNDP 
projects and assessment of candidate Projects of 
Common Interest. 









Interactions with stakeholders included in every phase of 
development.  
Long-Term Network Development Stakeholders Group 
(LTND SG), gathering European organisations and 




¤ TYNDP 2016 
TYNDP 2016 placed a focus on common planning studies where interconnection 
targets were agreed. This reinforced the link with Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 in 
terms of identifying “…investment gaps, notably with respect to cross-border 
capacities” and marked a significant step towards comprehensive coordinated 
planning. This release contained the first formal use of the CBA methodology. 
The plan also provided insight into several challenges for the power system in terms 




Table 2.4: Overview of methodological aspects and principles considered for TYNDP 
2016. Adapted from: “10-Year Network Development Plan 2016, ENTSO-E, 
December 2016” 
Topic Description Methodological context 
Included projects 
Projects proposed by 
TSOs for inclusion 
and third party 
projects 
The TYNDP 2016 project list has been set throughout a 
public process from March to October 2016 under the 
aegis of the EC, and the active supervision of the 
NDSG, acting as ethical committee. 
Time horizon 2020 and 2030 
Five scenarios, with four 2030 ‘Visions’ comparable to 
those of the TYNDP 2014 but refocused to the EU 2030 
goals, updated with various evolutions and designed 
with new methodologies; as well as a new 2020 
‘Expected Progress’ scenario. 
Definition of 
scenarios 
Limited set of 
representative visions 
realised with the 
involvement of all 
impacted 
stakeholders 
The four 2030 visions are built around two axes: 
The level of centralisation in the governance of the 
decarbonisation policies (more European or more 
national) and the level of progress in meeting the 
European targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Two of the visions have a stronger bottom-up approach, 
while the other two visions have a stronger top-down 
approach. 
Market studies Pan-European 
Pan-European market studies seem to have been fully 
internalised in the process of scenario building and the 
assessment of projects. Regional market studies 
consider the boundary conditions from pan-European 
market studies and deliver bulk power flows and pinpoint 
which specific cases need to be further studied via 
network studies; they also deliver the economic part of 
the CBA assessment. 
Network studies Regional network studies 
Analyse how the grid handles the various cases of 
generation dispatch identified during the regional market 




Formal use of CBA 
assessment 
CBA methodologies complemented with more 
transparent rules to define the reference grid for projects 
assessments. 
Project promoters have been invited to complete the 
ENTSO-E CBA results with their own information and 
comments to build self-supporting projects assessment 








Interactions with stakeholders included in every phase of 
development. The group now called the Network 
Development Stakeholders Group (NDSG) gathers 
European organisations and incorporates the major 




¤ TYNDP 2018, according to information mentioned in public discussion fora, takes 
the TYNDP 2016 experience in common planning and identification of system needs 
as a basis and proposes to go further, highlighting operational challenges. It pursues 
added stakeholder and external interaction in the definition of scenarios. On top of 
that, the alignment of scenarios with ENTSO-G will be pursued. 
 
Progress evaluation 
Starting from a mere list of projects in 2010, the TYNDP is evolving into a 
coordinated planning tool, providing the identification of projects with increasingly 
complete methodologies and relevant information concerning system changes and 
technical and economic challenges for generation associated with the energy 




According to the TYNDP 2016 executive summary, the proposed set of projects will 
meet the 10% interconnection capacity goal by 2020, only missing the critical Spain-
France interconnection. Overall, in order to meet Europe’s goals towards 2030 in 
terms of energy and climate policy, market efficiency and security of supply, the 
TYNDP 2016 estimates up to 150 billion euros of investments in grid infrastructure. 
TYNDP 2016 identifies the necessary projects to deliver the required infrastructure to 
support the energy transition and market integration. However, according to TYNDP 
monitoring reports, a significant percentage of projects is subject to delays and many 
projects are being rescheduled. This is strongly highlighted by ENTSO-E in the 
executive summary of TYNDP 2016 draft report for regulatory opinion: 
“The TYNDP 2016, unfortunately, confirms the trend identified in the previous 
TYNDPs, with moderate progress: about 25% of TYNDP investments suffered 
delays in the past two years (compared with 33% in 2014), though more are being 
rescheduled (22% now compared with 12% in 2014). TYNDP monitoring also shows 
that of the TYNDP 2014 investments in a design or permitting stage two years ago, 
at present 20% are under construction, and 5% has been commissioned. Making the 
comparison with TYNDP 2012, these levels are respectively 30% and 10%. 
Implementation monitoring also shows that of the TYNDP 2016 investments 
presently in design or permitting phase, on average these items have faced a delay 
of one year since 2014, and three years since 2012”.45 
Improving coordination at the planning level is necessary, as discussed above, but 
these results also show that strong focus must be placed on how to make the 
foreseen reinforcements a reality, i.e. how to implement TYNDP, how to transform 
planned projects into tangible assets through investment. 
                                            
45 http://tyndp.entsoe.eu/projects/2016-11-28-1600-exec-report.pdf. 
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Two main factors, also involving PCI projects, are commonly referred to as the major 
obstacles responsible for delays (they are not really coordination issues): 
− Low public acceptance from local populations (to overcome this obstacle it is 
necessary to improve wide participation of stakeholders in the decision-
making process, as well as strong and coherent political support from the 
European to the local level); 
− Lengthy permitting procedures (best practices across Europe should be 
harmonised to streamline the permit granting process and penalties should be 
foreseen if deadlines are not met). 
Very often, when a project is identified in the TYNDP or has a PCI label and 
experiences further delays, this fuels the argument which questions the need of the 
project itself and reinforces public reluctance to accept new transmission lines. 
Sometimes, this reluctance also results from the lack of convincing answers to some 
basic questions, such as “what is the real benefit of that line to our community?”. 
 
Coordination of TYNDP with ‘national ten year plans’ 
The 2009 Regulation prescribes that the TYNDP shall “build on national investment 
plans” and that “the Agency [ACER] shall provide an opinion on the national ten-year 
network development plans to assess their consistency with the Community-wide 
network development plan”. However, it is not clear how much coordination is 
performed and how much national, regional and Union-wide plans impact upon each 
other. 
A project identified at national level is usually proposed for inclusion in the TYNDP, 
but if a project is identified in the framework of the TYNDP process, it is not clear 
whether it must be incorporated in the respective national plans. From this 
perspective, could the TYNDP have a more binding nature concerning projects that 
seem to be robust in the face of uncertainty and changing conditions? If a project 
identified in the TYNDP is necessary to deliver the European electricity 
infrastructure, in particular as regards the 10% or 15% targets, and it is not 
implemented, then there are no consequences for those delaying or aborting the 
project. 
 
2.1.4 Meeting the energy transition 
The 1996 and 2003 electricity Directives assumed that market forces would lead to a 
quick harmonisation of wholesale energy prices across Europe, for the benefit of 
energy consumers. In the meantime, insufficient convergence of wholesale electricity 
prices due to insufficient interconnection capacities between national energy 
networks has been recognised as a failure of the Internal Energy Market; legal and 
regulatory action has been undertaken since 2009 to overcome this problem. 
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The TYNDP concept and process, introduced by the 2009 electricity Regulation, was 
a logical attempt to fix the problem, providing – at last – an answer to the question 
“How can network planning coordination be ensured in a fully liberalised and partially 
Europeanised electricity market?” However, the TYNDP is the tardy reply to a 
question that should have been answered 21 years ago and its evolution over the 
past six years shows how difficult it is to properly implement that solution, especially 
if the corresponding question “How can transmission network investment 
coordination be ensured in a fully liberalised and partially Europeanised electricity 
market?” has not yet been effectively addressed.  
Now, the question is whether the TYNDP instrument can be useful in order to 
promote the energy transition in Europe. There is no reason why it should not be fit 
for purpose. However, this requires a two-fold effort: 
− On the one hand, to pursue and accelerate the very impressive trend 
embodied in recent TYNDP editions in order to improve procedural and 
methodological features, as well as quantity and consistency of the data set; 
− On the other hand, to immediately take into due account the new 
stakeholders, devices and processes that are shaping the energy transition, 
providing a quantum leap in terms of stakeholder participation, conceptual 
framework and planning tools, i.e. reinventing transmission network planning 
coordination in the three-dimensional space of digitalisation, decarbonisation 
and integration of electricity systems. 
 
In recent years, cross-border capacity has increased more significantly than in the 
past, as shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 2.5: EU transmission circuit length in km 
(Based on ENTSO-E statistical fact sheet from 2010 to 2015)46 









2010 136943 4790 147195 288928 n/d 
2011 140761 4470 148642 293873 5368 
2012 142656 4527 150909 298092 5368 
2013 141359 9141 151743 302243 5260 
2014 141096 9859 156019 306974 5719 
2015 140407 10962 157183 308552 5781 
Variation 2010-
2015 
2.5% 128.9% 6.8% 6.8% 7.7% 




Table 2.6: Number of cross-border lines in the ENTSO-E area 
(Based on ENTSO-E available statistical fact sheet data from 2013 to 2015) 








2013 89 18 123 319 22 
2014 93 18 127 327 23 
2015 93 18 128 328 27 
 
Investment in cross-border lines is essential to increase cross-border capacity and to 
enhance electricity market integration. However, cross-border lines do not tell the full 
story since internal capacity and internal reinforcements also play a key role in 
defining cross-border capacity and market integration.  
The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) fund has been supporting many 
interconnection and reinforcement projects in Europe to develop the electricity 
market.47 According to the CEF Energy Key figures brochure,48 published in 
November 2016, by the end of 2016, 36 actions involving PCIs in electricity for a 
total of €1,004.5 million have been supported.  
 
  




2.2 Market and system operation 
System operation must ensure that the electricity system is able to match generation 
and demand under secure and efficient conditions. This must be done following 
market decisions in each trading period and respecting technical restrictions while, at 
the same time, ensuring the availability of reserves for possible contingencies and 
ancillary services to support the power system in real-time. 
The draft Regulation establishing a network code on electricity emergency and 
restoration highlights in its preamble the importance of interdependency in system 
operation: 
“Even though each TSO is responsible for maintaining operational security in its 
control area, the secure and efficient operation of the Union's electricity system is a 
task shared between all the Union TSOs since all national systems are, to a certain 
extent, interconnected and a fault in one control area could affect other areas. The 
efficient operation of the Union's electricity system also requires a close collaboration 
and coordination between stakeholders”.49 
Market and system operation are at the core of the interconnected networks and of 
the internal energy markets in Europe for electricity and natural gas. Since security 
risks and efficiency gains are very sensitive aspects and have impact on the whole 
interconnected system, tight coordination among TSOs, on the one hand, but also 
between TSOs and all market players and operators, on the other hand, is crucial. It 
should also be pointed out that some physically interconnected systems do not 
correspond to EU Member States. 
Several blocking factors have hindered the necessary development of tight system 
and market coordination at the EU level, in particular the following ones that will be 
discussed in the subsequent Sections: 
− Lack of comprehensive coordination of system operation; 
− Lack of common remedies policy and redispatching approach; 
− No common reserve contracting and cost allocation procedures; 
− No intraday auction-based cross-border allocation; 
− Lack of harmonised load shedding coordination. 
 
2.2.1 Lack of comprehensive coordination of system operation 
 
Purpose and need for coordination 
Network operators must provide non-discriminatory access to networks at Europe-
wide level, therefore the use of networks and interconnectors must be coordinated to 
some extent. Furthermore, although system security is a national responsibility, 




systems are highly interdependent and any problem can easily spread to large areas 
of an interconnected network. Therefore, system operation coordination mechanisms 
among TSOs are required. Market operation impacts upon system operation 
everywhere. In order to optimise the functioning of power exchanges and market 
functioning in increasingly larger areas, it is necessary to improve system operation 
across the relevant areas. 
Following the introduction of competition in electricity, system operation coordination 
has been performed by TSOs in different regions in Europe according to different 
levels of coordination and formalisation, ranging from voluntary agreements to 
mandatory rules enforced by supra-national regulatory bodies.  
The following paragraphs describe how system operation coordination was carried 
out before the Third Energy Package and how it is developed today, in line with the 
family of operational guidelines (the Regulation establishing a network code on 
emergency and restoration and the Regulation establishing a guideline on system 
operation) that has been published.50 
 
Operational coordination before the Third Package 
Before the Third Energy Package of 2009, regional organisations such as UCTE 
(Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity), NORDEL (cooperation 
between the transmission system operators in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden), BALTSO (cooperation organisation of Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian Transmission System Operators), UKTSOA (United Kingdom 
Transmission System Operators Association), ATSOI (Association of the 
Transmission System Operators of Ireland) promoted the coordination and 
development of the European interconnected system through non-binding rules 
agreed voluntarily by all their members. Moreover, they regularly published statistical 
information concerning system development and operation. 
In parallel to these voluntary regional arrangements, procedure manuals and binding 
network codes were adopted at national level, following the introduction of 
independent energy regulation in EU Member States.  
The following statements are taken from the ENTSO-E website and illustrate part of 
the historic evolution of these regional organisations.5152 
  
                                            
50 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/wholesale-market/electricity-network-codes. 




FROM ENTSO-E website: Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of 
Electricity (UCTE) 
“The Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity coordinated the 
operation and development of the electricity transmission grid for the Continental 
European synchronously operated transmission grid, thus providing a reliable 
platform to all participants of the Internal Electricity Market and beyond. 
Since 1951, the Union for the Coordination of Production and Transmission of 
Electricity (UCPTE) had coordinated synchronous operations through meetings of 
experts and managers from at first a small number of interconnected companies at 
the interface of Switzerland, France and Germany, and over various stages from a 
growing number of companies and countries. The UCPTE's operational and planning 
recommendations helped ensure reliable supply of electricity in Continental Europe. 
In 1999, UCTE re-defined itself as an association of TSOs in the context of the 
Internal Energy Market. Building on its experience with recommendations, UCTE 
turned to make its technical standards more binding through the Operation 
Handbook and the Multi-Lateral Agreement between its members. These standards 
became indispensable for the reliable international operation of the high voltage 
grids which are all working at one "heart beat": the 50 Hz UCTE frequency related to 
the nominal balance between generation and the electricity demand of some 500 
million people in one of the biggest electrical synchronous interconnections 
worldwide. 
In its final year of existence, UCTE represented 29 transmission system operators of 
24 countries in continental Europe. 
On 1 July 2009 UCTE was wound up. All operational tasks were transferred to 
ENTSO-E. 
UCPTE/UCTE The 50 Year Success Story – Evolution of a European Interconnected 
Grid gives a chronological account on the development of the interconnected 
electricity grid of Continental Europe and provides facts and figures on the work of 
UCPTE and UCTE until their transition into ENTSO-E, in July 2009”. 
 
FROM ENTSO-E website: 
“In addition to the UCTE as a technical association, the NORDEL, UKTSOA, ATSOI 
and BALTSO also existed with the same goals in other parts of Europe. The main 
focus on market was organised by activities of ETSO (It was becoming quite clear, 
especially under the rearranged market design, that a shift from a more voluntary to 
an enforcement-based platform would be needed if a sufficient level of compliance 
were to be guaranteed). Furthermore, the EU talked much about the so called “20-
20-20 targets” (standing for 20% decarbonisation, a 20% increase in the share of 
renewable energy sources (RES) fed in and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency 
by 2020) which meant that the share of RES in the generation mix was now rapidly 
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growing favoured by the current legislative climate, and particularly difficult for the 
grid to catch up. Such intentions voiced by the EU required more co-ordinated 
action, involving not only TSOs, but all relevant parties, such as generators, 
legislators, regulators, research institutes and stakeholders. To address these 
pressing issues, and in anticipation of the 3rd package of energy legislation, all TSO 
associations embarked on an intensified cooperative commitment which was given a 
legal foundation through the establishment of the new pan-European body ENTSO-E 
(European Network of TSOs for Electricity) on 19 December 2008. Among its 
founding members were all of the UCTE’s TSOs. 
This reorganisation resulted in the merging of the existing associations, including the 
UCTE, which was wound up by mid 2009. 
 
Operational coordination following the Third Package 
Following the adoption of the operational guidelines, foreseen in the 2009 electricity 
Regulation, operational coordination in Europe has been consistently enforced at 
national and at pan-European level. 
The following box contains some of the principles laid out in the 4th May 2016 draft 
Regulation establishing a guideline on electricity transmission system operation,53 
reflecting the need for harmonised rules for all system players and also the need to 
further enhance coordination among TSOs via their mandatory participation in 
regional security coordinators (RSCs). 
 
(3) Harmonised rules on system operation for transmission system operators 
(‘TSOs’), distribution system operators (‘DSOs’) and significant grid users (‘SGUs’) 
should be set out in order to provide a clear legal framework for system operation, 
facilitate Union-wide trade in electricity, ensure system security, ensure the 
availability and exchange of necessary data and information between TSOs and 
between TSOs and all other stakeholders, facilitate the integration of renewable 
energy sources, allow more efficient use of the network and increase competition for 
the benefit of consumers. 
(4) To ensure the operational security of the interconnected transmission system, it 
is essential to define a common set of minimum requirements for Union-wide system 
operation, for the cross-border cooperation between the TSOs and for utilising 
relevant characteristics of the connected DSOs and SGUs. 
(5) All TSOs should comply with the common minimum requirements on procedures 
necessary to prepare real-time operation, to develop individual and deliver common 
grid models, to facilitate the efficient and coordinated use of remedial actions which 
are necessary for real-time operation in order to maintain the operational security, 




quality and stability of the interconnected transmission system, and to support the 
efficient functioning of the European internal electricity market and facilitate the 
integration of renewable energy sources ('RES'). 
(6) While there are currently a number of voluntary regional cooperation initiatives in 
system operations promoted by TSOs, formalised coordination between TSOs is 
necessary for operating the Union transmission system in order to address the 
transformation of the Union electricity market. The rules for system operation 
provided for in this Regulation require an institutional framework for enhanced 
coordination between TSOs, including the mandatory participation of TSOs in 
regional security coordinators ('RSCs'). The common requirements for the 
establishment of RSCs and for their tasks set out in this Regulation constitute a first 
step towards further regional coordination and integration of system operation and 
should facilitate the achievement of the aims of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and 
ensure higher security of supply standards in the Union. 
(7) This Regulation should set out a framework for the mandated cooperation of 
TSOs via the appointment of RSCs. RSCs should issue recommendations to the 
TSOs of the capacity calculation region for which it is appointed. TSOs should, 
individually, decide whether to follow or not the recommendations of the RSC. The 
TSO should remain responsible for maintaining operational security of its control 
area. 
 
According to the operational guidelines, RSCs are entities owned or controlled by 
their clients, the TSOs, in one or more Capacity Calculation Regions (CCR).54 They 
provide services to support TSOs in regional coordination, aiming at creating 
economies of scale and at providing the most cost-efficient solutions at the regional 
level in dealing with maximising the capacity offered to the market and in defining 
remedial actions to cope with network restrictions. 
The principles to be used by the RSCs are agreed by all TSOs in each Capacity 
Calculation Region. 
RSCs are designed to provide advice on the most adequate measures to TSOs, who 
have the capability to control the network in real time. Hence, the RSCs are not 
equipped to take direct control of the grid. 
All European TSOs will delegate services at least to one regional security 
coordinator. 
The following table presents the main areas covered by the 2016 draft Regulation 
establishing a guideline on electricity transmission system operation. 
 
                                            
54 As defined in Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management, Capacity Calculation Region means a “geographic area in which 
coordinated capacity calculation is applied”. 
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Table 2.7: Overview of System Operation Guidelines. Adapted from ENTSO-E 
website55 
 System Operation Guidelines 
Regulation Pending. The draft Regulation establishing a guideline on system operation received a positive vote in Comitology on 4 May 2016. 
Covered areas 
The System Operation Guideline is one of the network codes/guidelines drafted 
under the Third Energy Package. In 2015, the European Commission, ACER and 
ENTSO-E agreed to merge the three operational network codes into a single 
System Operation Guideline during their preparatory work for Comitology. The 
new guideline is composed of the former network codes on Operational Planning 
and Scheduling (NC OPS), Operational Security (NC OS), and Load Frequency 
Control and Reserve (NC LFCR). 
Operational 
security 
Basis for the power system to function with a satisfactory level of security and 
quality of supply, as well as efficient utilisation of infrastructure and resources. It 
will do so by focusing on common operational security principles, pan-European 
operational security, coordination of system operation, and some important 
aspects for grid users connected to the transmission grid. 
Measures aim to enhance capacity to maintain operational security and support 
the efficient functioning of the European internal electricity market. 
OPS 
It focuses on the planning phase, ahead of real time operations. It determines the 
roles and responsibilities for Transmission System Operators (TSOs), 
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) and significant grid users (SGUs) towards 
the operational scheduling procedures and prescribes how these different parties 
exchange data. 
The approach taken is to define the minimum requirements needed to ensure a 
planning process that is coherent and coordinated across Europe. First, the code 
determines common methodologies and principles that allow for a coordinated 
approach towards operational security analysis and adequacy analysis. Second, 
the code determines how to coordinate availability plans, allowing for a more 
optimal planning of outages for the maintenance of relevant assets. 
LFCR 
Focus on frequency quality criteria, frequency control structure, frequency 
containment reserves, frequency restoration reserves, replacement reserves, 
exchange of reserves and synchronous time control. These LFCR provisions will 
also help to ensure the efficient utilisation of infrastructure and resources. 
 
  




In 2013, Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 substantially reinforced the responsibilities of 
TSOs in system operation coordination, as recalled in the following box. 
 
Article 21 
Amendments to Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 is hereby amended as follows: (1) Article 8 is 
amended as follows:  
(a) in paragraph 3, point (a) is replaced by the following:  
‘(a) common network operation tools to ensure coordination of network operation in 
normal and emergency conditions, including a common incident classification scale, 
and research plans. These tools shall specify inter alia:  
(i) the information, including appropriate day ahead, intra-day and real-time 
information, useful for improving operational coordination, as well as the optimal 
frequency for the collection and sharing of such information;  
(ii) the technological platform for the exchange of information in real time and where 
appropriate, the technological platforms for the collection, processing and 
transmission of the other information referred to in point (i), as well as for the 
implementation of the procedures capable of increasing operational coordination 
between transmission system operators with a view to such coordination becoming 
Union-wide;  
(iii) how transmission system operators make available the operational information to 
other transmission system operators or any entity duly mandated to support them to 
achieve operational coordination, and to the Agency; and  
(iv) that transmission system operators designate a contact point in charge of 
answering inquiries from other transmission system operators or from any entity duly 
mandated as referred to in point (iii), or from the Agency concerning such 
information.  
The ENTSO for Electricity shall submit the adopted specifications on points (i) to (iv) 
above to the Agency and to the Commission by 16 May 2015.  
Within 12 months of the adoption of the specifications, the Agency shall issue an 
opinion in which it considers whether they sufficiently contribute to the promotion of 
cross-border trade and to ensuring the optimal management, coordinated operation, 




It is expected that considerable effort will be required during the coming years in 
order to align all national frameworks with the new binding regulations on system 
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operation and to specify the terms and conditions or methodologies that are required 
by the regulations and will need agreement by all concerned TSOs and approval by 
all the national regulatory authorities. 
As an essential implementation aspect, monitoring and reporting is performed by 
ENTSO-E. However, the draft regulation on system operation does not establish 
enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Article 14 Monitoring 
ENTSO for Electricity shall monitor the implementation of this Regulation in 
accordance with Article 8(8) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. Monitoring shall cover 
at least the following matters: 
(a) operational security indicators in accordance with Article 15; 
(b) load-frequency control in accordance with Article 16; 
(c) regional coordination assessment in accordance with Article 17; 
(d) identification of any divergences in the national implementation of this Regulation 
for the terms and conditions or methodologies listed in Article 6(3); 
(e) identification of any additional improvements of tools and services in accordance 
with subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 55(1), beyond the improvements identified 
by the TSOs in accordance with Article 55(1)(e); 
(f) identification of any necessary improvements in the annual report on incidents 
classification scale in accordance with Article 15, which are necessary in order to 
support sustainable and long-term operational security; and 
(g) identification of any difficulties concerning cooperation on secure system 
operation with third country TSOs. 
 
This implementation will be carried out simultaneously with the implementation of the 
Regulations on market guidelines, which will require a significant effort in terms of 
ensuring the consistency and reliability of procedures. 
The definition and implementation of quite an extensive list of terms, conditions and 
methodologies (Article 6 of Regulation on system operation) with national, regional 
or pan-European impact, still leave a considerable margin for national specificities, in 
line with the exclusive national responsibility for system operation. 
The approval of the above-mentioned terms, conditions and methodologies requires 
the unanimous support of all relevant regulatory authorities. 
While it is expected that RSCs will play increasingly important roles in optimising 
system operation and market functioning, the responsibility for operational decisions 
still belongs to the national TSOs and are applied according to national regulations. 
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For the time being, liability mechanisms, enforcement rules and regulation are all 
national. 
When the process reaches maturity and confidence, further services or 
responsibilities, even more close to real time, might be added. Currently, RSCs are 
only focused on operational planning. 
 
2.2.2 Common redispatching approach 
The most common – and in a certain way the ‘easiest’ – form of market intervention 
is called “redispatching” and basically consists of changing the scheduled output of 
some generators until the newly computed load-flows fit the technical restrictions of 
the underlying physical infrastructure. 
 
Purpose and need for coordination 
Whenever market outcomes are incompatible with reliable system operation some 
kind of remedial action is necessary.  Redispatching is a typical remedial action and 
may have very strong redistributive impacts. 
While large areas of day-ahead market coupling have been created in the EU, still 
there is no common redispatching approach, which leads to the substantial 
fragmentation of power markets at the closing loop, where all day-ahead or intraday 
transactions enter their final settlement stage. 
In a market that strives to be more and more integrated and, at the same time, 
becomes highly volatile, a common framework for remedial measures allowing for a 
more efficient use of the grid and increased security of the electricity system is of 
paramount importance. 
Ex-ante allocation of available cross-border capacities through appropriate market-
based algorithms provides for effective preventive congestion management. 
However, congestion management after capacity has been allocated is often 
necessary, making the use of remedial actions inescapable. The associated costs 
must be identified and recovered through appropriate market-based or regulatory 
mechanisms. 
The CACM Regulation provides the framework for the day-ahead and intraday 
markets time frame capacity allocation and congestion management. Here, the 
remedial measures considered are redispatching and countertrading: 
− Redispatching: the TSO must assess, based on defined criteria, which 
generator’s output will be modified in order to change physical flows in the 
transmission system and relieve a physical congestion; 
− Countertrading: the TSO must buy and sell electricity to balance demand 
between two bidding zones to relieve a physical congestion. 
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Before the CACM, redispatching and countertrading often relied on bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. Many different agreements lacked appropriate coordination 
and were often based on a limited exchange of data and very simple cost sharing 
principles. Very often, these uncoordinated and oversimplified methods (due to a 
limited evaluation of the causes of the restrictions) led to unfair decisions concerning 
the choices of generators to redispatch and, consequently, to unfair and inefficient 
sharing of costs and benefits. 
The CACM Regulation aims to overcome all these risks by establishing clear rules 
on how to perform redispatching and countertrading and also how to quantify the 
associated costs and benefits. 
The following table is extracted from the ‘ACER Market Monitoring Report 2015’.56 
According to ACER, it is still difficult to compare the total cost of remedial actions 
between Member States due to the lack of harmonised definitions. 
 
Table 2.8: Network congestion related volumes and costs of remedial actions – 2014 
(GWh, thousand euros). Source: ACER/CEER (2015) 
 
 
Preventive and remedial congestion management measures are very 
interdependent. In case preventive measures are used, such as offering less cross-
                                            
56 ACER/CEER (2015), Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity Markets in 
2014, p. 171. 
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border capacity, then less remedial measures, such as redispatching and 
countertrading, will be necessary. The report by ACER highlights that cross-zonal 
exchanges in the process of capacity calculation are sometimes limited in order to 
solve TSOs internal congestion problems. 
 
Current status 
The CACM Regulation, entered into force on 13 August 2015, establishes the tasks 
and the deadlines (Articles 9, 35, 74) for developing the methodologies for 
coordinated redispatching and countertrading as well as cost sharing. 
 
Article 9 
Adoption of terms and conditions or methodologies 
6. 
(c) the methodology for coordinated redispatching and countertrading in accordance 
with Article 35(1); 




Coordinated redispatching and countertrading 
1. Within 16 months after the regulatory approval on capacity calculation regions 
referred to in Article 15, all the TSOs in each capacity calculation region shall 
develop a proposal for a common methodology for coordinated redispatching and 




Redispatching and countertrading cost sharing methodology  
1. No later than 16 months after the decision on the capacity calculation regions is 
taken, all TSOs in each capacity calculation region shall develop a proposal for a 
common methodology for redispatching and countertrading cost sharing. 
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In November 2016, ACER approved the proposal from all TSOs for the 
determination of capacity calculation regions.57 According to the Regulation 
timelines, the definition of the coordinated redispatching and countertrading 
methodology is therefore formally on track. 
During the public consultation process, the definition of Capacity Calculation Regions 
proved to be a challenge in its own right since it builds on the definition of the bidding 
zones and will define the regions where the capacity calculation methodologies will 
be applied. This will strongly influence where and if congestions could be verified 
and the subsequent incurred incomes for grid reinforcements or costs of remedial 
measures. 
The ACER decision indicates the need to merge CCRs as the most effective way to 
optimise capacity allocation and congestion management in regions that already 
have major cross-border flows.  
The capacity calculation methodologies will define, to a large extent, the signals that 
will be provided from the market in terms of network reinforcement needs 
considering available cross-border capacity and congestion income distribution as 
well as internal restrictions leading to a redispatch and cost sharing. It should be 
pointed out, that some of the physically interconnected non-EU Member States are 
not involved in this process, which makes efficient operational coordination even 
more difficult to achieve and operation less reliable. 
 
2.2.3 No common reserve contracting and cost allocation 
Given the current mix of generation with growing shares of RES, large electricity 
trade volumes tend to move closer to real time and the role of intraday and balancing 
power markets tends to increase. 
 
Purpose and need for coordination 
The enhanced coordination – and, eventually, integration – of electricity balancing 
markets is fundamental to the successful assimilation of volatile RES and constitutes 
a fundamental building block in the completion of the European internal electricity 
market. However, to date limited progress has been achieved. This is due to the 
wide diversity of current balancing markets in Europe and to the importance of 
balancing to ensure security of supply. Both factors further stress the harmonisation 
challenge. 
                                            




This challenge was recognised by ACER, when developing the framework guidelines 
for the electricity balancing network code, in the following terms:58 
The core element of the Framework Guidelines are the models for cross-border 
exchanges of balancing energy that should first emerge in different geographical 
areas and gradually, i.e. within 6 years after the entry into force of the Network Code 
on Electricity Balancing, be integrated into one European platform where all TSOs 
would have access to different types of balancing energy while taking into account 
the transmission capacities available between different areas. 
 
Electricity balancing represents a cost that is included in the transmission network 
tariff or in separate components of regulated tariffs. An integrated market where 
balancing resources can be effectively shared and optimised across countries will 
result in important benefits for all consumers. This optimisation requires the 
possibility not only of contracting and sharing cross-border reserves, but also of 
identifying the amount and location of reserves across a region or across Europe 
that will ensure system security needs and provide the most cost effective solution. 
The supporting document published by ENTSO-E together with the draft proposal for 
the Electricity Balancing (EB) guidelines summarises as the ‘Added value of EB’ the 
particular aspects and challenges that are related to an integrated balancing market 
– from the point of view of the EU network of TSOs.59 
 
“The targets and methods to foster Balancing Market integration as set forth in the 
FG EB aim to reduce total costs and to increase Social Welfare while ensuring 
Operational Security. 
In a recent Impact Assessment, commissioned by the European Commission, it has 
been assessed that reasonable benefits can be gained by integrating Balancing 
Markets. Nevertheless, it also needs to be pointed out that compared to the other 
electricity market timeframes the Balancing Markets represent only 2-3% of the total 
turnover volume of wholesale markets. Hence, the potential cost saving of 
integrating Balancing Markets can be considered to be relatively small. As the 
Balancing Services are the last resort action for TSOs to ensure Operational 
Security, the most important objective in developing integrated Balancing Markets is 
to keep the lights on while facilitating market integration. 
While the integration of the European energy markets apart from Balancing is 
following rather clear target models, as is the case for example in capacity allocation 
set out in the Network Codes on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management 
(NC CACM) and Forward Capacity Allocation (NC FCA), clear target models for the 
                                            
58 http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/fg_and_network_codes/pages/balancing.aspx. 
59 ENTSO-E (2014), Supporting document for the Network Code on Electricity Balancing, 6 August 
2014, available on the ENTSO-E website. 
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different kinds of Balancing Services have not been detailed. Hence, rather than 
detailing such target models, the NC EB lays out the processes to develop and 
implement the steps towards realising these efficiency gains while maintaining 
Operational Security. TSOs have to develop models for market-based cooperation, 
first on regional level and later on European level pursuant to the deadlines defined 
in the NC EB. 
The NC EB provides for a phased approach to foster cooperation amongst TSOs in 
various areas of Balancing. The key concept of Coordinated Balancing Areas 
(CoBAs) is introduced in the NC EB which establishes a flexible obligation for 
cooperation to ensure a swift transition towards the relevant target. 
The NC EB provides a foundation for a coordinated set of Balancing rules, 
incorporating the benefit of learning from experience, en route towards a regional or 
pan-European Balancing Market”.60 
 
Another approach is coming from the EU Agency for Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators. The ‘ACER Market Monitoring Report 2015’ underlines the need to 
further integrate balancing markets in order to increase efficiency and overall 
benefits.61 Those conclusions are supported, to a large extent, by the significant 
variation of balancing service prices observed in Europe and the currently very 
limited exchange of balancing services across European borders. The pictures below 
are taken from the ACER report (p. 209 and p. 212). 
  
                                            
60 Ibid., p. 11. 
61 ACER/CEER (2015), op. cit., p. 205. 
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Fig 2.5: Overall costs of balancing (capacity and energy) and imbalance charges 
over national electricity demand in a selection of European markets – 2014 
(euro/MWh). Source: ACER/CEER (2015) 
 
 
Fig 2.6: EU balancing capacity contracted abroad as a percentage of the system 




The Commission Regulation establishing a guideline on electricity balancing is taking 
the final steps in the Comitology process and is expected to be published in 2017. 
The objectives and purpose of the ‘Electricity Balancing Guideline’ in terms of 




Subject matter and scope 
1. This Regulation lays down detailed guidelines on electricity balancing including 
the establishment of common principles for the procurement and the settlement of 
frequency containment reserves, frequency restoration reserves and replacement 
reserves and a common methodology for the activation of frequency restoration 
reserves and replacement reserves. 
2. The requirements set forth by this Regulation shall apply to TSOs, DSOs including 
closed distribution systems, regulatory authorities, the Agency, ENTSO-E, third 
parties to whom responsibilities have been delegated or assigned, where applicable, 
and market participants. 
 
Having in mind the need to test how balancing markets could be implemented in 
practice, several cross-border pilot projects have been put in place by ENTSO-E.62 
The project TERRE (Trans-European Replacement Reserve Exchange) stands out 
as the one with a more trans-European perspective and, apparently, is in an 
advanced and promising stage.  
The effective functioning of balancing markets is one of the critical aspects to ensure 
system security: replacement reserves represent the outer layer immediately after 
frequency restoration reserves and frequency containment reserves. This explains 
why balancing remains a TSO responsibility. Reliability and confidence in balancing 
markets is an important aspect when switching from established traditional solutions 
to new, more market-based and coordinated approaches across Europe. Different 
regional schemes are already running in parallel and need to be progressively 
harmonised. 
The participation of consumers either directly or indirectly through aggregators and 
based on new digital technologies is an essential aspect to be accommodated in the 
new model for balancing markets. 
 
2.2.4 No intraday cross-border allocation with auction 
Intraday markets are gaining increased importance due to growing amounts of 
intermittent RES generation. Intraday markets allow market participants to level their 




                                            




Purpose and need for coordination 
Wide and efficient intraday markets are becoming crucial for the success of the 
internal market. 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 established the congestion management methods for 
single day-ahead and intraday market time-frames, allowing the use of continuous 
trading in the case of intraday markets. 
The Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) Regulation describes 
in its preamble the possible use of different methods: 
 
(13) Capacity should be allocated in the day-ahead and intraday market time-frames 
using implicit allocation methods, in particular methods which allocate electricity and 
capacity together. In the case of single day-ahead coupling, this method should be 
implicit auction and in the case of single intraday coupling it should be continuous 
implicit allocation. The method of implicit auction should rely on effective and timely 
interfaces between TSOs, power exchanges and a series of other parties to ensure 
capacity is allocated and congestion managed in an efficient manner. 
(14) For efficiency reasons and in order to implement single day-ahead and intraday 
coupling as soon as possible, single day-ahead and intraday coupling should make 
use of existing market operators and already implemented solutions where 
appropriate, without precluding competition from new operators. 
 
Formal status in implementing the CACM Regulation 
The Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a 
guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management is currently in the 
implementation phase and both the day-ahead and intraday timeframes are testing 
the platforms that can be used to serve at EU level. The intraday market coupling 
project initiative is called the XBID project. 
A brief description of this project is provided in the ENTSO-E web page highlighting 
the continuous nature of the intraday market.63 
 
“The Regulation No 2015/1222 on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management 
(CACM) defines the rules for a continuous intraday market that allows market 
participants to trade up to at least one hour before real-time. Coupling national 
intraday markets will increase intraday liquidity, benefiting market players and 
facilitating RES integration. 




To help realise this goal TSOs from 12 countries, along with power exchanges 
(PXs), have launched the cross border Intraday (XBID) Market Project [which] will 
enable the creation of a joint integrated intraday cross-zonal market. The 
overarching objective of the XBID solution is to create one integrated European 
intraday market. 
This single intraday cross-zonal market solution will be based on a common IT 
system forming the backbone of the European solution, linking the local trading 
systems operated by the PXs as well as the available cross-zonal transmission 
capacity provided by the TSOs. Bids and offers submitted by market participants in 
one country can be matched by those submitted by market participants in any other 
country within the IT systems’ reach, provided there is cross-zonal capacity 
available”. 
 
ENTSO-E, in its 9 August 2016 ‘Report on the progress and potential problems with 
the implementation of Single Day-Ahead and Intraday Coupling’, highlights the many 
results achieved so far and the 2017 implementation goal, but notes that the XBID 
project “continues to be a complex project to deliver”. 
The referred complexity relates to several aspects including the need to link multiple 
countries into a single platform, the close relationship between intraday markets and 
real-time operation, and the many parts involved in defining the process including 
TSOs, NEMOs (i.e. market operators) and NRAs. 
All these issues drive the need for clarity about cost-sharing and cost recovery and 
clear governance in terms of roles and responsibilities. 
Liquidity in intraday markets is considered a vital element to ensure effective 
competition; currently, liquidity is relatively low in the majority of national intraday 
markets. The picture below is taken from the ‘ACER Market Monitoring Report 2015’ 
and presents the evolution of traded volumes in the period 2011 to 2014.64 According 
to the report, many factors contributed to the observed increase in traded volumes in 
different markets. As such, it is difficult to identify the causes for higher liquidity. 
However, according to the ACER evaluation, “the three markets with the highest ID 
liquidity (Italy, Portugal and Spain) are characterised by a high penetration of 
renewable-based generation, the presence of exclusive ID auctions and obligatory 
unit bidding”.65 A special comment is further added concerning the example of 
Germany, where “the presence of local or regional ID implicit auctions seems to 
attract ID liquidity and may play a role in improving ID competition. In Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, the precise impact of ID auctions in liquidity is uncertain and difficult to 
disentangle from other factors, as their respective ID markets also present exclusivity 
and unit bidding, which is unique in Europe. The recent developments presented 
                                            
64 ACER/CEER (2015), op. cit., p. 195. 
65 Ibid., p. 199. 
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above for Germany would confirm that auctions may contribute to increased liquidity 




Fig 2.7: Intraday traded volumes in a selection of EU markets – 2011-2014 (TWh). 
Source: ACER/CEER (2015), p. 195 
 
There is no consensus yet about the best model for intraday power markets. Some 
studies suggest that cross-border allocation with auctions could improve the intraday 
market performance.67 Aspects such as greater market depth, easy access to market 
participants, more effective implementation and more market reliability are referred 
to in the literature. 
 
2.2.5 Lack of harmonised load shedding coordination 
Coordination principles for under-frequency or under-voltage load shedding schemes 
have been well established and functioning for many years. 
  
                                            
66 Ivi. 
67 Neuhoff K., N. Ritter, A. Salah-Abou-El-Enien and P. Vassilopoulos (2016), Intraday Markets for 
Power: Discretizing the Continuous Trading?, Discussion Papers, No 1544, German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW Berlin). 
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Current status 
The network code on electricity emergency and restoration establishes a formal 
framework and principles, where all TSOs should design the system defence plans 
which will include the automatic under or over frequency control schemes and 
automatic schemes against voltage collapse. Frequency management procedures 
will require additional regional coordination within each synchronous area. 
 
Article 11 
Design of the system defence plan 
1. By [12 months after entry into force of this Regulation], each TSO shall design a 
system defence plan in consultation with relevant DSOs, SGUs, national regulatory 
authorities, other competent authorities, neighbouring TSOs and the other TSOs in 
its synchronous area. 
2. When designing its system defence plan, each TSO shall take into account at 
least the following elements:  
(a) the operational security limits set out in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation 
(EU) 2017/XXX [SO GLs];  
(b) the behaviour and capabilities of load and generation within the synchronous 
area;  
(c) the specific needs of the high priority significant grid users listed pursuant to point 
(e) of paragraph 4; and 
(d) the characteristics of its transmission system and of the underlying DSOs 
systems. 
[…] 
6. The measures contained in the system defence plan shall comply with the 
following principles: 
(a) their impact on the system users shall be minimal; 
(b) they shall be economically efficient;  
(c) only those measures that are necessary shall be activated; and  
(d) they shall not lead the TSO's transmission system or the interconnected 
transmission systems into emergency state or blackout state. 
 
The participation of resources on the demand side, as a first response to avoid 
automatic load-shedding, is an aspect that should be considered in future system 
operation. 
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Further to the automatic under or over frequency control schemes and automatic 
schemes against voltage collapse currently implemented, there may be eventual 
situations where load shedding could be necessary due to unforeseen and extreme 
events that would disrupt system adequacy in Europe. In such extreme cases, it 
would be necessary to have key principles to share the burden between Member 
States and to manage the abnormal situation. Although it is clear that all efforts 
should focus on having a reliable adequacy assessment across Europe, there is 
currently no explicit definition of what should be done to deal with the consequences 
in those extreme and, hopefully, unlikely cases. This also seems to be a case where 




2.3 Solidarity among Member States in the electricity sector 
 
2.3.1 Lack of comprehensive coordination for Solidarity 
As explained in Section 1.2.5, the concept of solidarity is more applied and much 
more developed in the natural gas industry than in the electricity sector, where only 
vague references without operational substance can be traced. Solidarity is seen 
here from the perspective of security of supply. 
 
Purpose and need for coordination 
Some examples will show that even in the electricity sector situations may exist 
where coordination and solidarity are necessary to deal with events that have the 
potential to disrupt energy supply if not properly addressed. The solar eclipse of 
2015 is a case where strong coordination was successfully put in place on a 
voluntary basis to ensure system security. 
The impact analysis report prepared by ENTSO-E provides a good description of the 
event and the main concerns related to the exchange of balancing reserves:68 
 
“On 20 March 2015 a solar eclipse will pass over the Atlantic Ocean between 07:40 
and 11:50 UTC (08:40-12:50 CET) and the eclipse will be visible across Europe. The 
reduction in solar radiation will directly affect the output of the photovoltaics (PV) and 
for the first time this is expected to have a relevant impact on the secure operation of 
the European power system. In the synchronous area of Continental Europe and the 
synchronous area of Great Britain preliminary studies to evaluate the impact of the 
solar eclipse and possible countermeasures to be taken by the TSOs have been 
performed. In 2015 the installed capacity on PV in the synchronous region of 
Continental Europe is expected to reach 90 GW and the eclipse may potentially 
cause a reduction of the PV infeed by more than 30 GW during clear sky conditions. 
This situation will pose a serious challenge to the regulating capability of the 
interconnected power system in terms of available regulation capacity, regulation 
speed and geographical location of reserves. Although a solar eclipse is perfectly 
predictable the transformation from solar radiation to electric power is associated 
with uncertainties which call for a careful coordination throughout the entire 
interconnected power system of Continental Europe including adjacent power 
systems”. 
 
                                            
68 ENTSO-E (2015), Solar Eclipse 2015 – Impact Analysis – Report prepared by Regional Group 
Continental Europe and Synchronous Area Great Britain, Brussels, 19 February 2015. 
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The recommendations of the mentioned report, directed to individual TSOs and the 
Continental Europe Regional Security Coordinators Initiative, express some implicit 
solidarity and the importance of regional coordination in these type of events: 
 
“Not all the TSOs will be affected by the eclipse on the same scale, but all will see 
the same impact on the frequency; some countries are not affected by PV variations, 
but can support the other TSOs by providing them reserves. The main challenge for 
the TSOs will be to coordinate the use of the reserves in order to balance the power 
in real time without creating overloads on the grid. Therefore coordination 
procedures should be exercised well in advance. 
The proposed recommendations to the TSOs from Continental Europe synchronous 
region can be split in two levels. 
Individual TSOs 
[…] 
- Each TSO shall increase control reserves as much as necessary for its own needs. 
In case of high probability not to cover its own control block/area, each TSO shall 
estimate and declare to other TSOs the amount of control reserve he will need in 
real time. 
- TSOs which can provide more control reserve than they need shall propose these 
reserves to help frequency management in real-time. 
[…] 
Continental Europe synchronous area coordination 
[…] 
- RSCIs can be involved in D-2, D-1 and ID to check forecast files, detect potential 
constraints due to reserve exchanges, evaluate limits, propose remedial actions. 
- If necessary TSOs will set up an extraordinary operational coordination until the 
day of the eclipse,including day-ahead and real-time teleconference to coordinate 
PV forecasts, real-time frequency management, reserve exchanges and flow 
management”. 
 
The network code on electricity emergency and restoration goes beyond the System 
Operation guidelines Regulation and establishes the additional procedures and 
remedial actions to be applied in the Emergency, Blackout and Restoration states. It 
also describes in its preamble that “Each TSO should support any other TSO in 
emergency, blackout or restoration state, upon request, where such support does 




Inter-TSO assistance and coordination in emergency state 
1. Upon request from a TSO in emergency state, each TSO shall provide through 
interconnectors any possible assistance to the requesting TSO, provided this does 
not cause its transmission system or the interconnected transmission systems to 
enter into emergency or blackout state. 
 
Linked to the solidarity mechanism and beyond the network code on electricity 
emergency and restoration, there is the case of an ultimate action of load shedding 
in case the system adequacy would not be ensured for a given period of time. 
Coordination of key principles for sharing the burden and costs would be necessary 
to transparently decide on the effective actions to be taken. 
 
Current status 
Although the relevance and benefits of coordination can be exemplified and some 
solidarity principles are suggested, there is no solidarity mechanism to serve as a 
framework in the observed cases. Cost sharing is also performed without any explicit 
ex-ante guidance or ex-post reference. 
Even in the network code on electricity emergency and restoration, the aspects of 
cost recovery are dealt with in a very loose manner: “The costs borne by system 
operators subject to network tariff regulation and stemming from the obligations laid 
down in this Regulation shall be assessed by the relevant regulatory authorities. 
Costs assessed as reasonable, efficient and proportionate shall be recovered 





















Chapter 3 addresses issues related to harmonisation. Four factors are identified as 
somewhat blocking the integration of European electricity systems and the transition 
to a low-carbon economy. 
To begin, there is no harmonisation of congestion rent allocation schemes in Europe. 
Current EU legislation establishes some general rules and the CACM Commission 
Regulation sets a timeframe for the definition of tasks and methodologies. 
Nonetheless, some fundamental questions related to the distribution of resources 
remain unanswered. 
The lack of harmonisation of capacity remuneration mechanisms represents a 
second blocking factor. The issue is strictly connected to reliability and its 
enforcement in liberalised and interconnected electricity systems. With the 
restrucutring of the industry in the 1990s, European policy-makers faced important 
questions on how to guarantee reliability in the new competitive setting, but failed to 
provide clear answers. Due to a general state of overcapacity, reinforced by a 
massive investment cycle in CCGT, Member States usually adopted a laissez-faire 
approach towards reliability. The 1996 electricity Directive reflected such confidence 
in the free market forces, barely mentioning the issue and the significant implications 
of interconnecting several national electricity systems, where the choice of 
generation mix remains a national prerogative. A mandate to monitor capacity 
adequacy was introduced for every Member State by the second electricity Directive 
in 2003, but the Commission did not develop a common European approach. 
Incredibly, nothing concrete happened in Europe even after the wave of blackouts 
that affected several electricity systems around the world in 2003.  
In more recent years, the problem of ensuring system reliability has become even 
more complex and difficult because of the development of a strong European climate 
policy, mainly based on the deployment of renewable energy sources in the 
electricity sector. New ways to assess system reliability became necessary, but the 
Third Energy Package adopted in 2009 was more concerned with enhancing 
competition and did not provide any clear guidance. The pre-existing and fragmented 
planning and capacity adequacy analysis methods remained in place. It is only 
recently that the situation has begun to change. 
The EU is now repeating the same flawed approach to capacity mechanisms. 
Allowing the participation of market players from neighbouring countries and 
avoiding to support capacity that negatively impacts on environmental policies is 
good but not enough. Applying abstract competition policies will not provide the 
solution either. In an interconnected electricity system with a growing penetration of 
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intermittent renewables, no meaningful assessment of capacity adequacy can be 
performed at national level. Besides, the choice of generation mix, a Member State’s 
prerogative, affects the methodologies and the data sets needed to perform such an 
assessment. Therefore, a comprehensive and consistent EU regulatory framework is 
required to reconcile the freedom of the Member States to choose their generation 
portfolio with the overall reliability of the interconnected systems and the efficiency of 
the internal market. 
The absence of transmission tariffs harmonisation across European countries 
constitutes a third blocking factor. Currently, there are differences in the level and 
structure of transmission tariffs in EU Member States and, for the past several years, 
there has been an ongoing debate on the opportunity of further harmonisation. 
Recent research promoted by ACER concluded that in the short term transmission 
tariffs are not a priority. However, in the long term there is a case for harmonisation, 
based on the need for greater consistency and the application of tariffs that better 
reflect the costs generated by market participants and minimise distortions.  
A final factor that can block the Europeanisation of the electricity industry is the lack 
of harmonisation of ‘State aid’ to large energy consumers. Member States can 
exempt large energy consumers from the full payment of network tariffs and levies 
like those for the subsidisation of renewables. The European Commission has 
already approved several exemptions, but their proliferation can distort competition 




3.1 Congestion rent allocation 
Congestion rents arise whenever there is a discrepancy between energy trade 
requests and transmission network capacity. The lack of sufficient network capacity 
– as compared to trade requests – blocks the market process and fragments the 
wider market into smaller zones, exhibiting different prices and different price 
dynamics. A ‘congestion rent’ is a benefit made from this price differential. The 
allocation of congestion rents is key to provide suitable incentives to TSOs, both in 
the short run operation and in long-term planning. 
 
Purpose and need for harmonisation 
In the EU, in spite of the persistent lack of interconnection capacity, there is still no 
common congestion rent allocation scheme. The combined result of insufficient 
interconnection capacity and congestion rent allocation schemes which are not 
harmonised creates serious distortions of competition within the internal electricity 
market. 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-
border exchanges in electricity states the principles to be followed regarding the use 
of revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection capacity: 
 
“Article 16 
General principles of congestion management 
… 
6. 
Any revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection shall be used for the 
following purposes: 
(a) guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity; and/or 
(b) maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities through network 
investments, in particular in new interconnectors. 
If the revenues cannot be efficiently used for the purposes set out in points (a) and/or 
(b) of the first subparagraph, they may be used, subject to approval by the regulatory 
authorities of the Member States concerned, up to a maximum amount to be decided 
by those regulatory authorities, as income to be taken into account by the regulatory 
authorities when approving the methodology for calculating network tariffs and/or 




The established general principles, although providing a framework for the allocation 
of congestion rents, do not ensure the correct incentives and use for the 
reinforcement of interconnections. If the congestion rents are used to guarantee the 
actual availability of the allocated capacity, i.e. covering redispatching costs, they 
may be avoiding necessary internal reinforcements in the bidding zone, therefore not 
contributing to a more interconnected market operation. If the congestion rents are 
applied in the calculation of transmission tariffs, the correct incentives for network 
development will not be visible as well. 
The figure below, extracted from the ‘ACER Market Monitoring Report 2015’, shows, 
for each country, the total congestion revenues in 2014 and the way these revenues 
were allocated. According to the report, “The total congestion revenue received by 
TSOs in 2014 increased by 317 million euros, or by almost 16% compared to 2013, 
and amounted to 2,314 million euros. The highest year-to-year income increase was 
reported by TSOs in Sweden, Great Britain and France, whereas the highest income 
decrease was reported by TSOs in Germany, the Netherlands and Italy”.69 
Different uses for congestion income can be observed in Fig. 3.1: interconnection 
investments represent less than half of total revenue. 
 
 
Fig 3.1: Congestion revenues – 2014 (million euros). Source: ACER/CEER (2015) 
 
In Section 2.2.2 on redispatching it was argued that congestion rents should come 
only from real congestion in the interconnectors, all other internal restrictions leading 
to a redispatch should be treated as redispatching costs and properly allocated 
                                            
69 ACER/CEER (2015), op. cit., p. 173. 
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according to the origin of the restriction. This would provide a more transparent set of 
signals when dealing with complex issues such as interconnection reinforcements. 
Interconnection reinforcements create winners and losers: the area with lower prices 
will experience price increases while the area with higher prices will benefit from 
reduced prices. Sometimes policy-makers and regulators have difficulty managing 
and communicating these situations. 
Harmonisation is needed to ensure clarity on the need for reinforcements and on the 
allocation of congestion rents. 
 
Current status 
CACM Regulation (entered into force 13 August 2015) establishes the tasks and the 
deadlines (Articles 9, 73) for developing the methodology for congestion income 
distribution. 
 
“Article 9 Adoption of terms and conditions or methodologies 
6. 
(k) share congestion income in accordance with the methodology jointly developed in 
accordance with Article 73; 
 
Article 73 Congestion income distribution methodology 
1.By 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation, all TSOs shall develop a 
proposal for a methodology for sharing congestion income”. 
 
The proposal from all TSOs on congestion income distribution methodology (Article 
73) was submitted to ACER in August 2016, according to the CACM timeline. 
This draft methodology lays down the simple rules which need to be followed to 
collect and distribute the Congestion Income to the Bidding Zone Borders and, after 
the assignment of Congestion Income to each Interconnector, the TSO on each side 
of the Bidding Zone border shall receive their share of this Congestion Income. 
Different arrangements between borders have been in place and now the proposed 
methodology establishes a common set of rules. 
Although, according to the scope defined in the CACM Regulation (EU) 2015/1222, 
the methodology defines how to split congestion rents between borders, fundamental 
issues such as harmonisation of congestion rents allocation are not addressed and 
remain open questions. 
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3.2 No harmonisation of capacity remuneration mechanisms 
‘Capacity remuneration mechanisms’ or ‘capacity payments’ tout court is one of the 
most contentious issues of the current electricity debate in the European Union. 
Given the amounts of money at stake, this is no surprise. This is also one of the 
topics that best illustrates how the combined reluctance of politicians and energy 
experts in addressing very basic questions leads to a huge – and, unfortunately for 
consumers, hugely expensive – smoke screen. Instead of answering a few very 
basic and practical political and technical questions and thereupon building a 
consistent – and relatively simple – monitoring, warning and rewarding system, 
political and technical decision-makers eluded those questions and invented 
theoretical arguments and sophisticated ‘answers’ in the abstract realm of market 
theory. ‘Answers’ that usually address the symptoms, not the roots, of the disease. 
This Section is divided into five parts, according to the following scheme:  
1. Introduction to the very basic capacity issues; 
2. Capacity under monopoly; 
3. Capacity under liberalisation – distinguishing between two phases: 1996-2003 
and 2003-2006; 
4. Capacity under decarbonisation; 
5. Capacity under the new DG Competition policy. 
At each stage, the main questions are explained in a simple language and the logical 
answers to these questions are discussed, also showing how the questions were 
eluded and where we are today. Combining these five parts, the reader will be in a 
position to realise how to get rid of past traps and how to address capacity issues in 
a forward-looking, consistent energy transition process. 
 
3.2.1 ‘Capacity’: who decides how much is needed and who pays for it? 
In developed countries, consumers expect to be almost always supplied with 
electricity. When unusual storms or accidents interrupt supply for some minutes or 
hours – a few days in the worst case – consumers usually complain, although they 
accept that it is ‘impossible’ to always prevent such disruptions. When technical 
restrictions or human errors produce a supply interruption, consumers also complain, 
usually being less tolerant than in the case of natural disasters. In these situations, 
enough generation capacity is installed in the country, but due to unexpected events 
some consumers are not supplied for some time. These unexpected events may be 
related to the following subjects: 
1. Generation capacity – power plant outages may temporarily reduce the amount 
of available overall generating capacity and associated power output below 
demand level. Under these circumstances, if no alternative means are available – 
e.g. interconnections with neighbouring countries where enough capacity is 
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available – supply interruptions are inevitable. Power plant outages may be 
caused by equipment failure, lack of cooling water, plant operator error, etc.; 
2. Transmission capacity – transmission line or substation outages may temporarily 
reduce the amount of available transmission capacity in some network areas, 
thus decreasing power flows and limiting the ability to supply all demand;70 
3. System operation – even if enough generation and transmission capacities are 
available, it may happen that some consumers cannot be supplied. This may 
result, in turn, from two different types of events: 
a) System restrictions – electricity systems are designed based on some 
assumptions about standard patterns of generation and demand. If, for some 
unexpected reason, either generation or demand profiles are suddenly 
changed, the system may be unable to cope with these changes, either 
transiently or in steady-state. In order to ensure stability of the whole system, 
some generators and/or consumers may have to be disconnected from the 
network; 
b) Human error – system operators rely on a large spectrum of measurements 
and computer simulations that provide the necessary information to manage 
the electricity system in real-time. Machine-based errors may appear along 
the processing chain that mislead system operators, inducing them to take 
the wrong decision; even when the information available to operators is 
complete and consistent, they may misjudge the situation, undertaking 
inappropriate actions that may trigger some kind of load shedding.  
In the context of the above-described cases, it is common to use the expression 
‘reliability’. 
Another type of event, much less common in developed countries, is the disruption 
of primary energy supply to power plants. This may be caused by natural events 
(e.g. scarce water inflows in rivers where hydropower plants are located due to 
unusual lengthy drought periods) or by political incidents (e.g. interruption of natural 
gas supply due to transit fee disputes between supplier and transit countries). In this 
context, it is common to use the expression ‘security of energy supply’. 
Focussing on ‘reliability’ issues only, it is important to understand how reliability was 
ensured in the past, under the monopolistic regime, how liberalisation challenged the 
old model and how decarbonisation and digitisation add new layers of complexity. 
 
3.2.2 ‘Capacity’ under monopoly 
In the old days of vertically integrated monopolies and centralised planning, the basic 
task of the planner was to provide an investment plan that considered: 
                                            
70 Some Transmission System Operators publish in their website real-time information about outages 
– see, for instance, https://www.nationalgridus.com/upstate-ny-business/storms-outages/outage-map. 
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a) The primary energy choices of the State (for example, imposing or forbidding 
nuclear power plants; subsidising domestic coal, etc.), the evolution of primary 
energy prices in world markets and the costs of power plant technologies; 
b) The expected growth of electricity demand and its location; 
c) The desired ‘reliability’ level – basically determining how many supply 
interruptions, and which volumes of associated not-supplied energy, were 
acceptable. 
Based on these inputs, planners provided an optimal investment plan including both 
power plants (their size, location, type of primary energy used, year of 
commissioning, etc.) and network facilities (overhead lines, cables, substations – 
including their location, capacity, year of commissioning, etc.). 
To assess the desired aggregate reliability level, each electricity system component 
must be assigned a given failure rate. Knowing the failure rate or ‘mean time 
between failures’ and the useful life period of each individual component, it is then 
possible to compute the overall electricity system reliability index for every hour of 
each year of the planning horizon. Different types of redundancy must be included in 
the system, i.e. several components must be duplicated, in order to guarantee an 
acceptable overall performance level.  
As consumers became more affluent and demanding in developed countries, i.e. 
less tolerant to electricity disruptions, planners increased the amount of redundancy 
and tended to oversize everything, from generation capacity to transmission lines, to 
low-voltage transformers, in order to be ‘on the safe side’. This ‘safety’ policy had 
obvious financial costs, leading to increasing tariffs. However, as long as these cost 
increases could be offset by economies of scale at generation level, they remained 
‘hidden’ and consumers were satisfied. 
One way to improve reliability while, at the same time, avoiding unnecessary 
redundancy and associated costs, is to replace deterministic reliability models 
through probabilistic ones. This allows planners and operators to optimise 
redundancy, preventive maintenance, etc. 
Accuracy of any reliability analysis depends on the quality of the statistical data 
used. Very often, data series are incomplete or inconsistent, therefore some 
‘educated guesses’ have to be used by those making the analysis. The central 
planner had all available information, she decided which data to use and how, and 
she was the only responsible agent for system reliability.  
 
3.2.3 ‘Capacity’ under liberalisation 
The end of generation and supply monopolies challenged the central planner’s role 
for two main reasons: 
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− Investors are free to decide if, when and where to build a new power plant or 
to refurbish an existing one; 
− Generators, suppliers, traders and other agents are free to establish any type 
of contractual arrangements, as long as these are compatible both with the 
regulatory framework and with available infrastructure resources. 
Whenever legislators decided to liberalise the electricity sector, they took one of 
three views vis-à-vis reliability: 
1) Laissez-faire: market forces will provide for the necessary generation 
investments and will determine the ‘right’ value of reliability and security of 
energy supply. Therefore, legislators and regulators do not need to address the 
issue; 
2) Ex-ante obligation: for example, imposing upon each electricity supplier a legal 
obligation to procure long-term capacity contracts corresponding to their 
respective present contractual volumes; 
3) Ex-post intervention: the government or the regulator set up a monitoring 
mechanism to assess reliability and security of supply levels, triggering 
tendering procedures for new generation capacity whenever the need arises 
(i.e. in case the market fails to deliver the expected capacity investments that 
guarantee the desired reliability levels).  
 
The first phase (1996-2003) 
In the early days of liberalisation, most governments adopted the laissez-faire 
attitude. The 1996 electricity Directive mentions the word ‘reliability’ only once 
(“Whereas each transmission system must be subject to central management and 
control in order to ensure the security, reliability and efficiency of the system in the 
interests of producers and their customers”) and ‘tolerates’ long-term planning in the 
following terms (Article 3):  
“Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 90, 
Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in the 
general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, 
including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and to 
environmental protection. Such obligations must be clearly defined, transparent, non-
discriminatory and verifiable; they, and any revision thereof, shall be published and 
notified to the Commission by Member States without delay. As a means of carrying 
out the above mentioned public service obligations, Member States which so wish 
may introduce the implementation of long-term planning”. 
Long-term planning was defined as follows (Article 2):  
“long-term planning shall mean the planning of the need for investment in generation 
and transmission capacity on a long-term basis, with a view to meeting the demand 
for electricity of the system and securing supplies to customers”. 
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In the 1990s, when electricity liberalisation was adopted in the European Union, 
long-term planning was not at all a fashionable concept. The first electricity Directive 
was negotiated between 1991 and 1996 and the concepts of ‘public service’ and 
‘long-term planning’, strongly supported by the French government and opposed by 
the European Commission and by most Member States, was at the very heart of the 
political battle.  
The 1996 Directive also allowed Member States to “choose between an 
authorization procedure and/or a tendering procedure” for the construction of new 
generating capacity. The tendering procedure corresponded to the so-called ‘Single 
Buyer’ model (“single buyer shall mean any legal person who, within the system 
where he is established, is responsible for the unified management of the 
transmission system and/or for centralized electricity purchasing and selling” – 
Article 2), strongly supported by the French government and opposed by everybody 
else. According to the 1996 Directive (Article 6): 
“1. Where they opt for the tendering procedure, Member States or any competent 
body designated by the Member State concerned shall draw up an inventory of new 
means of production, including replacement capacity, on the basis of the regular 
estimate referred to in paragraph 2. The inventory shall take account of the need for 
interconnection of systems. The requisite capacity shall be allocated by means of a 
tendering procedure in accordance with the procedure laid down in this Article. 
2. The transmission system operator or any other competent authority designated by 
the Member State concerned shall draw up and publish under State supervision, at 
least every two years, a regular estimate of the generating and transmission capacity 
which is likely to be connected to the system, of the need for interconnectors with 
other systems, of potential transmission capacity and of the demand for electricity. 
The estimate shall cover a period defined by each Member State”. 
The obligation to publish “at least every two years, a regular estimate of the: 
- generating and transmission capacity which is likely to be connected to the 
system; 
- need for interconnectors with other systems; 
- potential transmission capacity;  
- demand for electricity”, 
was imposed only upon Member States that opted for the tendering procedure. In 
the other Member States, such obligation did not exist, therefore information about 
the expected evolution of generation and transmission capacities was not published.  
As regards interconnections, the 1996 Directive just established that “The system 
operator shall provide to the operator of any other system with which its system is 
interconnected sufficient information to ensure the secure and efficient operation, 
coordinated development and interoperability of the interconnected system” (Article 
7). 
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In brief, the 1996 Directive, although aiming at laying down “common rules (…)  
relating to the organization and functioning of the electricity sector” eluded the 
fundamental question of a such quest:  
How to balance Member States’ freedom to choose their energy mix with the need to 
develop a common transmission infrastructure supporting a common electricity 
market, knowing that, due to physical and technical features, any interconnected 
electricity system impresses upon all interconnected partners de facto common 
reliability levels (independently of their will to agree on legally binding common 
standards)? 
In particular, the amount of installed generating capacity (and the associated reserve 
margin as compared to peak demand) and the technical characteristics of the 
generators (for instance, as regards their automatic response to frequency 
deviations in the network), in any Member State, influence the overall reliability of 
electricity systems in all interconnected Member States. Reliability is a common 
good. 
The European legislator’s laissez-faire attitude regarding the functioning of electricity 
markets, embodied in the absence of any specific rules and in mere statements of 
general principles (such as: “Member States (…) shall not discriminate between 
these [electricity] undertakings as regards either rights or obligations”; “The system 
operator shall not discriminate between system users or classes of system users”), 
expresses the belief that competition law would be enough to avoid market 
distortions and to ensure efficient and fair market outcomes, whatever shape these 
electricity markets would take at national level. This attitude was common to the 
liberalisation of almost all sectors in Europe (including network industries such as 
transport and communications) and it was common all over the world in the early 
1990s. In different degrees, this approach succeeded in liberalising energy markets 
at national level in many countries, in different continents. However: 
1) Imagining that market forces alone could drive 15 national markets, organised in 
different ways, to ‘naturally’ evolve towards a single electricity market without 
strong regulatory intervention was a mistake. Institutions are always necessary for 
the proper functioning of efficient markets and they are indispensable for the 
functioning of supra-national markets. This mistake was soon addressed, first 
through the negotiation of voluntary agreements (1998-2000) and later on through 
successive legislative and regulatory measures; in the meantime, the amount of 
‘cross-border’ regulations is astronomical. 
2) There is no technical, economic or institutional justification – and there is indeed 
no empirical evidence – to make us believe that market forces can self-organise 
and self-regulate electricity reliability. Legislators could have allowed market 
forces alone to shape markets and, at the same time, provide a suitable legal 
framework to protect the ‘common good’ reliability, thus avoiding the potential risk 
of an impoverished technical quality of service, blackouts, etc. But the 1996 
Directive did not attempt to establish common reliability standards or, at least, 
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procedures to define and enforce such standards. It did not even set up any 
mechanism to monitor reliability and security of supply at European level, although 
Article 6, quoted above, clearly shows that the legislator was aware of the issues 
at stake. 
Although the Single Buyer Model (i.e. the tendering procedure) was accepted as a 
legitimate and legal alternative to the full liberal approach (i.e. the mere authorisation 
procedure), it was never implemented…not even by France. 
The laissez-faire approach was extremely convenient because liberalisation started 
from a situation of generation overcapacity in most EU Member States and investors 
built so many new power plants that overcapacity steadily increased, as can be seen 
in the following picture. Taking 1990 as a reference, installed capacity always 
increased faster than final electricity consumption. In particular: 
− In 2000, compared to 1990, consumption had increased 17% while total 
installed capacity had increased by 21%.  
− At the end of 2014, compared to 1990, electricity demand had increased by 
25%, while total installed capacity had increased by 74%. 
 
 
Fig 3.2: Final electricity consumption and total installed electricity generation 
capacity in the EU-28, 1990 – 2014. Source: elaboration based on data from 
Eurostat 
 
Initially, the capacity increase was mainly due to the “dash-for-gas” of the 1990s and 
2000s: combined-cycle gas turbines’ (CCGT) installed capacity in the EU-28 
increased from 1.8 GW in 1990 to 45 GW in 2000 and to 100 GW in 2010.  
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In the 21st century, wind and solar generation took the lead in terms of new capacity 
additions, as can be seen in Table 3.1 and in Figure 3.3. As wind and solar power 
plants can only generate electricity when the wind blows or the sun shines, ‘one MW’ 
of their installed capacity cannot be directly compared to ‘one MW’ of gas-fired 
power plants, able to generate four or more times further electricity during the year. 
Nevertheless, there is generation overcapacity in the European Union.71 
 





Fig 3.3: Net electricity generation capacity in the EU, 1995 – 2015 [MW]. Source: 
EWEA (2016), Wind in power: 2015 European statistics, p. 8 
  
                                            
71 Unfortunately, transmission under-capacity prevents electricity consumers throughout Europe from 
fully reaping the benefits of generation overcapacity.  
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The second phase (2003-2006) 
In the year 2000, the European Council decided to fully liberalise the electricity and 
natural gas markets. In order to speed up the liberalisation process a new electricity 
Directive was approved in June 2003. This new Directive limited the tendering 




Tendering for new capacity 
1. Member States shall ensure the possibility, in the interests of security of supply, of 
providing for new capacity or energy efficiency/demand-side management measures 
through a tendering procedure or any procedure equivalent in terms of transparency 
and non-discrimination, on the basis of published criteria. These procedures can, 
however, only be launched if on the basis of the authorisation procedure the 
generating capacity being built or the energy efficiency/demand-side management 
measures being taken are not sufficient to ensure security of supply. 
2. Member States may ensure the possibility, in the interests of environmental 
protection and the promotion of infant new technologies, of tendering for new 
capacity on the basis of published criteria. This tender may relate to new capacity or 
energy efficiency/demand-side management measures. A tendering procedure can, 
however, only be launched if on the basis of the authorisation procedure the 
generating capacity being built or the measures being taken are not sufficient to 
achieve these objectives. 
3. Details of the tendering procedure for means of generating capacity and energy 
efficiency/demand-side management measures shall be published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union at least six months prior to the closing date for 
tenders. 
The tender specifications shall be made available to any interested undertaking 
established in the territory of a Member State so that it has sufficient time in which to 
submit a tender. 
With a view to ensuring transparency and non-discrimination the tender 
specifications shall contain a detailed description of the contract specifications and of 
the procedure to be followed by all tenderers and an exhaustive list of criteria 
governing the selection of tenderers and the award of the contract, including 
incentives, such as subsidies, which are covered by the tender. These specifications 
may also relate to the fields referred to in Article 6(2). 
4. In invitations to tender for the requisite generating capacity, consideration must 
also be given to electricity supply offers with long term guarantees from existing 
generating units, provided that additional requirements can be met in this way. 
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5. Member States shall designate an authority or a public body or a private body 
independent from electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
activities, which may be a regulatory authority referred to in Article 23(1), to be 
responsible for the organisation, monitoring and control of the tendering procedure 
referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4. Where a transmission system operator is fully 
independent from other activities not relating to the transmission system in 
ownership terms, the transmission system operator may be designated as the body 
responsible for organising, monitoring and controlling the tendering procedure. This 
authority or body shall take all necessary steps to ensure confidentiality of the 
information contained in the tenders. 
 
Given the fact that no Member State had opted for the tendering procedure/single 
buyer model, it was logical to remove this option from the new Directive, aimed at 
fully liberalising energy markets. 
The 2003 Directive mentions the word ‘reliability’ only once, although in a different 
context as compared to the previous Directive. It now appears in a reference to the 
tasks of TSO (Article 9): 
“Each transmission system operator shall be responsible for: 
(a) ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the 
transmission of electricity; 
(b) contributing to security of supply through adequate transmission capacity and 
system reliability; (…)”. 
‘Long-term planning’ is still mentioned in the 2003 Directive, although in a rather 
obscure way (Article 3): 
“In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for 
the fulfilment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, Member States 
may introduce the implementation of long term planning, taking into account the 
possibility of third parties seeking access to the system”. 
However, the 2003 Directive introduced a very interesting and important provision on 
security of supply: 
 
Article 4 
Monitoring of security of supply 
Member States shall ensure the monitoring of security of supply issues. Where 
Member States consider it appropriate they may delegate this task to the regulatory 
authorities referred to in Article 23(1). This monitoring shall, in particular, cover the 
supply/demand balance on the national market, the level of expected future demand 
and envisaged additional capacity being planned or under construction, and the 
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quality and level of maintenance of the networks, as well as measures to cover peak 
demand and to deal with shortfalls of one or more suppliers. The competent 
authorities shall publish every two years, by 31 July at the latest, a report outlining 
the findings resulting from the monitoring of these issues, as well as any measures 
taken or envisaged to address them and shall forward this report to the Commission 
forthwith. 
 
Now, a mandatory security of supply monitoring mechanism is introduced for all 
Member States, not just for those opting for tendering procedures. However, the 
language used is less accurate than in the corresponding provisions of the old 
Directive, in particular as regards transmission and interconnections, as can be seen 
in the following table. 
 
Table 3.2: Comparing the language on security of supply/reliability monitoring in the 
1996 and 2003 electricity Directives 
TOPIC 1996 Directive 2003 Directive 
GENERATION 
CAPACITY 
generating (…) capacity which is 
likely to be connected to the 
system; 
- supply/demand balance on the 
national market 
- envisaged additional capacity 
being planned or under 
construction 
DEMAND demand for electricity 
- level of expected future demand 
 
- measures to cover peak demand 
TRANSMISSION  
- transmission capacity which is 
likely to be connected to the 
system; 
 
- potential transmission capacity;  
- quality and level of maintenance 
of the networks 
INTERCONNECTION 




measures (…) to deal with 
shortfalls of one or more suppliers 
 
Despite the not so clear language, Article 4 of the 2003 electricity Directive could 
have been used by the European Commission to promote a common European 
approach to security of supply and reliability through: 
a) harmonisation of national reports concerning methodologies, data, etc.; 
b) critical assessment of the national reports;  
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c) establishment of a EU system and market computer model to enable extrapolation 
of national conclusions to EU level, through appropriate synthesis of EU reliability 
and security of supply indicators from the respective national indicators. 
However, the European Commission did not plan to follow that approach at the time 
of publication and, following unexpected events, the Commission decided to 
completely ignore this ‘technical’ Article 4 and to embark on a new and very 
ambitious – political – approach. Immediately after the 2003 Directive was approved, 
several blackouts occurred in the USA and in the EU, in both cases affecting several 
States, in August and in September 2003,72 leading many people to believe that 
electricity markets were unable to ensure security of supply and needed to be 
somehow ‘fixed’ in order to avoid further disturbances.  
The United States reacted, as usual, in a very pragmatic way, addressing the core 
problem. The legislator decided to set up a new ‘Electric Reliability Organization’, 
“the purpose of which is to establish and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-
power system”,73 under direct supervision and control of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). This organisation opened its operation in June 
2006.74 In March 2007, the first legally-binding reliability standards for the USA 
electricity transmission system were approved and subsequently enforced (June 
2007). Reliability Standards impose requirements on the users, owners and 
operators of the transmission system to assure that they fulfil their responsibilities in 
reliable grid operations. Since 2007, FERC has “approved over 100 mandatory 
Reliability Standards that address many facets of maintaining and improving bulk 
power system reliability, issued directives and ordered standards to be developed as 
well as reviewed thousands of electric reliability organization compliance and 
enforcement actions”.75 
In Europe, on the contrary, neither the Commission nor Member States were willing 
to solve the very real technical coordination problem through the establishment of an 
effective ‘federal’ governance similar to the one introduced in the USA. In December 
2003, the European Commission made a proposal for a Directive on security of 
electricity supply.76 This proposal called upon national regulatory authorities to “set 
performance standards for transmission and distribution system operators” and to 
approve the “document setting out [transmission system operators’] intentions for the 
provision of adequate level of cross-border interconnection capacity”. These national 
performance standards could not have ensured proper EU reliability coordination, 
                                            
72 A list of the worst blackouts occurred in the past half century is available at www.power-
technology.com/features/featurethe-10-worst-blackouts-in-the-last-50-years-4486990/. 
73 Energy Policy Act of 2005. Section 1211 Electric Reliability Standards. 
74 A presentation of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation is available on the NERC 
website. 
75 FERC (2016), Reliability Primer, available at https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2016/reliability-
primer.pdf.  
76 European Commission (2003), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment, 
COM(2003) 740 final, Brussels, 10 December 2003. 
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but at least they would have promoted a more transparent technical dialogue 
between network users, network operators and regulators throughout the European 
Union. Unfortunately, these proposals were rejected by the Member States in the 
Council and the final text, approved in January 2006,77 provides for no coordination 
mechanism, assigns no explicit function to regulatory authorities and, consequently, 
had no practical impact. It is almost unbelievable that a Directive supposed to 
address reliability concerns, minimising the risk of large-scale blackouts similar to the 
2003 events, mentions the word ‘reliability’ just once – and in a collateral context, not 
even legally-binding (Whereas 5): 
“When promoting electricity from renewable energy sources, it is necessary to 
ensure the availability of associated back-up capacity, where technically necessary, 
in order to maintain the reliability and security of the network”. 
The equivalent directive on natural gas78 was equally weak, assigning coordination 
of security of supply to a Gas Coordinating Group, “composed of representatives of 
Member States and representative bodies of the industry concerned and of relevant 
consumers, under the chairmanship of the Commission”, thus excluding regulators, 
and not setting up any competent technical body to prepare and enforce operational 
and reliability standards.79 
The European scepticism of the merits of regulation, supra-State coordination and 
competitive markets to ensure reliability and security of supply is in sharp contrast 
with the US approach. There, following the large August 14, 2003 blackout, 
legislation was passed which provides a clear and comprehensive federal regulatory 
framework to handle network reliability issues. And, since 2007, more than 100 
Reliability Standards have been approved by the Federal Regulator and enforced by 
TSOs and integrated companies. In the EU, the first Network Code establishing a 
guideline on system operation was still pending approval on December 31, 2016 – 
more than 13 years after the large blackout of September 28, 2003 that 
disconnected more than 50 million consumers for several hours in Italy; and more 
than 10 years after the 2006 incident that disconnected more than 10 million 
consumers from Germany to several other countries. 
As new generation capacity continued to come online massively – in the period 
1990-2005, each year generation capacity additions amounted to, on average, 7.5 
GW fossil-fuel (of which 4.5 GW combined-cycle) and 2.5 GW wind – and no new big 
blackouts occurred after 2006, the political and social pressure to address reliability 
issues decreased very fast.  
                                            
77 Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 
concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment, Official 
Journal, L 33/22, 4 February 2006. 
78 Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of 
natural gas supply, Official Journal, L 127/92, 29 April 2004. 
79 When Russia cut gas supplies through Ukraine, in January 2006, the Coordinating Group had no 
idea about how flows could be technically reversed in order to supply Eastern European countries 
with gas from Western Europe. 
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Another way to look at the figures in the period 1990-2005 is as follows: new 
combined-cycle installed generation alone increased by 68.6 GW, corresponding to 
a maximum yearly output of 601 TWh; while final electricity consumption increased 
by 619 TWh in the same period. 
In brief, it is fair to state that during the first decade of electricity liberalisation (1996-
2006) the related issues of capacity adequacy and reliability standards and reliability 
enforcement were either not at all or not properly addressed in the European Union: 
the laissez-faire attitude was clearly dominant in most – if not all – Member States. 
This was due, in part, to the abundant, sustained, ‘free-market’ generation capacity 
investments. On the other hand, addressing reliability issues in an interconnected 
system covering several States is a difficult political and administrative task, if the 
institutional supra-State framework does not provide for suitable governance 
instruments, as is the case in the European Union. 
These crucial issues of capacity and reliability were also not addressed during the 
second decade of liberalisation (2006-2016). However, in the meantime, important 
changes occurred – in policy and in electricity markets in Europe, as well as in 
technology – that require a different, more complex approach than the one that 
would have been suitable in the first phase. The next Section discusses these 
changes and their impact upon the dual issues of capacity and reliability.  
 
3.2.4 ‘Capacity’ under decarbonisation 
The October 27 2005 informal European Council meeting held at Hampton Court, 
under the UK Presidency, represents a very important milestone in the EU energy 
sector for two main reasons. At that meeting, Heads of State and Government 
decided to: 
1. try – again – to develop a common European energy policy; 
2. bring together energy and climate policies. 
This informal agreement was restated at the formal December 2005 Council 
meeting: 
“The European Council stresses the importance of an integrated approach to climate 
change, energy and competitiveness objectives, and underlines that strategies to 
invest in cleaner and more sustainable energy both in the EU and more widely can 
support a range of policy objectives, including energy security, competitiveness, 
employment, air quality and reduced greenhouse gas emissions”.80 
                                            
80 www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/87642.pdf. 
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During 2006 the European Commission prepared several policy documents and in 
January 2007 proposed ‘An energy policy for Europe’.81 In March 2007 the European 
Council endorsed that document and concluded that: 
“The challenges of climate change need to be tackled effectively and urgently. 
Recent studies on this subject have contributed to a growing awareness and 
knowledge of the long-term consequences, including the consequences for global 
economic development, and have stressed the need for decisive and immediate 
action. The European Council underlines the vital importance of achieving the 
strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature increase to not more 
than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.  
Given that energy production and use are the main sources for greenhouse gas 
emissions, an integrated approach to climate and energy policy is needed to realise 
this objective.  
Integration should be achieved in a mutually supportive way. With this in mind, the 
Energy Policy for Europe (EPE) will pursue the following three objectives, fully 
respecting Member States' choice of energy mix and sovereignty over primary 
energy sources and underpinned by a spirit of solidarity amongst Member States:  
− increasing security of supply;  
− ensuring the competitiveness of European economies and the availability of 
affordable energy;  
− promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change”.82 
Based on this new ‘integrated’ approach, the European Commission proposed, in 
January 2008, the so-called ‘20-20-20 by 2020’ Package. Almost all relevant legally-
binding documents were approved in Spring 2009, namely the following ones: 
− Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and 
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC;83 
− Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community;84 
− Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction 
commitments up to 2020.85 
                                            
81 European Commission (2007), Communication from the Commission to the European Council and 
the European Parliament on An energy policy for Europe, COM(2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10 January 
2007. 
82 www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/93135.pdf. 
83 Official Journal, L 140/16, 5 June 2009. 
84 Official Journal, L 140/63, 5 June 2009. 
85 Official Journal, L 140/136, 5 June 2009. 
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The renewables Directive 2009/28/EC “sets mandatory national targets for the 
overall share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy 
and for the share of energy from renewable sources in transport”, according to the 
figures in Annex I of the Directive. Eight out of twenty-seven Member States 
accepted a target for the share of energy from renewable sources in gross final 
consumption of energy higher than 25% (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Austria, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden), while other four Member States indicated 
shares between 20% and 25%. Member States have also adopted national 
renewable energy action plans, indicating targets for each energy related sector: 
electricity, heating and cooling, and transport. According to the national plans, the 
share of electricity from renewable sources in final EU electricity consumption by 
2020 is around 34%. 
The EU commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions was strengthened in October 
2009, when the European Council decided “to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
80-95 % by 2050 compared to1990 levels”.86 
One expected result of the ‘integrated’ climate and energy policy was the expansion 
of power plants based on renewable sources of energy. This result has been 
achieved, as pointed out by the European Commission in the latest progress report, 
published in 2015: 
“Total installed capacity of renewable electricity generation has increased 
significantly over the last 20 years, in particular through rapid growth of installed wind 
and PV capacity. To put into perspective, while electricity generation capacity from 
renewable sources in 2013 reached around 380 GW, the existing electricity 
generation capacity of fossil fuel plants in the EU was around 450GW in 2013”.87 
The European Council pointed out, back in 2011, that decarbonisation, i.e. “reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 as agreed in 
October 2009”, “will require a revolution in energy systems, which must start now”.88 
However, recognising the disruptive consequences of new policies and technologies 
is one thing, actively shaping the “revolution in energy systems” is a very different 
story. For many years, most policy makers and academics ignored the need to 
redesign energy markets, either because they believed that the EU Emissions 
Trading System would harmoniously interact with pre-existent electricity and natural 
gas markets, or because they thought that energy markets would automatically 
adapt to the boundary conditions imposed by the new policies. Unfortunately, none 
of these hypotheses turned out to be true and although the EU has developed a 
coherent integrated approach in terms of objectives and targets (called the Energy 
Union), it still lacks a consistent operational integrated approach. Such approach 
requires the simultaneous reform of both system and market operation in order to 
                                            
86 www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/110889.pdf. 
87 European Commission (2015), Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Renewable energy progress report, COM(2015) 293 final, Brussels, 15 June 2015. 
88 www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119175.pdf. 
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take into account the structural changes observed and expected in EU electricity 
systems in the 21st century. 
There are at least three reasons that make the old EU market model unfit for 
decarbonisation: 
1) Almost all power plants based on renewable energy sources enjoy a State 
guaranteed selling price (feed-in tariff, market premium, tax credit, etc. – all 
different mechanisms lead to the same end-result: subsidised electricity 
generation prices). In the year 2000, subsidised power plants represented 
less than 2% of total installed generation capacity and less than 1% of gross 
electricity generation in the EU-28. In 2014, wind and solar accounted for 12% 
of total gross electricity generation and all renewable sources were 
responsible for 29% (up from 14% in 2000). The impact of these figures on 
wholesale electricity market prices cannot be overlooked: if the trend goes on, 
wholesale prices will be increasingly depressed and no incentive for new 
conventional capacity will emerge from the market; on the other hand, if 
subsidies are suddenly stopped, decarbonisation targets will not be achieved. 
Decision-makers did not want to address this question ex-ante, keeping the 
old laissez-faire attitude; now, they pretend that renewable-based power 
plants could and should ‘compete in the market’, i.e. that a simple market-
based approach will deliver the right balance between capacity and demand 
growth; 
2) The output of most power plants based on renewable energy sources (water, 
wind and sun) is weather dependent. Hydropower plants with associated large 
reservoirs can mitigate primary energy variability, but even these plants are 
not immune to weather changes, as some severe droughts have taught us, 
from Norway to Brazil. The methodology for evaluating capacity adequacy 
must consider this new reality; 
3) The electrical machines and surrounding electronic devices that form a power 
plant have different mechanical and electrical characteristics, according to the 
primary energy used and the associated technologies. Substantial changes in 
the primary energy mix – and, consequently, in the associated technological 
mix – in any given electricity system, prompt behavioural changes, in electrical 
terms, both at the individual plant level and at the system level. This affects 
the dynamic stability of the whole interconnected system. 
The last point is particularly important because it underlines the close and 
increasingly intimate relationship between ‘capacity’ and ‘reliability’, thus highlighting 
the dangers of a laissez-faire attitude. In the first decade of liberalisation, the main 
justification for the laissez-faire policy was the fact that ‘the market’ was delivering 
enough (even too much) new capacity; therefore, there was no need to monitor 
capacity developments in the EU. Moreover, since reliability was seen mainly as an 
issue of reserve margins and reserve margins were comfortably high, there was no 
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need – or, at least, no hurry – to change reliability standards and reliability 
governance.  
As pointed out in previous Sections, this is a fallacy, because reliability depends on 
much more than reserve margins and ensuring a certain level of reliability requires 
the design and implementation of appropriate coordination mechanisms. These 
coordination rules implicitly or explicitly involve decisions about how to share costs 
and benefits among the different network users across the interconnected system. 
Therefore they should be carefully scrutinised. In other words, reliability involves 
more than mere quantitative aspects, closely related to capacity and capacity 
reserve margins, being independent of the underlying market structure. In fully 
liberalised markets operating upon a supra-State interconnected network, the actions 
of market agents, both in the short-term and in the long-term, must be taken into 
account in a consistent and coordinated manner in order to manage the whole 
system in the most reliable way, while enabling markets to operate efficiently. The 
‘quality’ of coordination, expressed in terms of reliability standards and rules, as well 
as in terms of reliability governance, is as important as the quantitative (capacity 
related) dimension of reliability. 
Decarbonisation changes the structure and functioning of electricity systems very 
deeply. Here are some major consequences: 
1. The ‘quantity’ of available generation capacity in the system must be 
evaluated in different ways, according to the renewable energy used in the 
different power plants; therefore, the evaluation of ‘reserve margins’ becomes 
a much more complex task than in the past; 
2. The widespread introduction of new electronic control and power conversion 
devices changes the dynamic behaviour of the electricity system; 
3. The massive and very fast increase in generation capacity (in the period 
2005-2014, total installed capacity increased by 29%, corresponding to 219 
GW) was not matched by similar growth of transmission capacity (in the 
period 2010-2015, the length of AC circuits increased by 6.8%), thus 
amplifying the potential for conflicting requests for transmission capacity. 
In this new, low-carbon world, capacity and reliability must be assessed in a very 
different way as compared to the old days of centralised power systems built around 
very large conventional power plants. The qualitative dimension becomes 
increasingly important and complex. The fallacious laissez-faire reasoning “market 
delivers enough generating capacity, ergo market delivers enough reliability and 
there is no need for new reliability governance” just does not hold anymore. 
Back in 2007, when the so-called Third Energy Package was launched, the 
European Commission somehow recognised the need to move away from the 
laissez-faire attitude towards a more pro-active approach regarding system planning 
and operation in general. However, this acknowledgement was not followed by the 
introduction of new rules, not even of a new conceptual framework or new 
guidelines. The Third Package, approved in 2009, set up new bodies (namely 
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ENTSO and ACER) and left them the task to develop new rules. However, because 
the Third Package was mainly concerned with “improving and integrating competitive 
electricity markets in the Community”,89 no guidance was provided about how to 
translate “an integrated approach to climate and energy policy” in terms of system 
planning and operation. The 2009 electricity Directive is too vague and does not 
provide either for appropriate EU planning or operational coordination, as can be 
seen from the following quotes: 
On climate change (no references appear on sustainability or integrated approach): 
“In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for 
the fulfilment of environmental goals and goals for energy from renewable sources, 
as referred to in this paragraph, Member States may introduce the implementation of 
long-term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access 
to the system”.90 
“Member States shall implement measures to achieve the objectives of social and 
economic cohesion and environmental protection, which shall include energy 
efficiency/demand-side management measures and means to combat climate 
change, and security of supply, where appropriate. Such measures may include, in 
particular, the provision of adequate economic incentives, using, where appropriate, 
all existing national and Community tools, for the maintenance and construction of 
the necessary network infrastructure, including interconnection capacity”.91 
On monitoring the security of supply and capacity tendering: 
“Member States shall ensure the monitoring of security of supply issues. Where 
Member States consider it appropriate, they may delegate that task to the regulatory 
authorities referred to in Article 35. Such monitoring shall, in particular, cover the 
balance of supply and demand on the national market, the level of expected future 
demand and envisaged additional capacity being planned or under construction, and 
the quality and level of maintenance of the networks, as well as measures to cover 
peak demand and to deal with shortfalls of one or more suppliers. The competent 
authorities shall publish every two years, by 31 July, a report outlining the findings 
resulting from the monitoring of those issues, as well as any measures taken or 
envisaged to address them and shall forward that report to the Commission 
forthwith”.92 
“Member States shall ensure the possibility, in the interests of security of supply, of 
providing for new capacity or energy efficiency/demand-side management measures 
through a tendering procedure or any procedure equivalent in terms of transparency 
and non-discrimination, on the basis of published criteria. Those procedures may, 
however, be launched only where, on the basis of the authorisation procedure, the 
                                            
89 Article 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, op. cit. 
90 Article 3 (2). 
91 Article 3 (10). 
92 Article 4. 
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generating capacity to be built or the energy efficiency/demand-side management 
measures to be taken are insufficient to ensure security of supply”.93 
“Member States may ensure the possibility, in the interests of environmental 
protection and the promotion of infant new technologies, of tendering for new 
capacity on the basis of published criteria. Such tendering may relate to new 
capacity or to energy efficiency/demand-side management measures. A tendering 
procedure may, however, be launched only where, on the basis of the authorisation 
procedure the generating capacity to be built or the measures to be taken, are 
insufficient to achieve those objectives”.94 
On planning and adequacy: 
“Every year, transmission system operators shall submit to the regulatory authority a 
ten-year network development plan based on existing and forecast supply and 
demand after having consulted all the relevant stakeholders. That network develop-
ment plan shall contain efficient measures in order to guarantee the adequacy of the 
system and the security of supply”.95 
“When elaborating the ten-year network development plan, the transmission system 
operator shall make reasonable assumptions about the evolution of the generation, 
supply, consumption and exchanges with other countries, taking into account invest-
ment plans for regional and Community-wide networks”.96 
On EU planning and operational coordination: 
“The regulatory authority shall examine whether the ten-year network development 
plan covers all investment needs identified during the consultation process, and 
whether it is consistent with the non-binding Community-wide ten-year network 
development plan (Community-wide network development plan) referred to in Article 
8(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. If any doubt arises as to the consistency 
with the Community-wide network development plan, the regulatory authority shall 
consult the Agency. The regulatory authority may require the transmission system 
operator to amend its ten-year network development plan”.97 
“Regulatory authorities shall cooperate at least at a regional level to:  
(a) foster the creation of operational arrangements in order to enable an optimal 
management of the network, promote joint electricity exchanges and the allocation of 
cross-border capacity, and to enable an adequate level of interconnection capacity, 
including through new interconnection, within the region and between regions to 
allow for development of effective competition and improvement of security of 
supply, without discriminating between supply undertakings in different Member 
States; 
                                            
93Article 8 (8). 
94Article 8 (2). 
95Article 22 (1). 
96Article 22 (3). 
97 Article 22, (5). 
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(b) coordinate the development of all network codes for the relevant transmission 
system operators and other market actors; 
and 
(c) coordinate the development of the rules governing the management of 
congestion”.98 
“The Commission may adopt Guidelines on the extent of the duties of the regulatory 
authorities to cooperate with each other and with the Agency. Those measures, 
designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, 
shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred 
to in Article 46(2)”.99 
The accompanying electricity Regulation (EC) No 714/2009100 is mainly concerned 
with “enhancing competition within the internal market in electricity”.101 It makes no 
reference to any integrated approach, nor even to climate, decarbonisation or 
carbon. In fact, the text of the Regulation clearly shows that for his authors energy 
and climate policies are not on the same foot, ‘sustainability’ being a by-product of 
liberalisation: 
“The internal market in electricity, which has been progressively implemented since 
1999, aims to deliver real choice for all consumers in the Community, be they 
citizens or businesses, new business opportunities and more cross-border trade, so 
as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices and higher standards of service, 
and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability”.102 
Decarbonisation requires a new approach to security of supply and capacity 
adequacy analysis, clearly distinguishing between the political instant (definition of 
the energy mix) and the regulatory instant (providing procedural definitions of 
reliability compatible with national energy mix options and with the internal market). 
This was already clearly explained in 2004103 and again in 2006, by an author of the 
present report in the following terms: 
“If an interconnected system has to support the development of an integrated 
market, co-ordination is necessary in several fields, such as: long-term planning of 
interconnectors and other transmission facilities, short-term planning of operation, 
emergency procedures, restoration procedures, protection strategies and settings, 
balancing and settlement. 
                                            
98 Article 38 (2). 
99 Article 38 (5). 
100 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament And of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, Official Journal, L 211/15, 14 August 2009. 
101 Article 1. 
102 Whereas (1). 
103 Vasconcelos J., Some brief remarks on security of electricity supply. Opening panel at CIGRE 
conference, 30 August 2004. 
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The development of a new set of rules, enabling the more efficient, reliable and 
secure operation of the interconnected system and supporting the development of an 
integrated and efficient wholesale electricity market, requires the will and ability of all 
system operators, the active participation of all network users and close regulatory 
supervision. Although very important steps have been already undertaken in the EU, 
progress in this area is still urgently needed. 
Within the new, competitive and unbundled legal framework, network operators must 
adopt a different approach to network reliability as they did in the old days of 
vertically-integrated monopolies. Probabilistic methods play an increasingly 
important role and new mathematical tools are being introduced. Planning 
methodologies must be fully transparent to network users and regulators.  
The reliability standards of each network operator must be clearly identified and 
published. Where integration into a supra-national market has been decided, a 
certain degree of harmonization is needed. (…) 
A procedural definition of security of supply under new forms of organization of 
electricity markets is needed, especially where liberalization and unbundling have 
been introduced. This definition should be technically sound and accepted by the 
stakeholders; it should lead to a set of quantitative measurements and to the 
publication of monitoring reports on a regular basis. 
Once the primary energy mix is defined in quantitative terms, assessing security of 
electricity supply still requires some generation related assumptions. For instance, it 
is necessary to estimate the availability of power plants – this is not trivial given the 
introduction of new technologies and new products from different manufacturers, as 
well as the existence of different maintenance and operation strategies of producers 
competing in the wholesale market. It is also necessary to estimate the expected 
output of power plants – again, this is not a trivial task, since it is necessary to define 
the set of statistical data used to compute the output of hydro, wind or solar power 
stations and different stakeholders may have different views about the required level 
of data robustness, according to their own capacity mix. The estimated energy 
outputs will also have an obvious impact upon the necessary reserve margins and 
system costs; this fact reinforces the probability of stakeholders adopting very 
different views on the appropriate selection of statistical data. 
Moreover, some primary energy choices – e.g. decentralized generation – may have 
a considerable impact upon network planning and operation strategies. Transmission 
and distribution networks must be constructed in such a way that electricity can flow 
efficiently from points of generation to points of consumption; the size, type and 
location of power plants clearly influence the grid topology and the associated 
necessary investments. The impact of the chosen primary energy mix upon network 
costs requires a neutral, objective assessment of costs and benefits; it is hard to 
believe that producers and network operators, having contradictory interests, will 
provide the most suitable analytical work. 
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When discussing security of electricity supply, one should carefully examine the 
geographical boundaries of the region under study. (…) 
Defining security of electricity supply at regional, supra-national level, is a new 
challenge from the technical point of view and it may take some time before we 
reach an acceptable result; however, this technical challenge is a minor one as 
compared to the big political challenge that was establishing the principle of a single 
energy market and the common rules for its functioning”.104 
Back in 2008, the European Commission published a Green Paper105 where the 
need to take a different approach to energy networks and their renewed importance 
for the successful achievement of EU policies was explicitly recognised: 
“The task of modernising the power grid to integrate more distributed generation 
units and "smart" technologies to allow better demand management and to absorb 
large amounts of renewable energy generation, going beyond 2020, must become a 
top priority for the EU. (…) 
The new renewable energy and climate change legislation, including the "20-20-20" 
goals, urgently needs to be reflected in network planning and programmes in the 
public and private sectors. 
The EU must develop a comprehensive strategy on integrating renewable energy 
sources into the grid, in full cooperation with national and regional authorities and 
market actors. This should address such issues as cost allocation along the supply 
chain, back-up costs, transmission technologies, the link between local and 
European grids and regulatory coherence. The EU, Member States, and local and 
regional authorities should also encourage and facilitate decentralised energy 
production, which contributes to energy security and offers an important opportunity 
for regional development, creating growth and jobs”. 
However, these very sound statements were not incorporated in the Third Energy 
Package. 
The ‘internal market first’ approach has guided regulatory policies across the EU, as 
well as at EU level (ACER, European Commission) and it has influenced all Network 
Codes foreseen in Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. Basically, the specific technical 
challenges of decarbonisation have been avoided or their importance systematically 
minimised, in order to keep the old planning and capacity adequacy analysis 
methods in place for as long as possible. This situation is now slowly changing, as 
illustrated by the “Mid-term Adequacy Forecast” 2016 recently published by ENTSO-
E, “the first Pan-European probabilistic assessment of adequacy” that “takes into 
                                            
104 Vasconcelos J., Security of energy supply: prophecies and fallacies, 2nd Annual Conference, 
Florence School of Regulation, 12 May 2006. 
105 European Commission (2008), Green paper. Towards a secure, sustainable and competitive 
European energy network, COM(2008) 782 final, Brussels, 13 November 2008. 
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account transformation of the power system with increasing variable generation from 
renewable energy sources”.106 
 
3.2.5 ‘Capacity’ under the new DG Competition policy 
Article 107 TFEU establishes as a general rule that:  
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market”.  
However, numbers 2 and 3 of the same Article establish, respectively, which forms 
of aid “shall be compatible with the internal market” or “may be considered to be 
compatible with the internal market”.  
Article 108 TFEU establishes that: 
“The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States, keep under constant 
review all systems of aid existing in those States. (...) 
The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its 
comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not 
compatible with the internal market having regard to Article 107, it shall without delay 
initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned 
shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a 
final decision”. 
These Articles leave a considerable discretionary latitude in the hands of the 
European Commission. 
In order to provide “a clearer and more coherent architecture of State aid control” the 
European Commission published in 2012 a Communication on EU State Aid 
Modernisation.107 This document states in the introduction that: 
“The single market is Europe's best asset for generating sustainable growth. An 
effective internal market requires the deployment of two instruments: first, regulation 
to create one integrated market without national borders and, second, competition 
policy including State aid control to ensure that the functioning of that internal market 
is not distorted by anticompetitive behaviour of companies or by Member States 
favouring some actors to the detriment of others”. 
In fact, the document addresses the second mentioned instrument (competition 
policy), and not the first one (regulation). However, it should be pointed out that, in 
                                            
106 https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/SDC%20documents/MAF/MAF_2016_FINAL_REPORT.pdf. 
107 European Commission (2012), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on EU 
State Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM(2012) 209 final, Brussels, 8 May 2012. 
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the EU internal market, discussing a regulation without establishing a regulator to 
implement it, is like refining a competition policy without DG COMP – it cannot work. 
While the EU financial market regulators were created in 2011 as part of the 
European System of Financial Supervision; in network industries, including 
electricity, there are, as of yet, no EU regulators (ACER is an agency for the 
cooperation of Member States energy regulators, it is not the European Energy 
Authority). 
The same document foresees the “revision and streamlining of State aid guidelines”, 
including environmental aid. In line with this announcement, the European 
Commission published in 2014 the “Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy 2014-2020” (hereafter called Guidelines).108 
In the introduction, the Guidelines stress the need to phase-out environmentally 
harmful subsidies and recall the importance of the Europe 2020 strategy, as well as 
of the Commission’s proposal for 2030 energy and climate targets,109 namely as 
regards the achievement of an “ambitious commitment to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in line with the 2050 roadmap”, following “a cost-efficient approach” and 
“providing flexibility to Member States to define a low-carbon transition appropriate to 
their specific circumstances”.  
The Guidelines cover many energy relevant aid measures, such as: energy from 
renewable sources, energy efficiency measures (including cogeneration and district 
heating and cooling), reductions in funding support for electricity from renewable 
sources, energy infrastructure and generation adequacy measures. As regards the 
last point, the Guidelines provide the following definitions: 
“generation adequacy means a level of generated capacity which is deemed to be 
adequate to meet demand levels in the Member State in any given period, based on 
the use of a conventional statistical indicator used by organisations which the Union 
institutions recognise as performing an essential role in the creation of a single 
market in electricity, for example ENTSO-E; 
generation adequacy measure means a mechanism which has the aim of ensuring 
that certain generation adequacy levels are met at national level”. 
When addressing aid to energy from renewable sources the Guidelines indicate that: 
“These Guidelines apply to the period up to 2020. However, they should prepare the 
ground for achieving the objectives set in the 2030 Framework. Notably, it is 
expected that in the period between 2020 and 2030 established renewable energy 
sources will become grid competitive, implying that subsidies and exemptions from 
balancing responsibilities should be phased out in a degressive way. These 
                                            
108 European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission on Guidelines on State aid 
for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, Official Journal, C 200/1, 28 June 2014. 
109 European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on A 
policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, COM(2014) 15 final, 
Brussels, 22 January 2014. 
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Guidelines are consistent with that objective and will ensure the transition to a cost-
effective delivery through market-based mechanisms. (…) 
Aid to electricity from renewable energy sources should in principle contribute to 
integrating renewable electricity in the market. However, for certain small types of 
installations, this may not be feasible or appropriate. (…) 
In order to incentivise the market integration of electricity from renewable sources, it 
is important that beneficiaries sell their electricity directly in the market and are 
subject to market obligations. The following cumulative conditions apply from 1 
January 2016 to all new aid schemes and measures: 
(a) aid is granted as a premium in addition to the market price (premium) whereby 
the generators sell its electricity directly in the market; 
(b) beneficiaries are subject to standard balancing responsibilities, unless no liquid 
intra-day markets exist;  
and 
(c) measures are put in place to ensure that generators have no incentive to 
generate electricity under negative prices. (…) 
From 1 January 2017, the following requirements apply: 
Aid is granted in a competitive bidding process on the basis of clear, transparent and 
non-discriminatory criteria, unless: 
(a) Member States demonstrate that only one or a very limited number of projects or 
sites could be eligible;  
or 
(b) Member States demonstrate that a competitive bidding process would lead to 
higher support levels (for example to avoid strategic bidding);  
or 
(c) Member States demonstrate that a competitive bidding process would result in 
low project realisation rates (avoid underbidding)”. 
Besides requiring the introduction of ‘competition for the market’, through mandatory 
auctions for new renewable capacities from 1 January 2017, the Guidelines also 
require ‘competition in the market’: “integrating renewable electricity in the market”. 
Obviously, the market being mentioned there is the legacy ‘standard’ market from 
the era of centralised, conventional power plants. Not the market design of the 
future, where 90% of electricity generation will come from renewable sources of 
primary energy, most of them connected to medium and low voltage level networks. 
Requiring electricity producers from renewable sources to “sell their electricity 
directly in the market” and making them “subject to standard balancing 
responsibilities” delays the necessary market reform and slows down the 
development of electricity from renewable sources. It creates the illusion that the ‘old’ 
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market model and the old planning (capacity) and operational (reliability) rules are 
compatible with the ‘new’ “ambitious commitment to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in line with the 2050 roadmap”. 
This approach is not helping the European Union to achieve 2020 (and beyond) 
renewable energy targets; neither it is helping the European Union to become, again, 
a world leader in renewable energy. In the period 2010-2015, investments on 
renewable energy in Europe decreased by 60%; in the meantime, the volume of 
investment in renewable energy in China is more than twice the corresponding EU 
figure, as can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 3.3: Some figures on investment in RES in Europe and China 
$ bn Europe China 
2004 25 3 
2010 113 40 
2015 49 103 
Source: Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF (2016), Global Trends in Renewable Energy 
Investment 2016, p. 14. 
 
When addressing aid for generation adequacy in the Guidelines, the European 








However, this text is very far from the above-mentioned ‘Communication on EU 
State Aid Modernisation’, where it was clearly stated that an “effective internal 
market requires the deployment of two instruments: first, regulation to create one 
integrated market without national borders”.  
If such a consistent, long-term EU regulatory policy were already in place, anyone 
would easily benefit from: 
− all the assessments mentioned in point (224), which would be regularly 
performed and published; 
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− the identification of “when and where the generation adequacy problem is 
expected to arise” (221), which would be routinely performed and published at 
EU level, triggering suitable warning signals and launching appropriate 
preventive measures, compliant with previously approved procedures; 
− the definition of generation adequacy problems, which would automatically be 
delivered at EU level, i.e., taking into account, simultaneously, the energy mix 
of all Member States and all existing and planned transmission capacities; 
− capacity adequacy assessment which would routinely consider “the 
development of market coupling, intraday markets, balancing markets and 
ancillary services markets and storage of electricity”, as well as the “roll out of 
smart meters” and many other aspects, according to harmonised 
methodologies and data sets. 
In fact, it is the opposite which is true, and these Guidelines assume that such 
consistent EU regulatory policy does not exist and they establish some criteria to 
evaluate ‘capacity related State aid’ cases on a national basis. Unfortunately, this 
approach based on Guidelines is technically flawed because, in an interconnected 
system with the current penetration of intermittent generation, no meaningful 
assessment of capacity adequacy can be performed at the national level. What may 
look like an issue of capacity inadequacy at national scale may disappear when the 
analysis is performed on an EU scale. And vice-versa, one Member State may 
believe that it has no capacity adequacy problem, based on a national assessment, 
while it may turn out that, because of the combined effects of energy mix options in 
the other Member States, there will be a problem in the future. 
Requiring market agents from neighbouring Member States to be allowed to 
participate in capacity mechanisms in a given Member State as a precondition for 
the approval of ‘State aid cases’ may seem very supportive of the internal market. 
However, if the analysis is performed at the national level only and does not take in 
due account the technical intricacies of reliability and capacity adequacy throughout 
a large interconnected system with increasing volumes of intermittent generation and 
increasing amounts of electronic control devices, it does not lead to more reliable, 
more efficient and more integrated markets. 
The second instrument (competition policy) is fundamental “to ensure that the 
functioning of that internal market is not distorted by anticompetitive behavior”, but if 
it is based on incomplete information it will be of little value. Only a robust and 
consistent EU regulatory framework, taking into due account EU long-term policies, 
as well as Member State primary energy and technology options and the technical 
characteristics of the whole interconnected system can ensure the functioning of the 
internal electricity market and can provide the conceptual framework and the 
necessary data to accurately assess the behaviour of market agents and States. 
The major conceptual weakness of the Guidelines, i.e. the absence of a coherent 
vision on the combination of EU markets and policies, is reflected in the recent ‘Final 
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Report of the Sector Inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms’,110 published on November 
30, 2016. Instead of addressing capacity and reliability issues within the complex 
framework of EU policies, the Final Report follows the ‘market first’ approach, 
described in the previous Section, ignoring EU climate policy. This is acknowledged 
in a very candid way in the Report’s last footnote, preceding the list of overall 
conclusions: 
“These conclusions focus primarily on the ability of various types of capacity 
mechanisms to address problems of security of electricity supply in the most cost 
effective and least market distortive way. Capacity mechanisms can however affect 
the generation mix and therefore interact with policy instruments aimed at fostering 
decarbonisation. As recognised by the Energy and Environmental Aid Guidelines in 
paragraphs (220) and (233)(e), the design of capacity mechanisms should take into 
account these impacts in order to contribute to the overall coherence of EU energy 
policy in electricity markets”.  
Capacity mechanisms can indeed affect the generation mix. For sure, the generation 
mix affects the methodologies and the data sets needed to perform a sensible 
capacity adequacy assessment. And, as long as the Treaty is not changed, the 
generation mix is determined by Member States, not by competition policy. To 
reconcile Member States’ freedom with the overall reliability of interconnected 
systems and the efficiency of supra-State markets, a comprehensive, consistent EU 
regulatory framework is indispensable. Only within this framework can “the most cost 
effective and least market distortive” capacity mechanisms be designed. 
 
  
                                            
110 European Commission (2016), Report from the Commission – Final Report of the Sector Inquiry on 
Capacity Mechanisms, COM(2016) 752 final, Brussels, 30 November 2016. 
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3.3 Structure of transmission tariffs 
Since 2003, all transmission and distribution electricity and natural gas network 
tariffs in the EU should be “fixed or approved” by national regulatory authorities. 
However, given the existing regulatory diversity in Europe – not to mention multiple 
government interventions in tariff setting – it is not an easy task to compare energy 
network tariffs across Europe. The difficulty concerns both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects; in other words, it concerns: 
− tariff levels (how much, on average, is paid for each energy unit flowing 
through a given network); 
− tariff structures (what is paid – i.e. which costs are included; who pays; how 
they are paid – i.e. which variables are used to assign costs to network users; 
where it is paid – whether tariffs are national, regional or nodal; when – i.e., 
whether tariffs are time-of-use dependent or not).  
 
Current status 
Fig. 3.4 shows the diversity of transmission tariff levels across Europe.111 
 
Fig 3.4: Unit Transmission Tariffs as computed by ENTSO-E 
 
Figure 3.5 on the next page illustrates the structural diversity of electricity 
transmission tariffs in general. 
                                            
111 ENTSO-E (2016), Overview of Transmission Tariffs in Europe: Synthesis 2016, June 2016, p. 11. 
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The following table shows the existing diversity of electricity transmission tariff 
structures in Europe concerning some selected features.112 
 
Table 3.4: Diversity of transmission tariff structures in Europe – selected features 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows the different composition of transmission lines, by voltage level, 
managed by TSOs in Europe.113 
                                            
112 Ibid., p. 9. 
113 Ibid., p. 34. 
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Table 3.5: Weight of different voltage levels operated by TSOs in Europe 
 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the voltage threshold between distribution and transmission 
networks, as well as the voltage levels managed by DSOs in each Member State.114 
 
                                            
114 Eurelectric (2013), Power Distribution in Europe: facts and Figures, p. 15 (the document is 
available at www.eurelectric.org/media/113155/dso_report-web_final-2013-030-0764-01-e.pdf). 
138 
 
Fig 3.6: Voltage levels managed by DNOs in the EU in 2011 
 
Purpose and need for harmonisation 
Potentially, differences in transmission tariff structures among the EU Member 
States may lead to market distortions in the internal energy market. However, this 
risk should not be overstated, first of all because average transmission tariffs are 
much lower than wholesale energy prices; hence, their impact on cross-border trade 
is limited.  
The major factor that may distort cross-border trade, in terms of transmission tariff 
structure, is the different allocation of transmission costs to generators and 
consumers. Yet, as shown in Figure 3.7, all the continental EU Member States but 




Fig 3. 7 Share of Generation and Load network charges in %. Source: ENTSO-E 
(2016) 
 
Moreover, in continental Europe: 
− Locational price signals are almost non-existent; 
− System services and losses are predominantly included in transmission tariffs. 
Harmonisation of the ratio between generation and load in favour of load was 
decided by national regulators on a voluntary basis at the very beginning of 
electricity liberalisation in Europe, in the late 1990s. In fact, this was one of the first – 
and one of the very few – times where national regulators achieved a relevant result 
at the EU level by just using their powers at the national level in a sensible and 
coordinated way – i.e. deciding to implement the same solution at the same time in 
all Member States. This approach does not require specific EU legislation and it 
does not require a supra-national body to enforce the collective decision. But it 
requires, of course, a very strong commitment of all national regulators to the internal 
energy market – and a certain quantum of peer pressure. 
Ten years later, Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 established an open framework for a 





2. Guidelines may also determine appropriate rules leading to a progressive 

































































































































































producers and consumers (load) under national tariff systems, including the 
reflection of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism in 
national network charges and the provision of appropriate and efficient locational 
signals, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 14. 
 
The issue has been debated since then and the central remaining question is 
whether there should be a legal framework for further harmonisation of transmission 
tariffs. 
In order to provide supporting information for policy decisions, ACER recently 
sponsored a study called ‘Scoping towards potential harmonisation of electricity 
transmission tariff structures’.115 
“The benefits of a shorter-term regulatory response on harmonisation (e.g. removal 
of G-charges or greater harmonisation of the G-L split) are, in the consultant’s view, 
unlikely to outweigh potential costs. Given a general lack of evidence and certainty 
that differences in tariff structures in practice lead to inefficient outcomes, CEPA 
concludes that the benefits of shorter-term regulatory response would be highly 
uncertain. … 
In the longer term, CEPA believes that there is a stronger case for further 
harmonisation, based on the need for greater consistency and application of tariff 
structures that reflect the costs generated by market participants’ decisions. CEPA 
proposes that Member States establish a clear and harmonised set of principles 
based on an agreement on the balance between the policy objectives set out in the 
Third Package. Specifically, the consultant proposes cost reflectivity and cost 
recovery, as well as transparency and predictability, as key factors to be 
considered”. 
 
The conclusions drawn from the study indicate that no clear case for further 
harmonisation can be found: 
 
“The Agency notes a potential for the current absence of harmonised tariff structures 
to impact negatively on the efficiency of the IEM, potentially distorting the market 
participants’ investment and operational decisions. However, according to CEPA’s 
investigation, the distortions are not evident at the moment and highly uncertain in 
the future, and the evidence and associated impact are not easily identifiable or are 
not material. The Agency notes the current ambitious market reform including the 
Network Codes currently being progressed and the Energy Union Strategy, and 
considers it reasonable to deliver those first. In that regards, the Agency agrees with 
                                            
115 ACER (2015), Scoping towards potential harmonisation of electricity transmission tariff structures. 
Conclusions and next steps, December 2015. 
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CEPA’s conclusion that any potential distortions, or benefits of harmonisation, would 
be more easily appraised in the future, as markets become more integrated and 
reforms are delivered. Equally, a visible and measurable distortion from the absence 
of, or a benefit of further harmonisation, should be observable in order to set out 
clear and objective principles needed for the development of a Network Code. In 
conclusion, the Agency considers a formal Framework Guidelines process to be a 
disproportionate response at this stage”. 
 
ACER also outlines the main aspects to be considered when setting transmission 
tariffs aiming “to be fed into the new Energy Market Design considerations, in 
coordination with CEER’s work on distribution tariffs”: 
 
More specifically, the following aspects may be considered in establishing a common 
set of transmission tariff principles: 
· Cost reflectivity principle. Consider the role of transmission tariffs in line with the 
new Energy Market Design and policy objectives and identify the cost categories 
included in the transmission tariff. The latter would consider the types of costs 
included in transmission tariffs in combination with future electricity market design, 
such as the definition of generation charges referred to in Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 838/2010, and the charging method for each cost category. 
· Explore various options behind the cost recovery principle to ensure transmission 
costs are recovered in the least distortionary manner. 
· Transparency and predictability. 
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3.4 The lack of harmonisation of ‘State aid’ to large energy 
consumers through discounts on network tariffs and ancillary 
services. 
 
Many Member States have exempted large industrial consumers from the payment 
of certain components of transmission tariffs. This may create distortions of 
competition in some energy-intensive industries; however, it does not seem to be a 
serious problem in the electricity industry itself. 
The legal basis for special treatment of large electricity consumers consists of three 
main documents that will be briefly introduced in what follows. 
1. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the 
Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity.116 
This Directive foresees the possibility of several exemptions and acknowledges that: 
“(28) Certain exemptions or reductions in the tax level may prove necessary; notably 
because of the lack of a stronger harmonisation at Community level, because of the 
risks of a loss of international competitiveness or because of social or environmental 
considerations. 
(29) Businesses entering into agreements to significantly enhance environmental 
protection and energy efficiency deserve attention; among these businesses, energy 
intensive ones merit specific treatment.” 
Article 17 of this Directive provides special treatment to energy-intensive consumers 
in the following terms: 
 
                                            
116 Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the 




2. DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC.117 
                                            
117 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, Official Journal, L 275/32, 25 October 2003. This Directive was 
amended subsequently by the Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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This Directive foresees “measures to support certain energy-intensive industries in 
the event of carbon leakage”. The risk of carbon leakage is defined as follows 
(Article 10a): 
“15. A sector or subsector shall be deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage if:  
(a) the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of 
this Directive would lead to a substantial increase of production costs, calculated as 
a proportion of the gross value added, of at least 5 %; and 
(b) the intensity of trade with third countries, defined as the ratio between the total 
value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries and 
the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third 
countries), is above10 %. 
16. Notwithstanding paragraph 15, a sector or subsector is also deemed to be 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage if:  
(a) the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of 
this Directive would lead to a particularly high increase of production costs, 
calculated as a proportion of the gross value added, of at least 30 %; or 
(b) the intensity of trade with third countries, defined as the ratio between the total 
value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries and 
the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third 
countries), is above30 %.” 
 





Germany and France have already allocated, respectively, 245 M€ (2015) and 93 
M€ (2016) per year to subsidise electricity prices of industries exposed to the risk of 
carbon leakage. Most Member States have not yet made use of this possibility, while 
others have applied very small amounts (e.g. Spain – 4 M€). 
 
3. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (2014/C 200/01)118 





Based on these Guidelines, DG COMP has approved exemptions up to 95% of 
transmission costs for large electricity consumers in Germany, France119 and Italy;120 
                                            
118 European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission on Guidelines on State aid 
for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, Official Journal, C 200/1, 28 June 2014. 
119 Case SA.43468 (2016/NN). Final decision CE C(2016) 5251 final of 11.08.2016. See also: 
− Loi n° 2015-1786 du 29 décembre 2015 de finances rectificative pour 2015. 
− Décret n° 2016-141 du 11 février 2016 relatif au statut d'électro-intensif et à la réduction de 
tarif d'utilisation du réseau public de transport accordée aux sites fortement consommateurs 
d'électricité. 
120 See: 
− Decreto-Legge n. 83/12, convertito dalla Legge n. 134/12; 
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reductions up to 85% in Poland121 and Denmark;122 and in several other Member 
States (some cases still pending). 
In Germany, for instance, only 42% of industrial demand pays the full tariff 
corresponding to renewable energy support (6,88 cent/kWh), as shown in Fig 3.8.123 
43% of industrial demand pays a reduced tariff between 0,05 and 1,38 cent/kWh. 
 
 
Fig 3.8: Contribution of industrial electricity demand to the payment of renewable 
subsidies in Germany, 2017 tariffs 
 
  
                                                                                                                                        
− AEEGSI Delibera 17 novembre 2016 677/2016/R/eel. 
121 Case 37345 (2015/NN.). See also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261395/261395_1832252_133_2.pdf. 





Part 2 – “Removing roadblocks with the appropriate pillars” 
 
 




The first part of our report, consisting of chapters form 1 to 3, illustrates that, 
although it has been more than two decades since its inception, the creation of a 
single, integrated European power market is still a work in progress. A series of 
issues, which stem from inadequate or ineffective solutions from decision-makers to 
basic policy questions, is hindering the integration process. Compounded by the 
current challenges of decarbonisation and digitalisation, those factors constitute 
‘roadblocks’ in the path towards the establishment of a truly ‘Europeanised’ power 
market with seamless transmission system operation and operators.  
In our view, two of these roadblocks are particularly relevant and deserve full 
consideration. They are redispatching actions, on the one hand, and capacity 
adequacy and crisis management, on the other hand. Chapter 4 analyses them, 
describing the issues at stake, the reasons why they were not tackled before and 
explains why they are currently hampering the process of Europeanisation. 
Redispatching actions are the actions which are implemented following market 
closure by TSOs to relieve network congestions. By asking certain power plants to 
reduce or to increase generation, TSOs try to cope with the variability of RES 
production while also trying to reconcile market outcomes with the electricity flows 
that the interconnected European grid is physically able to accommodate with a 
reasonable security margin. The fast deployment of RES and the growth of trade in 
electricity across borders over the last few years have increased the need for TSOs 
to implement redispatching actions and the corresponding costs. The need and the 
benefits of coordination and cooperation of TSOs on the issue have become, 
respectively, more urgent and apparent. 
Cross-border redispatching actions call for stronger coordination among TSOs and 
for appropriate cost sharing mechanisms, which are rarely in place today. In the 
current legal and regulatory framework this is hardly a surprise. The lack of a 
common definition and actual data on redispatching costs, the potential redistributive 
impact of any allocative mechanism and the national liability of the TSOs – subject to 
national regulatory oversight – make the development of proper sharing mechanisms 
a sensitive topic. In turn, this slows down the development of coordination and 
cooperation of TSOs on redispatching actions and the optimal operation of the 
European interconnected system. 
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Capacity adequacy is the ability of a power system to cover demand at any time 
using its generation and demand response resources. Historically, capacity 
adequacy has been assessed at national level and vertically integrated public 
monopolies were entrusted with its promotion. Due to growing interconnections 
between the grids of European countries, national systems are becoming more and 
more interdependent, thereby making any capacity assessment performed in 
isolation at national level of little meaning. Developments in neighbouring countries 
have today profound impacts on any domestic power system, as illustrated recently 
by the ‘electricity crisis’ of January 2017. 
Concerns over the lack of reliable capacity are today widespread in Europe and 
several governments have introduced or are planning to introduce capacity 
remuneration mechanisms next to the traditional energy-only markets. In many 
cases, these policies are implemented in an uncoordinated way and on the basis of 
capacity assessments that do not capture the full impact of interconnections and 
resources in neighbouring countries. Overinvestment in generation capacity and 
distortions to the functioning of the internal energy market are concrete possibilities. 
Interdependence among national systems also affects crisis management. Extreme 
conditions, as for instance a strong cold snap in winter or a prolonged heat wave, 
can severely stress power systems and call for emergency actions to ensure 
continuity of supply. Traditionally, national TSOs have been responsible for keeping 
the lights on by managing scarce resources during times of crisis. Their national 
responsibility and, at times, distrust of neighbours, explain why solidarity, although 
most needed, is not always shown in these difficult periods and coordination of 





Twelve blocking factors have been presented in chapters 2 and 3, creating 
respectively first-order and second-order coordination issues for the implementation 
of a well-functioning European power market and system. Among these issues, 
European institutions and stakeholders are already coping and advancing with 
regard to issues like the lack of comprehensive coordination of system planning, the 
lack of comprehensive coordination of cross-border investments, the lack of common 
reserve contracting and cost allocation, and the lack of intraday cross-border 
capacity allocation with auctions. 
However, European institutions and stakeholders have achieved little or no 
improvements at all regarding some issues that, from our point of view, represent 
two major ‘roadblocks’ on the path towards an integrated and decarbonised 
European power sector. These two barriers, which this chapter will investigate in 
more detail as examples and case studies, are: 
− Roadblock (1): ‘dealing with redispatching actions’; 
− Roadblock (2): ‘capacity adequacy and crisis management’. 
The first issue of ‘redispatching actions’ encompasses two of the blocking factors 
mentioned in the previous chapters, i.e. the lack of comprehensive system operation 
and the lack of a common redispatching approach. On the other hand, the second 
issue, ‘capacity adequacy and crisis management’, incorporates three different 
blocking factors, i.e. the lack of a common definition of power security of supply, the 
lack of harmonisation of load shedding schemes, and the lack of comprehensive 
coordination for solidarity. 
This fourth chapter aims to illustrate our core methodology, as demonstrated in the 
first three chapters of the report. According to this, to fully and comprehensively 
overcome any particular roadblock, one would first have to ensure that all the 
relevant blocking factors are addressed and tackled. By applying this methodology, 
one would drive the European market and system integration through tighter and 
more efficient system-wide coordination and solidarity. 
To show how our methodology treats these roadblocks in the building of a more 
efficient European power architecture, we proceed as follows. For each of these 
issues, we look in detail at three aspects. First, we describe the issue, in particular 
the potential or concrete inefficiencies on exchanges and investment decisions 
arising from it. Second, we question why the issue has not been tackled before, by 
looking at the root of the problem (at a technical, organisational, economic, 
institutional, legal and political level). Finally, we explain why the issue acts as a 
roadblock in the process of building a more efficient European power system, in 
terms of cost sharing, coordination and solidarity.  
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4.2 Roadblock One: dealing with redispatching actions 
 
4.2.1 What's the issue? 
TSOs are legally responsible for the management of power flows on their national 
network. As a consequence, if they notice that the power flows resulting from the 
decisions of market players and the market outcome exceed the maximal flows 
acceptable through wires and other network devices, they will take redispatching 
actions in order to modify these flows.124 Redispatching actions, which are taken 
outside of the day-ahead and the intraday electricity markets, can be preventive, if 
they are carried out before real time, i.e. ‘long’ before congestions concretely 
materialise, or curative, if they are taken in real time, i.e. just before or after 
congestions materialise.  
Since most national markets have a single price zone,125 TSOs generally use 
‘redispatching’ to manage power flows at national scale. Indeed, having a single 
price zone for a whole country assumes that the national power network is a copper 
plate with no internal bottlenecks. This assumption is usually unrealistic from the 
physical point of view and TSOs often act and implement redispatching actions as a 
last resort to relieve internal network congestions. 
Congestions also occur at the borders between national price zones. These 
bottlenecks have been mainly managed in the past with explicit and implicit capacity 
auctions, but congestion levels along interconnections or on national grid lines highly 
interactive with cross-border trade have recently become so high, that ‘cross-border 
redispatching actions’ are now regularly needed. An example of this trend is 
represented by the power network in the Central Eastern Europe area (CEE), which 
was stressed or highly stressed for 62% of the time in 2015, requiring cross-border 
coordination between TSOs at the day-ahead stage (Coreso, 2015). 
It is important to note that the real-time network constraints that must be managed 
through redispatching actions are the consequence of problems occurring earlier, 
ahead of time, which are not properly addressed by the current market design. In 
Europe, congestion management is actually based on a set of tools. First, there are 
mechanisms for transmission capacity calculation between pre-defined bidding 
zones (ATC-based or flow-based products) and, second, there are mechanisms for 
the allocation of transmission capacity at different time horizons, from year-ahead to 
intraday.126 
                                            
124 We assume here that all zero cost actions that TSOs can take in order to reduce the level of power 
flowing through congested network elements (e.g. changes in network topology via the coupling or 
decoupling of network nodes, changes in phase-shifting transformer taps, etc.) have already been 
implemented.  
125 Exceptions are represented by Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Italy. 
126 In the long run, investments on the transmission network and in generation down the congested 
lines can also solve the problem. For instance, the installation of phase-shifters at a border can help 
to manage cross-border congestions. This is what happened in the last few years between Germany 
and Poland. 
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It is then the ‘market design’ which nurtures operational constraints. Uniform pricing 
across large bidding zones creates unscheduled loop-flows and transit flows, while 
smaller bidding zones with borders more aligned with the congested lines reduce the 
need for cross-border redispatching actions because, in the latter case, markets are 
better equipped to take into account the physical limits of what the grid can 
effectively accommodate.  
Nevertheless, better designed bidding zones do not fully eliminate the need for 
redispatching. First, because unforeseen events like sudden outages or changes in 
renewables output can trigger congestions. Second, because transmission capacity 
auctions between smaller and better configured bidding zones may not be optimal to 
deal with all the network constraints present in the European power system 
(Sadowska and Willems, 2013). Indeed, zonal pricing alone does not ensure that the 
available network capacity is entirely used and in the most efficient way, because 
market players do not have access to the whole physical details of the network 
topology and to the precise location of all alternative generators. Therefore, a 
combination of zonal pricing with properly defined zones and limited redispatching 
can provide a more efficient allocation of resources and welfare maximisation. 
It is often extremely difficult and sometimes impossible in practice to distinguish 
between national and cross-border redispatching.127 This happens because the 
European power grid is highly meshed, at least in the CWE and in the CEE areas, 
and congestions occur mainly on ‘internal’ lines due to intermingled internal and 
international power exchanges (Duthaler, 2009). 
The difficulty of assessing the origin of many congestions and, as a result, the 
impossibility of identifying in a thorough and systematic way  who is ‘responsible’ for 
them often prevents any meaningful discrimination between internal and cross-
border redispatching. In turn, this makes the sharing of redispatching costs even 
more important and difficult to perform properly. 
Currently, different methods are implemented to share cross-border redispatching 
costs.128 In continental Europe, TSOs distinguish between cross-border 
redispatching actions required to relieve congestions on interconnections and cross-
border redispatching actions required to relieve congestions on internal lines. For 
cross-border redispatching actions required to relieve congestions on 
interconnections, the current practice is to equally share costs between the TSOs on 
both ends of the line. However, this situation represents only a minority of cases. For 
cross-border redispatching actions required to relieve congestions on internal lines, 
the most frequent case in fact, the principle of ‘requester pays’ usually applies. 
According to it, the costs of remedial measures are paid by the TSOs who have 
asked other TSOs for assistance, regardless of whether they have or have not 
                                            
127 An exception is for parts of national networks that are organised as antennas. Consequently, 
cross-border flows cannot have an impact on them and the cause of a congestion can be more easily 
identified. 
128 ENTSO-E mentioned in 2012 that an agreement on the sharing of cross-border redispatching 
costs had been decided for 65% of inter-TSOs borders and that similar agreements were under 
discussion for an additional 10% of borders (ACER & ENTSO-E, 2012). 
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caused the problem (Vukasovic and Vujasinovic, 2014). However, to our knowledge, 
it is not mentioned anywhere how the costs of remedial actions resulting from 
proposals suggested by RSCs like Coreso or TSC are allocated (in these cases the 
need for redispatching is not flagged by a single TSO but by the RSC and the 
‘requester pays’ principle cannot be applied). 
In the Nordic power system, a distinction is made between the actions taken day-
ahead and the actions taken in real time. The cost of actions taken day-ahead is 
borne by the TSO that takes the decision. As for cross-border redispatching actions 
decided intraday or in real time, a further distinction is taken between actions to 
manage flows on interconnections and actions taken to manage flows on internal 
lines. For congestions on interconnections between bidding zones, cross-border 
redispatching costs are shared between the TSOs according to the “average market 
price of the two bidding zones [involved]” (ACER & ENTSO-E, 2012). For congestion 
within a bidding zone, the respective TSO bears the full technical, financial and 
operative liability for countertrading, meaning that each TSO bears the costs of 
countertrading (ACER & ENTSO-E, 2012).  
Given the variety of methods for the allocation of costs, it is important to question the 
incentives such methods provide to i) manage efficiently and reliably the power flows 
in real time with redispatching; ii) manage efficiently and reliably the power flows 
before real time by offering adequate cross-border capacity for market exchanges; 
and iii) invest adequately in cross-border transmission capacity in the long run. 
About the first two points – i.e. the efficient and reliable management of power flows 
in real time with redispatching and the provision of adequate cross-border capacity 
for market exchanges – the efficiency of the cost sharing methods currently in use is 
questionable.  
As for the cost sharing of redispatching actions in continental Europe, it incentivises 
TSOs to wait until the last minute to request coordinated actions for relieving internal 
constraints. The logic behind it is quite simple. By waiting, it may happen that 
another TSO faces a stronger constraint on its grid and makes the request first: in 
this case the payment for the remedial action is going to be borne by that TSO. 
However, such logic is risky and consequential for the whole interconnected system, 
because waiting until the last minute may make it more difficult to find adequate 
solutions to relieve the congestion or to deal with other, subsequent, congestions 
that may result from the management of the first one. 
A similar problem exists in the cost sharing method applied in the Nordic area, 
because any redispatching action before real time is to be managed by the country 
where the constraint is appearing. In addition, TSOs have the incentive to change 
the transmission capacity they offer for market transactions, because by doing so 
they influence market prices and the way redispatching costs are shared in real time 
(history shows that this kind of incentive exists both in theory and practice, Glachant 
and Pignon, 2005). Due to these inefficient short-term incentives in the current 
Nordic sharing scheme for cross-border redispatching costs, TSOs do not receive 
efficient economic signals for investment in network interconnections.  
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4.2.2 Why wasn’t it tackled before? 
The issue of how to share cross-border redispatching costs has not yet been tackled 
for a series of reasons of different nature: technical, organisation, institutional, legal 
and political. 
First, from a technical point of view, the implementation of cross-border 
redispatching actions on a large scale is quite new. Coreso and TSC, the two 
Regional Security Coordination Initiatives (RSCIs) launched in 2008, began to 
perform security analysis close to real time in 2009. Coreso mentioned already in 
2010 that “[it] has been able to propose coordinated actions that were less costly 
than the solutions foreseen by individual TSOs [in 2009]”, while TSC started to test 
multilateral redispatching actions in 2012. Multilateral redispatching actions did not 
just appear only six years ago, but at the beginning they were implemented with 
much less intensity than now. To have an idea of that, it is enough to say that 
stressed or highly stressed situations occurred only 11% of the time in the CWE area 
in 2009. Such a number was three times bigger in 2015. Similarly, in the Central 
South Europe area (CSE) stressed or highly stressed situations occurred 24% of the 
time in 2010 and 34% in 2015. The frequency of coordinated redispatching is 
increasing so much, that it makes the issue of reshaping the methods for 
redispatching cost sharing increasingly significant (Marinescu et al., 2005). 
Until quite recently, redispatching actions were mainly used at national scale only, 
while they are now increasingly implemented at cross-border level too. This is 
because cross-border interconnection capacity in the past, even if in some cases 
frequently saturated, was adapted to the generation portfolio. Its location was 
inherited from the previous era of vertically integrated companies, exchanging 
energy through long-term cross-border contracts. However, since the beginning of 
the liberalisation process, cross-border exchanges of power have increased and the 
network assets have been used closer to their technical security limits. Besides that, 
the European generation portfolio and its location have changed dramatically in 
recent years, in particular due to the large and swift deployment of RES, which now 
represent the main driver of network expansion in Europe (ENTSO-E, 2016). Until 
the new wave of grid assets planned or under construction become operational, the 
European power network will not be adapted to the generation portfolio and the 
power system will remain difficult to manage. Unscheduled flows (loop flows and 
transit flows) and the resulting constraints on the network have already become 
more frequent. Since it is almost impossible to manage congestion resulting from 
unscheduled flows at national scale, the need for coordinated actions among TSOs 
has become more apparent and so too does the issue of sharing the ensuing costs. 
Second, the question of sharing redispatching costs is also difficult to tackle from an 
organisational point of view. Public debate often mixes the market and the technical 
operation of the power system and there is confusion between the methods and 
responsibilities to solve market operation issues on the one hand and technical 
operation issues on the other.  
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In addition to that, the matter of cross-border sharing of the redispatching cost 
encompasses a large number of TSOs (seven TSOs in Coreso and 13 in TSC). It is 
clearly more difficult to find a consensual solution to move from the status quo with 
such a high number of actors involved. Moreover, until quite recently the 
redispatching costs to be shared were limited and some TSOs thought it was not a 
priority to modify their sharing rules (see for instance, ČEPS, 2011), despite being 
aware of the poor incentives as a result (Vukasovic and Vujasinovic, 2014). An 
essential question of governance then emerges about the definition of cost sharing 
mechanisms. Governance should be such that it avoids deadlock, e.g. a situation 
where each TSO has a veto right and can block the whole decision process. 
Nevertheless, without more details on this point, one could expect that individual 
veto is the default rule for the moment. 
Third, the redistributive impact of changing the sharing rule of cross-border 
redispatching costs represents an institutional barrier. Real or expected losers will 
oppose such change and will be able to block it, as far as the governance is based 
on the veto rights of a country or zone.  
From an institutional point of view, the lack of any accurate and neutral 
measurement of cross-border redispatching costs can also be a problem. Since it is 
difficult, if not entirely impossible, to distinguish between national and cross-border 
redispatching, it is then obviously demanding to correctly allocate the associated 
costs. 
Due to the uncertainty of the measurement of redispatching costs, the impact of 
changing the sharing rules cannot be determined with precision as well, i.e. the 
share of costs borne by the different TSOs is unclear and can only be roughly 
estimated. As a consequence of that, inaction prevails and current sharing rules are 
maintained. Even more worrying is the fact that such rules are not questioned 
anymore, despite their drawbacks being well known. 
Fourth, the existing legal framework helps to explain why the sharing of cross-border 
redispatching costs has not been tackled until now. Indeed, the responsibility of each 
TSO is defined only at national level, either for balancing or managing power flows. 
For the moment, there is no strong European regulation framing the obligation of 
TSOs at a regional or European level, although power flows on the European 
network are cross-border by nature from a physical and economic point of view.  
From a legal point of view, it has to be noted that existing EU legislation does not 
seem to be well applied to this specific case, thereby contributing to the currently 
blocked situation. Indeed, the 2009 electricity Directive states that regulators shall 
cooperate to improve the functioning of the internal energy market. Applied to the 
present issue, the principle affirmed in the Directive would imply that national 
regulators have to find ways to share the associated costs. Unfortunately, they did 
not do that and the issue is still pending. 
Fifth and finally, a political barrier can also explain why the question of sharing cross-
border redispatching costs has not yet been confronted. The issue is potentially a 
political hot topic because it implies an agreement on cross-country payments. From 
the past experience of the Inter-TSO Compensation (ITC) scheme or the more 
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recent debate on the Cross-Border Cost Allocation (CBCA) of Projects of Common 
Interests (PCIs), one should be aware of how difficult this kind of mechanisms are to 
agree upon and how difficult it is to make them evolve (see for ITC Pérez-Arriaga 
and Olmos, 2009 and see for CBCA Meeus and Keyaerts, 2014).  
This barrier is augmented by the absence of clear measurements of cross-border 
redispatching costs. They are published neither in an aggregated manner nor in a 
disaggregated one (some TSOs do provide some pieces of information like, for 
instance, the cross-border redispatching cost in Finland and France129 or the volume 
of cross-border redispatching in the TenneT control zone130). It is obviously difficult – 
if not entirely impossible – to discuss rationally something that is not accurately 
measured. The issue is then open to interpretation and anyone can have a legitimate 
concern that anyone else will try to force her to pay more for cross-border 
redispatching than is justified. This fear can be conveyed by TSOs or by regulators: 
in the context of incentive regulation, every slice of cross-border redispatching costs 
paid by foreigners contributes to seemingly reduced domestic costs. 
From a political point of view, the redistribution of cross-border redispatching costs 
according to some explicit rules may even sound contradictory, because historically 
redispatching costs used to be socialised at national level (this has usually been 
done through network tariffs, mainly paid by electricity consumers, hidden behind 
national market design rules or managed through a limitation of cross-border 
exchanges). The decision to socialise those costs was in line with the traditional 
assumption that national grids should be considered as a copper plate, thereby 
facilitating electricity trade, and in line with the political idea spread in Europe that 
electricity is a public service that everybody should have access to under the same 
conditions, whatever the location within national borders (think of remote islands for 
France or Spain). 
Finally, from a political point of view, cross-border redispatching costs should not 
even exist. Indeed, while building the European market, it was thought that cross-
border congestions would have been managed through market mechanisms alone 
(auctions, market coupling, etc.). However, this is not a panacea from a technical 
and an economic point of view. Without political acceptance of the existence of 
cross-border redispatching, it then seems difficult to open a sound discussion on 
sharing the associated costs. 
 
4.2.3 Is it a roadblock? 
The failure to solve the issue of cross-border redispatching actions and the sharing 
the associated costs is blocking the building of the IEM for three reasons: system 
reliability, coordination or even governance, as well as in terms of cost sharing. 
                                            
129 See the RTE webpage dedicated to redispatching, countertrading and associated costs 
https://clients.rte-france.com/lang/an/visiteurs/vie/redispatch_countertrade_and_costs.jsp and the 
Fingrid webpage dedicated to countertrade http://www.fingrid.fi/en/electricity-market/market-
integration/countertrade/Pages/default.aspx. 
130 See TenneT (2015). 
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First, ‘management of network constraints’ is by nature essential for the European 
power market, in particular as a matter of reliability. Redispatching, whether 
implemented at national or at cross-border scale is the last resort to relieve network 
constraints, thereby it is indispensable for the successful functioning of the IEM.  
Second, ‘dealing with redispatching actions’ raises a matter of cross-border 
coordination, in a bilateral and multilateral way. In this regard, TSOs have already 
been tackling the issue for the past several years through the development of the 
RSCIs. At the same time, other topics related to the management of network 
constraints must addressed at a fundamental level in order to unlock transmission 
congestion and make the European power system as seamless as possible. 
Focusing on redispatching actions, one should not forget that part of the congestions 
in real time result from poorly defined bidding zones (either due to short term and 
infrequent constraints or to more structural ones) and flexible resources (demand-
response or curtailment of RES) that are not fully utilised. These issues must also be 
treated in order to foster the integration of European electricity markets and increase 
competition through a network more efficiently used. These issues thus raise the 
matter of coordination. To a greater extent, they raise the issue of governance, 
because dealing with them requires revamping some of the national market designs 
and making them converge toward a common target model.  
The third and last reason that makes cross-border redispatching actions a roadblock 
in the project of a more efficient European system is the question of how to share the 
costs related to congestion management as a whole. It concerns obviously the 
question of how to share redispatching costs, since redispatching actions are 
implemented to solve congestions. But it is also linked to the redefinition of bidding 
zones, because it modifies how the costs of cross-border network constraints are 
shared day-ahead and intraday through differences in energy prices. It is also related 
to cross-border cost allocation of network investment and existing transmission 
assets. Sharing these costs may be perceived only as a matter of equity between the 
users of the European power network and the allocation of congestion and network 
costs. However, the allocation of these costs provides key incentives for generators 
and consumers to use the transmission network in a more or less efficient way. And 
more importantly, it also incentivises TSOs in the way they manage the network, 
providing transmission capacity to the market and network users, and in developing 
the network itself in the long term. Considering the central role of the TSOs in power 
flow management, such incentives must be designed with care to ensure efficient 
power flow management, the provision of capacity to the market and network 
development. Unfortunately, as we have seen in section 4.2.1, the current sharing 
rules of cross-border redispatching costs provide inefficient and even counter-
productive incentives to TSOs. Changing the rules on how to share cross-border 
redispatching costs should then provide better incentives to manage congestion as a 
whole. Consequently, better defined bidding zones and cross-border cost allocation 
would then increase available transmission capacity and make it more reliable. 
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4.3 Capacity adequacy and crisis management 
 
4.3.1 What’s the issue? 
When a TSO faces a situation that is too risky to cope with because the load is too 
high compared to available generation, electricity markets might stop working 
properly and crisis management rules are to be called upon to avoid an overall 
blackout. It is a last resort solution that bypasses the market economic rationale 
(Joskow and Tirole, 2005), to go straight to capping demand with load shedding or 
shedding only those consumers with a confirmed low willingness to pay (interruptible 
consumers). In order to limit the frequency of load shedding to an acceptable level 
given the estimated value of lost load, capacity adequacy must be monitored from a 
system-wide perspective, i.e. someone has to monitor if generation and demand 
response capacity in the system is able to cover the higher levels of the non-flexible 
load in the system. 
Since power systems were built at national scale, crisis management plans have 
been defined at this scale as well and have not been not harmonised at the 
European or even regional level, despite the fact that today national systems are 
deeply interconnected and interacting. Consequently, one could expect crisis 
management at European level to be not fully coordinated (yet). This was particularly 
illustrated by the Europe-wide partial blackout that occurred in 2006. Since then, 
even if ENTSO-E (2010, 2015) has pushed toward a convergence of crisis 
management with a first document in 2010 and then with the Network Code on 
Emergency and Restoration currently under Comitology review, nevertheless, a lot of 
country variations are still possible in designing national crisis management 
schemes. This variability and the lack of coordination/harmonisation in turn impacts 
particularly upon the geographical distribution of load shedding and is likely to keep it 
uneven (De Boeck & Van Hertem, 2014).  
Increasingly, there are widespread concerns on capacity adequacy and risk of crises 
due to supply shortage. However, these concerns are limited to some national 
situations and do not cover the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, with interconnections 
and market coupling ensuring that power flows toward the areas with the highest 
price, in particular in the case of supply scarcity, capacity adequacy issues are no 
longer national and may also concern neighbouring countries. Moreover, because of 
interconnections, two countries could simultaneously experience capacity shortage 
and may not be able to easily rely upon each other. Indeed, EU network codes give 
the right to a TSO to curtail cross-border transactions, if it faces an emergency 
situation in its control area (see Box 4.1). Hence, a TSO could first experience an 
emergency situation, curtail cross-border transactions to solve its internal problems, 




Box 4.1: Treatment of cross-border transactions in emergency situations 
The Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for 
Electricity (ACER, 2011) states that: “The CACM Network Code(s) shall provide that 
curtailment of cross-zonal transactions is applied only in emergency situations and 
ensure that the affected TSOs avoid any discrimination between the different types 
of commercial exchanges, between the relevant time frames and between 
exchanges internal to countries and cross-border exchanges”. 
Besides, article 12 §1 of the Network Code on Emergency and Restoration specifies 
that: “Each TSO upon request from a neighbouring TSO in Emergency State shall 
provide through Interconnectors any possible assistance to the requesting TSO, 
provided it does not endanger the Operational Security of its Transmission System 
or of the interconnected Transmission. This assistance includes, but is not limited to, 
a curtailment of Cross Zonal Allocated Capacities”.  
Article 12 §3 also mentions that “each TSO shall announce and duly prepare any 
manual opening of an Interconnector in coordination with neighbouring TSOs, 
respecting that this action will not endanger the Operational Security of the 
remaining interconnected Transmission System”.  
 
Whether capacity shortage is experienced in one or several interconnected countries 
at a time, coordination is essential to manage this kind of stretched situation.  
As a preliminary step, before considering and providing solutions, it is fundamental to 
have a metric of capacity adequacy. Such a metric, or even several ones, generally 
exist at national level and the one(s) used is most often not harmonised across 
Europe (AF Mercados EMI et al. 2016). For instance, in France, the power system 
has a target of a 3-hour loss of load expectation (LOLE), meaning that capacity 
adequacy must be guaranteed throughout the year except for 3 hours at maximum. 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway rely on a similar metric but specifically 
focused on critical situations. They then target the number of hours during a very 
cold winter, happening once every twenty years, during which the load cannot be 
covered by available generation and demand response capacity. In Great Britain, 
capacity adequacy was defined by capacity margin, but the UK Department of 
Energy & Climate Change has more recently underlined that such metric is not 
appropriate for security of supply, because it does not sufficiently take into account 
the intermittency of renewable generation.  
More than the metrics, until a few years ago there was no common methodology to 
assess the adequacy of individual EU power systems and the adequacy at regional 
or European level. However, the situation is changing: since 2013 the TSOs in the 
Pentalateral Energy Forum (covering seven countries: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherland and Switzerland) have worked together and 
develop a common methodology to assess adequacy, taking into account 
interconnection capacity, even if only in a simplified way (PLEF TSOs, 2015). 
ENTSO-E (2016) has relied on the same methodology to assess capacity adequacy 
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at European level. Consequently, if the issue of building common metrics and 
methodology was a problem in the past, the TSOs and ENTSO-E now have to 
continue to refine those metrics and methodology in order to better include in their 
analysis i) transmission capacity among countries and ii) concerns about flexibility 
resulting from the massive integration of RES in the power systems. Diffusion and 
acceptance by the stakeholders must also be pursued. 
The lack of capacity adequacy, i.e. the lack of generation and demand response to 
cover peak load, is currently addressed as a national problem, even if it can span 
neighbouring countries. For instance, during the winter 2016-17, Belgium, France 
and Italy in Western Europe, and Bulgaria, Greece and Romania in South-East 
Europe experienced tight situations.  
Some countries have hence been considering the introduction of or have already 
introduced capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) to foster generation and 
demand response investments and bridge the perceived capacity gap. 
One can notice a wide diversity of mechanisms (European Commission, 2016). For 
instance, capacity payments have been existing in Spain, Ireland and Portugal for a 
decade or more. A capacity market has been introduced in France in 2016. Capacity 
auctions have been implemented in Great Britain in 2015 and Italy is expected to do 
the same in 2017. Strategic reserves have been implemented in Sweden and 
Finland since the mid-2000s, in Belgium since 2014 and in Denmark since 2016. 
Germany has also introduced a regional strategic reserve to cope with North-South 
network constraints and is considering the introduction of a country-wide strategic 
reserve as of the end of 2017. The introduction of CRMs at national level reflects the 
widespread belief that capacity adequacy is an issue better addressed at national 
level rather than from the regional or European dimension, despite the fact that 
national power systems are today interconnected and interdependent. 
The development of such mechanisms has been all the more tempting as the 
European power system has experienced several years of decreasing and low 
prices, hampering market-driven generation investments. As a result, there is a 
general suspicion that capacity remuneration mechanisms may be implemented to 
subsidise national generators, especially as cross-border resources are generally not 
allowed to benefit from these mechanisms. Such a pattern will result in inefficient 
investments and will possibly lead to generation overcapacity.  
 
4.3.2 Why wasn’t it tackled before? 
Different reasons – technical, organisational, institutional and legal ones – explain 
why the issue of capacity adequacy and crisis management schemes has not been 
confronted in the past at an earlier stage.  
First, there are technical reasons. In this regard, the key issue is the lack of a 
common definition of security of supply. Indeed, with no common language, it was 
difficult for TSOs and regulators to openly and widely discuss this topic. In the past, 
each country was using its own metrics to measure security of electricity supply 
(frequency of load shedding, amplitude of main load shedding event, average 
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capacity margin or capacity margin in a crisis situation, etc.). It is often impossible to 
simply translate one of them into the other and to easily compare the situation of the 
various countries, because those metrics often measure different aspects of security 
of supply and, as a result, are not interchangeable. It is by finding and defining 
common metrics that a concrete discussion on this topic can start.  
A second technical reason relates specifically to the nature of electricity crises. 
Fortunately, such crises are very rare; however, it is then difficult to test alternatives 
and to improve existing crisis management schemes on a “learning by doing” basis. 
It is always possible to assess the impact of different combinations of national crisis 
management schemes by using computational tools, but the absence of any 
concrete and immediate impact makes the matter less urgent for the policy-makers, 
although it is imperative one. The major disturbance experienced by the European 
power system in 2006 confirms this tendency. It is only after that event that a 
convergence of crisis management schemes was acknowledged as necessary. 
While TSOs at ENTSO-E did work on it, confronting the harmonisation of national 
crisis management schemes, considerable freedom is still in place, as for the 
activation of load shedding in the case of extreme events. While crisis management 
schemes are, of course, a very technical issue, we may face the scenario where 
some countries are not addressing their own capacity adequacy, in contradiction with 
their neighbours at regional or European level. A better regulatory and governance 
framework is hence needed to reconsider the crisis management schemes and to 
coordinate them in order to come up with the best possible solution at regional or 
European level.  
Third, these first two technical reasons raise an organisational concern, which also 
explains why this problem was not tackled before. Indeed, changing existing habits 
on such a technical topic as crisis management is a very long and demanding 
process. And different TSOs do not face with the same strength the same issue at 
the same moment, resulting in some ‘losers and winners’ from the process. As a 
consequence, the convergence process of national crisis management schemes can 
be slow, because TSOs have to negotiate among themselves what to change and 
when to change in order for most of them to belong to the ‘winners’ category.  
A fourth technical and essential reason why capacity adequacy was not previously 
addressed at European level is that it is not a concern which affects the whole of 
Europe in the same way, but only some of the Member States and with different 
(specific) problems. This naturally fosters a ‘nationalistic’ point of view on the issue. 
Indeed, France is lacking peaking units and Great Britain firm base load units; 
Germany has been missing capacity in the South, while Italy needs flexibility to cope 
with variable RES. Since it is not the same and unique concern for all European 
countries, it is understandable that capacity adequacy became a relevant European-
wide topic only once the European Commission and some stakeholders had noticed 
that interaction with the internal market and cross-border participation to CRMs were 
an issue.  
From an economic point of view, the issue of capacity adequacy and crisis 
management at European level was not previously confronted and the economic 
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literature on the topic is recent. For example, Finon (2015) raised the question of 
capacity adequacy but with no concrete solution, neither to integrate interconnection 
in capacity adequacy assessment nor capacity remuneration mechanisms. 
Mastropietro (2016) showed the challenges for cross-border participation to capacity 
remuneration mechanisms. Besides, practitioners like CEER (2016), Roques (2016) 
or Frontier Economics (2014) investigated how cross-border participation can be 
implemented in capacity remuneration mechanisms. With no solid theoretical basis, 
coping with capacity adequacy at regional level is still challenging.  
Fifth and lastly, the main reason why capacity adequacy and crisis management 
were not tackled before is legal. Indeed, the European Commission has not 
developed significant direct power concerning national security of supply, at least in 
terms of market design. Security of supply is usually part of the national remit. 
Market design targeting security of supply at European level has only been 
addressed by the European Commission on a case-by-case basis with already 
available tools, mainly State aid and competition law to force the Member States to 
change the rules of their capacity remuneration mechanisms; or with its ‘sector 
inquiry’ to provide guidance for designing future mechanisms (European 
Commission, 2016). With such ‘DG Competition’ tools, it is difficult to have in-depth 
modifications of market rules ending in a harmonised EU market design (De 
Hauteclocque and Glachant, 2009).  
Capacity adequacy and crisis management are obviously a matter for the internal 
energy market. When they are not considered at European level, they can block the 
IEM with national tropism and some kind of protectionism on national assets. The 
2009 electricity Directive has already stated that regulators shall cooperate to 
improve the functioning of the IEM. However, this has not yet been faced from the 
point of view of capacity adequacy and crisis management. 
 
4.3.3 Is it a roadblock? 
The absence of a European field for capacity adequacy and crisis management is a 
roadblock for the building of an integrated power market, because a true and 
equitable level of European solidarity is missing, which is also hampering generation 
and demand response investments. Management of disruption remains uneven. 
Besides, even if the Network Code on emergency and restoration has already been 
drafted, the management of cross-border contracts by countries experiencing 
shortage is still uncertain, because appreciation is still open in the code on the target 
level of security of supply and on the governance to set it and determine the crisis 
management. The uneven development of capacity remuneration mechanisms 
shows that national thinking and management still prevail when it comes to capacity 
adequacy, while the recent events of winter 2016/17 made clear that it is rather a 
regional issue.  
In terms of coordination, non-harmonised national remuneration mechanisms also 
risk generating a major delay in building the European power market, while the day-
ahead and intraday markets are more and more integrated and progress in 
162 
harmonising and integrating the balancing markets is also already underway. 
Investment may then be far more incentivised in some markets than in others (even 
if more investment incentives are indeed generally needed). Besides, the tight 
situation recorded this winter shows that some countries are still tempted to have a 
nationally oriented crisis management policy (e.g. in South-East Europe), potentially 
triggering adequacy issues in interconnected power systems.  
In technical terms, the historical problem of a lack of common language and 
methodology to assess adequacy was a blocking point, but it can be progressively 
overcome as shown by the Pentalateral forum or the last mid-term capacity 
assessment by ENTSO-E. It will help the whole EU to have a better view of the 
actual available capacity which fully takes into account access to interconnection.  
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4.4 Table summary 
This chapter is summarised in the table below, fisrt detailing (second column) the issue for each of the two topics discussed 
(redispatching actions as well as capacity adequacy and crisis management), then (third column) the different reasons that 
explain why these topics were not fully confronted in the past and, lastly, the reasons why they represent roadblocks on the 
path toward the building of a more efficient and integrated Europe-wide power market. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of the findings. 

























Difficult distinction between 
national and cross-border 
redispatching. 
Cost sharing rules sending 
inefficient incentives. 
A set of other solutions to 
manage congestion: investments 
in interconnections, market 
design (bidding zones) and 
allocation of transmission 
capacity. 
Technical: quite a recent problem. 
Economic: debate mixes market and technical 
operation. 
Organisational: governance adapted to such a 
big number of TSOs to find a consensus. 
Institutional: redistributive impact of changing the 
rule/lack of measurement of cross-border 
redispatching costs. 
Legal: national liability of TSOs + no definition of 
liability at the European level + lack of 
cooperation of regulators to improve IEM 
regarding cross-border redispatching actions 
under the umbrella of the 2009 Directive. 
Political: difficult to find an agreement on cross-
border payment/perception that redispatching is 
only a national matter. 
Security of supply: redispatching is a 
last resort action to relieve network 
constraints... 
Coordination: … requiring coordination 
at European scale. 
Cost sharing: a central point in the 
discussion of congestion management 
(for stakeholders’ incentives and 
redistributive impacts) as a whole, 
while it is a cornerstone of the 
European market to foster 
competition. 
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Historically national building of 
network and design of capacity 
adequacy policy and crisis 
management schemes. 
Concerns on capacity adequacy 
and risk of crises only perceived 
at the national scale and lacking 
the regional or European stake. 
National answer to the problem 




Technical: lack of common measure and 
methodology until recently / rare crises making 
any harmonisation seem less urgent. 
Organisational: difficulty to change habits on a 
hot and risky technical topic. 
Economic: possible ‘losers and winners’ if 
changes required because habits may have to 
be changed / weak economic literature on these 
topics. 
Institutional: National thinking on these issues. 
Legal: No or limited direct power of the European 
Commission concerning security of supply + lack 
of cooperation of regulators to improve IEM 
regarding cross-border assessment and 
management of capacity adequacy under the 
umbrella of the 2009 Directive. 
Political: acceptability of shared capacity 
adequacy and crisis management. 
Solidarity: a true European and 
equitable solidarity is missing. 
Coordination: IEM stepping back with 
national capacity remuneration 
mechanisms and nationally oriented 
crisis management triggering 





Chapter 5 – Recommendations to handle the roadblocks 
 
Executive Summary 
To illustrate how to handle the roadblocks represented by redispatching actions, or 
by capacity adequacy and crisis management, Chapter 5 provides seven broad 
recommendations. They tackle the core ‘missing pillars’ identified in the first part of 
the report. Our recommendations are not comprehensive and ultimate technical 
solutions to those issues. We identify instead a few key tasks and then suggest 
entities that can best perform them. 
Redispatching actions are currently hindering progress in the Europeanisation of the 
electricity sector due to the inadequate coordination between market and system 
operation. As a ‘coordination issue’, TSOs shall then assess and periodically review 
the efficiency of the bidding zone configuration for the day-ahead and intraday 
electricity markets and its ability to reflect structurally congested lines. In case such 
configuration proves to be inadequate, a redrawing of the zones shall be undertaken 
by the TSOs at the ENTSO-E level. NRAs shall oversee the process. 
However, the TSOs gathered in ENTSO-E are ‘technical experts’ that can deliver the 
best coordinating mechanisms needed by the European power market and system 
only if national governments and NRAs agree on the ‘sharing issue’, by defining a 
framework for sharing the resulting costs and benefits. If no sharing framework is 
agreed among countries and NRAs, the TSOs alone could hardly unlock the current 
situation. 
A common methodology for cost calculation and cost allocation is also required to 
cope with the economic implications of redispatching actions and foster cooperation 
among TSOs at the bilateral and multilateral level. NRAs shall develop this common 
methodology within ACER, ensuring fairness and efficient signals for the TSOs. 
Member States shall support the process and avoid blocking it because of conflicting 
national objectives. 
Capacity adequacy and crisis management too are obstructing the integration 
process because each Member State tend to adopt a national approach and to lack 
trust in its neighbours when security of supply is at stake. Coordination is limited and 
even solidarity is too rarely implemented. Therefore, the development of a common 
methodology for assessing capacity adequacy and valuing it cross-border is an 
important step to improve transparency and trust, hence making coordination easier 
to implement. TSOs shall be responsible for the definition of such methodology at 
the ENTSO-E level. Once the methodology is adopted, Member States and the 
European Commission shall use it to assess the need for capacity remuneration 
mechanisms at the regional or national level. 
During a crisis, ‘every man for himself’ is the rule often followed by the Member 
States. However, closing borders usually worsens the situation and further reduces 
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trust between countries. When a shortage of electricity occurs, Member States 
should rather show solidarity and help each other. 
In particular, if the crisis affects a single country, neighbouring Member States shall 
have a legal duty to provide support by granting full access to their own domestic 
resources at market prices. Transactions shall not be curtailed, even if this implies 
price spikes in the countries providing help. On the contrary, if the crisis affects 
several countries at the same time, then the affected TSOs of those countries shall 
be in charge of managing the situation under the supervision of the NRAs, pooling 
and coordinating the available resources in order to minimise the risk of blackouts 
and the impact on the most vulnerable consumers. Emergency plans, based on rules 
for solidarity agreed by the Member States, need to be prepared in advance at the 
multilateral level. 
The above recommendations must be clearly specified in EU legislation, providing in 
this way some answers to the long pending questions illustrated in the first part of 
the report. Other recommendations are possible as well, but our report does not 
address them, as it does not address the legislative proposals published in late 2016 
by the European Commission. It is up to the numerous practitioners, decision-
makers, or even scholars, to do that and demonstrate – from their point of view and 
interest – what is missing and what could be done to further the integration of 
European power systems in the context of the decarbonisation and the digitalisation 




The first part of the report considers some basic questions that have not been 
properly addressed in the past two decades. The lack of or the inadequate answers 
provided by the European energy policy reveal the weakness of three pillars, which 
are essential for the construction in Europe of an internal market for electricity, able 
to foster the transition towards a low-carbon economy and to embrace the current 
digital revolution. These pillars, detailed in Chapter 1, are: the coordination of actions 
and decisions, the sharing of costs and benefits, and solidarity beyond costs and 
benefits (see Fig. 5.1). 
 
 
Fig 5.1: Diagram of the missing pillars 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 then complement the first part of the report by providing an 
overview of 12 blocking factors that stem from these unanswered questions which 
are hindering the completion of an efficient and effective internal market for electricity 
in Europe. 
Based on that broad analysis, the second part of the report narrows the focus on two 
specific issues, which represent two roadblocks on the path towards the 
establishment of a truly Europeanised power market with seamless transmission 
system operation and operators. They gather together several of the blocking factors 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and are labelled in Chapter 4 respectively as:  
1) dealing with redispatching actions; 
2) capacity adequacy and crisis management. 
The goal of this fifth and final Chapter is not to provide the ultimate technical 
solutions to those complex issues. It suggests rather a set of possible options and 
general recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers in the context of the 
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current debate over the Energy Union and the Winter Package (Clean Energy for All 
Europeans), proposed by the European Commission at the end of 2016. 
In order to provide such a set of recommendations on how to unlock what is currently 
blocking the Europeanisation process, reference is made to the framework defined 
by the three missing pillars and by the European Power Target Model. The latter 
emerged ‘informally’ in the past few years during the drafting of the Framework 
Guidelines and the Network Codes by ENTSO-E, ACER, the EC and Member 
States. It currently constitutes the common foundations of the internal market for 
electricity and is characterised by three key elements: 
1) The definition of a Europe-wide merit order and an energy price equilibrium in 
the day-ahead market from bids made in organised power exchanges; 
2) A simplification of the underlying physical infrastructure through the 
assumption that national grids can work as a copper plate or a small set of 
copper plates (bidding zones), where transmission capacity is efficiently 
allocated together with energy (implicit auctioning); 
3) Reconciliation of the market outcomes and the physical needs at the 
balancing stage through redispatching and other remedial actions performed 
by the TSOs.131 
The combined effect of these key elements is market coupling, i.e. the emergence of 
a single price for all European interconnected power systems, as long as no 
congestion occurs over interconnections or, in the case of flow-based coupled 
markets, over any defined critical network element of the interconnected systems. 
Such a single price is computed on the basis of the efficient use of both transmission 
and generation capacity and is theoretically able to adequately remunerate 
generation costs.132 
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents three possible 
recommendations for removing the first roadblock, i.e. ‘dealing with redispatching 
actions’. Section 5.3 then illustrates four suggestions to remove the second 
roadblock, i.e. ‘capacity adequacy and crisis management’. Finally, section 5.4 
briefly concludes by summarising the previous sections and providing some 
additional comments and suggestions for further research. 
  
                                            
131 Glachant J.M. (2016), Mapping the course of the EU “Power Target Model”… on its own terms, 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2016/23, pp. 2-3. 
132 Another element of the EU Power Target Model, as initially articulated by the EC, is the reliance on 
energy-only markets (EOM). However, as it is discussed in Chapter 3, there are several reasons for 
doubting that EOMs are enough to remunerate investment in generation capacity, especially after the 
massive penetration of renewables in the electricity mix. Therefore, despite the rather negative view 
of the EC, capacity remuneration mechanisms have been implemented or are under discussion in 
several European countries. For a discussion of energy-only markets as part of the EU Power Target 
Model and its ability to foster the transition towards a low-carbon economy, see among others Keay 
M. (2013), The EU “Target Model” for electricity markets: fit for purpose?. Oxford Energy Comment, 
OIES. 
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5.2 Recommendations to handle Roadblock One: ‘Dealing with 
Redispatching Actions’ 
The analysis in Chapter 4 shows that in the past years the frequency of congestions 
in the European power grid has increased and TSOs have resorted more often to 
remedial measures in order to preserve a secure functioning of the system. 
Redispatching of power plants, a curative measure for relieving grid congestions, 
has been particularly used in countries like Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom 
and Poland, at a significant cost for the system.133 
The fast and large deployment of renewable energy sources, often characterised by 
intermittent generation, and the inadequacies in the way market and system 
operations are coordinated (e.g. the non optimal configuration of bidding zones) are 
considered to be the main causes behind the increased frequency of congestions 
and their less predictable dynamics and location, which require TSOs to intervene 
closer to real time operation.134 In some cases, the slow pace of grid expansion, 
often due to local opposition and lengthy permitting procedures, is to blame as well. 
This is particularly relevant in areas where a lot of intermittent renewables has been 
connected. With transmission capacity lagging behind generation capacity 
developments, the physical constraints of the network become more apparent and 
market outcomes, based on the assumption that control areas work like a copper 
plate, are less sustainable.  
Therefore, the analysis confirms that two of the three pillars identified in the first part 
of the report are actually missing and contribute to blocking the Europeanisation of 
the electricity sector. Coordination of actions and decisions is missing because 
players acting on wholesale power markets perform their transactions without 
properly taking into account the structural constraints of the physical grid (imperfect 
coordination between market and system operation).135 Sharing costs and benefits is 
missing as well because there are currently few or no efficient and fair mechanisms 
in place for the allocation of the escalating costs generated by bilateral and 
multilateral redispatching actions. In turn, this worsens the issue of coordination, 
because the lack of a fair mechanism for sharing costs discourages the use of 
coordinated remedial actions which results in an increase in costs and a 
fragmentation of the IEM along the control zone borders.136 
                                            
133 According to the terminology adopted by ACER, redispatching, counter-trading and curtailment of 
allocated capacity are curative measures; changing grid topology is a preventive remedial measure 
instead. According to the data provided by ACER, the cost of redispatching (internal and cross-
border) in 2015 alone has been larger than 2.1 billion euro (it was only around 1.3 billion in 2014). 
See ACER/CEER (2016), Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity Markets 
in 2015, 2016, pp. 26-28. Anyway, it might be noted as well that electricity markets in some of the 
countries with the highest redispatching costs are among the most liquid in Europe, with clear 
advantages for market players and final consumers.  
134 Ibid. 
135 See section 1.2.1.2 of this report. 
136 The massive deployment of wind capacity in the North of Germany and the delay in the 
strengthening of the grid assets connecting the North and the South of the country are at the origin of 
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Given this state of affairs, the conceptual framework developed in this research 
report suggests three broad recommendations (see Fig. 5.2): 
1) Reconfiguration by the TSOs of the bidding zones for day-ahead and intraday 
markets; 
2) Definition of regulatory principles at European level for the adoption of the 
results of the bidding zone review; 
3) Adoption by the NRAs of a common methodology for the calculation and 
allocation of costs. 
 
 
Fig 5.2: Recommendations to handle Roadblock One 
 
5.2.1 Under the pillar of ‘Coordination of Actions and Decisions’ 
As explained in the previous chapter, one of the deep-rooted reasons for the 
increased use of redispatching actions in Europe is the inadequate configuration of 
bidding zones for day-ahead and intraday electricity markets. The assumption that 
national grids are like a copper plate, where market players can sell and buy power 
almost without any restraint, is an essential element of the European Power Target 
Model. However, for a zonal market to work efficiently, bidding zones should not be 
structurally affected by internal congestions. Today, most of the European bidding 
                                                                                                                                        
significant unscheduled flows negatively affecting Poland and other central European power systems. 
The impossibility to find other satisfactory solutions led the German TSO 50Hertz and the Polish TSO 
PSE Operator to install phase shifters on the interconnections between Germany and Poland, 
providing the option to limit power overflows from Germany to Poland. 
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zones follow national borders, often hiding relevant bottlenecks to the flow of 
electricity foreseen by the commercial transactions executed in wholesale markets. 
Therefore, redispatching is indispensable not only to adjust the system to 
unexpected outages or errors in the forecast of load and generation by intermittent 
RES, but also to reconcile market outcomes with the flows that the grid can 
accommodate. 
With better defined bidding zones, the result of market transactions would naturally 
be less alien to the physical reality of the grid and require less adjustment after gate 
closure.137 That is why a first recommendation to deal with redispatching actions is to 
review the configuration of the bidding zones and redraw/split them whenever 
structural congestions are pointed out.138 
The assessment and review of the bidding zone configuration must be undertaken at 
global level, as foreseen by the Network Code on Capacity Allocation and 
Congestion Management. TSOs and their European association ENTSO-E are 
particularly well positioned to carry out this review and eventually redraw the zone 
configuration so that it is more in line with the physical reality of the European 
interconnected grid. Indeed, since TSOs are in charge of system operation and 
security, they have a profound knowledge of how the network under their control 
works and where congestions usually take place. They have also developed models 
for simulating and forecasting energy flows under different conditions. Provided they 
work together at European level, it is difficult to think of a more experienced and 
competent entity for performing the bidding zone assessment and review.  
Hence, the coming EU legislation should openly state the duty of TSOs to 
collectively assess and review the current bidding zone configuration and repeat 
such exercise periodically. As European technical experts, TSOs should be relatively 
free in performing this task, as long as they complete it within a reasonable period of 
time. ACER, it goes without saying, will have to monitor the progress of the 
reconfiguration by the TSOs from the point of view of EU regulation. 
However, it is important to remember that a reconfiguration of the price zones is 
likely to produce significant consequences and have an economic impact on specific 
stakeholders. A power plant, for instance, could face a considerably changed 
competitive context, if included in a different bidding zone where the supply-demand 
                                            
137 As described in Chapter 2, the current physical reality of the power grid in Europe is, to a large 
extent, a legacy of the pre-liberalisation and pre-integration era. Besides, it is often not in line with the 
recent developments in generation capacity and is hardly adequate for the achievement of the EU 
decarbonisation goals in a cost effective way. Therefore, an optimal management of the current 
infrastructure is a first fundamental step to take, but it is not enough. In the long run, it is equally 
important to provide the right framework for the optimal expansion of the network. However, since the 
adaptation of the network requires a long period of time (from 10 to 20 years) and since some 
improvements on this issue have already been achieved (see Section 2.1), it is not a main focus of 
the recommendations presented in this chapter. 
138 A zone configuration subject to continuous changes has negative consequences for market 
operators, because it increases the uncertainty generators and buyers of electricity have to cope with. 
Therefore, the assessment and review of bidding zone configuration shall not be too frequent or 
triggered by modest and possibly temporary congestions. 
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balance is in favour of the latter. The same also applies to electric consumers, who 
could end up paying higher prices for energy. Besides that, there are still diverging 
views on how a change in the configuration of bidding zones impacts on the efficient 
use of infrastructure, on market liquidity and hedging, on market power and 
investment incentives. Finally, transition costs may be not trivial. This explains why 
the debate surrounding the issue of bidding zone configuration is politically sensitive 
and little progress has been achieved in the past couple of years.139 
‘Technical experts’, as the TSOs gathered in ENTSO-E are, cannot legitimately take 
fundamental decisions like redefining the configuration of bidding zones in a vacuum 
of pre-defined rules to assess winners and losers, and to share costs and benefits 
among them. Such complementary rules are really ‘regulatory principles’ and not 
technical reasoning. That is why they have to be set by regulatory authorities or 
national governments, or both, with a loop with ACER Guidelines. The European 
technical experts at ENTSO-E need a clear ‘regulatory framework’, unlocking the 
present state of national ‘costs and benefits sharing’, sealed in the current structure 
of the European bidding zones.  
To state this second recommendation descending from our analytical framework 
even more plainly, the pillar of ‘coordination’ cannot work well in complete separation 
from the pillar of ‘sharing’. And since sharing is often a politically delicate issue, the 
involvement and backing by national governments and NRAs are needed. Indeed, 
national authorities have to agree at European level on a clear framework for sharing 
the costs and the benefits of reconfiguring the bidding zones. On the contrary, if 
national authorities block the European ‘sharing’ process at national level, then the 
quest for developing the best ‘coordinating’ mechanisms at European level may 
remain blocked as well. 
 
5.2.2 Under the pillar of ‘Sharing Costs and Benefits’  
In the medium to long term, the review of the bidding zones configuration, supported 
by a clear regulatory framework for sharing costs and benefits agreed by national 
authorities, could effectively treat one of the deep causes behind the problem of 
redispatching actions. However, such review does not provide any suggestion for 
coping in the shorter term with the immediate symptoms of the problem posed by 
                                            
139 In August 2012, ACER invited ENTSO-E to initiate a pilot project on the assessment and review of 
the bidding zone configuration. A Technical Report was published by ENTSO-E in January 2014, 
followed by a Market Report by ACER in March 2014. Based on those early results, ENTSO-E began 
in Spring 2015 an investigation on the technical and economic efficiency of the current European 
bidding zones, together with the possibility of splitting the German-Austrian single zone. The results of 
this study, initially expected by the end of 2016, are now due by the end of 2017. In the meanwhile 
ACER issued in September 2015 a non-binding opinion calling for the split of the German-Austrian 
zone. The opinion was appealed in November 2015 by the Austrian regulator E-Control but reaffirmed 
by ACER in Fall 2016. For more details see: ENTSO-E (2014), Technical Report. Bidding Zone 
Review Process; and ACER (2014), Report on the influence of existing bidding zones on electricity 
markets. 
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redispatching, that is the escalating costs borne by system operators in managing 
the grid and the way in which these costs can or should be shared.  
As presented in Chapter 4, TSOs in Europe have discussed and sometimes agreed 
on how to share costs related to remedial actions at the bilateral or multilateral level. 
Unfortunately, partial or inadequate solutions have often been adopted, like those 
based on the ‘requester pays’ principle. Even the precise amount and distribution of 
those costs is currently not totally clear. As ACER underlined in autumn 2016, data 
on the volumes and costs of congestion related remedial measures in Europe are 
not complete nor easily comparable. Some NRAs do not provide such data to ACER 
or do not have it at all, while others make available information that is only partial or 
does not correspond to the same definition.140 
This lack of data harmonisation and transparency is detrimental to the solution of the 
sharing problem, because it is clearly difficult to agree on a mechanism for cost 
sharing when there is no consensus on how to measure those costs and no 
generally accepted quantification exists at present.141  
In addition to that, it is important to remember that TSOs are a regulated business 
and the recovery of their costs via grid tariffs has to be approved by national 
regulators. Therefore, a decision on the way to allocate redispatching costs to the 
different TSOs must involve the NRAs as well. Actually, given the right of NRAs to 
allow or disallow the expenses incurred by the TSOs, it is advisable that the NRAs 
are collectively in charge of the definition of harmonised mechanisms for sharing 
redispatching costs. The decision would be ideally taking place at European level to 
avoid issues of compatibility and harmonisation. In this respect, ACER is the proper 
entity to carry out this regulatory effort, because all NRAs are part of it and, in the 
case of initial diverging opinions, choices could be taken through a majority vote.142 
Due to the growing economic relevance of the issue, NRAs should act with relative 
urgency and propose a methodology for cost calculation and cost allocation in the 
next year or two, possibly before the end of the bidding zone review process by the 
TSOs. 
The mechanism for cost allocation should be fair, hence less politically 
unacceptable, and should provide sound economic signals to system operators, 
thereby fostering an efficient and effective use of redispatching actions. This is 
mostly not the case today because the cost of cross border redispatching and other 
remedial measures is usually redistributed on the basis of the ‘requester pays’ 
principle. The TSO calling for cross-border redispatch bears the costs of it, 
                                            
140 ACER/CEER (2016), Op. cit., pp. 26-28. 
141 To be clear, redispatching costs are measured at national level in order to allow cost recovery for 
the TSOs. However, the way they are classified, aggregated and reported is not the same in every 
European Member State, so that it is at the moment impossible to know with precision their amount 
on a comparable basis.  
142 ACER is not the European regulator for energy but rather an entity for the discussion of and the 
decision on cross-border issues in energy regulation. Its role in this respect is to promote the 
convergence of regulatory solutions in Europe. 
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irrespective of its responsibility for the congestion that the redispatching action is 
intended to cope with. At first glance, principles like the ‘polluter pays’ should be 
followed instead, but they often present important practical limitations as well (who is 
the polluter? Why should it be the last one to use capacity?). In the everyday 
operation of the system it is not easy to understand the cause of a congestion, i.e. 
the identity of the polluter, and it is not easy even to distinguish between 
redispatching to cope with internal or with external congestions (it is possible to use 
internal redispatching to solve cross-border congestions and vice versa). Some form 
of cost socialisation could be an alternative and inevitable solution.143 
However, it is not the aim of this report to identify or to define the best cost sharing 
mechanism to apply to redispatching costs. That is a task for technical experts (to 
propose or suggest) and for regulatory experts (to define, compare and, finally, to 
choose). What is relevant to stress at this point is that the Europeanisation of the 
electricity sector is blocked by the absence of such a methodology and that the best 
entity for taking a decision on it is the body of the European NRAs, i.e. ACER. 
Indeed, once a methodology for both cost calculation and cost allocation has 
received the regulatory backing by the European gathering of national regulators, 
increased cooperation among TSOs on redispatching actions is likely to follow 
swiftly. 
  
                                            
143 It is important to underline that cost socialisation does not necessarily imply solidarity. As it is 
explained in Chapter 1, solidarity should kick in only under extreme conditions, when normal market 
mechanisms do not work properly. Under normal conditions, general coordination and sharing 
principles are to be followed. 
175 
5.3 Recommendations to handle Roadblock Two: ‘Capacity 
Adequacy and Crisis Management’ 
The analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 illustrates that there is a growing concern in Europe 
for the capacity adequacy of electricity systems. Indeed, the relative decline in 
electricity consumption but not in peak demand recorded in the last decade and the 
massive subsidy-driven deployment of RES have led to a reduction in wholesale 
electricity prices. A drop in new investments in conventional generation capacity has 
followed, coupled with the retirement or the mothballing of several old or 
uncompetitive power plants, mostly running on fossil fuels and nuclear energy. 
As a result of these trends, dependable capacity like that based on natural gas or 
coal is currently lower than it was up to four or five years ago.144 Despite apparently 
wide reserve margins in overall capacity, quite a few European electricity systems do 
not appear to be fully adequate, especially when adverse weather conditions 
materialise (the January 2017 electricity shortage exemplifies it perfectly with critical 
situations in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece). 
Several national governments, afraid of security of supply and possibly also 
concerned with the economic viability of their electric utilities, have introduced or are 
planning the introduction of capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) next to the 
traditional energy-only markets. 
Therefore, the analysis confirms that all of the three pillars identified in the first part 
of the report are truly missing and are blocking the creation of a single European 
power market with seamless transmission system operation and operators. 
Coordination of actions and decisions is missing because Member States tend to 
adopt a national approach to the issue of capacity adequacy. The establishment of 
uncoordinated national CRMs represents a significant change vis-à-vis the Power 
Target Model which emerged during the implementation of the Third Energy 
Package. It is a change, as many have suggested, with the power to distort and 
fragment the Internal Energy Market before it is fully completed. Solidarity beyond 
costs and benefits and the sharing of costs and benefits are also missing because, in 
times of crisis, Member States tend to adopt an ‘every man for himself’ approach, 
where they put their own interests first and limit or totally avoid to cooperate and help 
their neighbours in difficulty. This attitude does not promote trust and cooperation 
among Member States, eventually worsening the problem of coordinating actions 
and decisions: if a country will not show solidarity during a crisis, why should one of 
its interconnected neighbours consider capacity in that country while assessing its 
own capacity adequacy? And in a similar fashion: why should a country develop a 
CRM open to cross-border participation from another country that will curtail 
interconnection capacity during a severe shortage of energy? 
                                            
144 Between 2010 and 2014 installed capacity in the EU has increased from 883.9 GW to 977.7 GW 
(+10,6%). However, as also illustrated in Table 3.1, in the same time interval the amount of nuclear 
and fossil fuel fired generation capacity has decreased by 8.2 GW and 13.6 GW respectively. 
Preliminary data from an industry association (Eurelectric) confirm the trend for 2015, with significant 
amounts of nuclear and fossil fuel capacity either permanently retired or mothballed. 
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Given this background, the conceptual framework developed in this research report 
suggests four potential recommendations (see Fig. 5.3): 
1) Adoption by the TSOs of a common methodology to assess capacity 
adequacy and to value it cross-border; 
2) Recourse to the common methodology for assessing the need of CRMs; 
3) Provision of full access to neighbouring resources under market conditions 
when a crisis affects a single Member State; 




Fig 5.3: Recommendations to handle Roadblock Two 
 
5.3.1 Under the pillar of ‘Coordination of Actions and Decisions’ 
The adequacy of power systems has been traditionally assessed in Europe by TSOs 
at national level through the adoption of a variety of metrics and computational 
methodologies. Criteria used to select adequacy standards were and sometimes still 
are today neither public nor transparent. Furthermore, methodologies developed in 
the past for power systems centred on conventional generation are often 
characterised by a deterministic approach that is not suitable for assessing the 
adequacy of systems with growing shares of intermittent RES. Finally, system 
adequacy was usually evaluated in isolation, with little or no attention paid to the 
contribution interconnected neighbouring systems could provide. As a result, 
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assessments performed at national level were and still are today not easily 
comparable and tend to underestimate or to overestimate the effective adequacy 
level of a specific system, depending on the concrete impact of interconnected 
capacity (i.e. interdependence is not properly assessed). 
Trusting neighbouring countries and developing coordinated policies within this 
existing heterogeneous information background for capacity adequacy is difficult and 
the temptation for national governments and TSOs to pursue adequacy on its own is 
inevitably strong. 
Thus, a first important recommendation to remove this roadblock on the integration 
process is for European countries to adopt a common methodology for assessing 
capacity adequacy and to value it cross-border. The idea is to develop a common 
‘language’ and to use it for judging the situation at national level in a comprehensive 
way, i.e. considering also resources from other countries that can be used to cover 
domestic demand in case of need. 
European TSOs have already started to perform adequacy assessments at the 
regional or at European level, taking into consideration interconnections among 
national grids and the growing role of intermittent RES. TSOs belonging to the 
Pentalateral Energy Forum (PLEF) area did it in 2015, while ENTSO-E undertook in 
early 2016 its first Mid-term Adequacy Forecast (MAF), covering the whole continent. 
Indeed, the expertise and experience gained by the TSOs could be capitalised on by 
granting them in EU legislation the explicit task of developing within the ENTSO-E 
framework the above mentioned common methodology for capacity adequacy 
assessment.  
Such methodology, based on a practical definition of adequacy and security of 
supply agreed by the Member States,145 will then enhance the transparency of the 
adequacy assessment process and expand trust among national governments, 
TSOs and other stakeholders.  
Comparability of the results obtained from the use of the common methodology 
could well be the basis for discussing the need and the nature of public policies 
tackling adequacy and security of supply.  
A second recommendation to handle this roadblock consists actually in providing a 
‘special’ status to the methodology: once developed by ENTSO-E, it should be the 
official tool for assessing capacity adequacy in the EU and in any single Member 
State. It should also be the only accepted tool to prove the need for a CRM: both 
Member States and the European Commission should stick to it and should not 
resort to any other criteria, even during a formal case handled by DG Competition. 
                                            
145 The definition of an adequacy standard is not a merely technical issue, but involves economic and 
social considerations about the proper level of security of supply a given system should be 
characterised by. However, once such standard is defined, technical experts can develop a 
methodology for assessing whether a system satisfies it or not. This, in the view of the research 
report, should be the task attributed to the TSOs and their European association ENTSO-E.  
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The recourse to the common methodology for evaluating the case of a CRM will 
improve coordination among the Member States in the field of capacity adequacy. 
National governments, as a matter of fact, will retain the possibility of whether or not 
to establish a CRM next to the energy-only market, but the justification underpinning 
their decision, i.e. the lack of capacity adequacy, will be scrutinised through the 
common methodology. It will then be easier to decide whether a CRM is really 
needed or if, on the contrary, interconnections and capacity in neighbouring systems 
can ensure an adequate level of capacity to the concerned Member State. 
 
5.3.2 Under the pillar of ‘Sharing Costs and Benefits’ 
Speaking the same language and sharing the same knowledge when dealing with 
capacity adequacy helps to coordinate security of supply policies and potentially 
induce a more European stance. Nevertheless, coordination on capacity adequacy is 
not enough for effectively coping with electricity shortages in the short term. When a 
system is clearly unable to meet its load due, for instance, to extreme cold waves or 
to disruptions in the supply of a fundamental fuel like natural gas, additional 
resources located beyond national borders have to be activated to cover internal 
demand.  
With supply shortage taking place in one country, then electricity will flow, if allowed, 
from its neighbours through interconnections. Generators in those countries will have 
to increase production and consumers located there will bear higher energy prices. If 
cross-border capacity is not curtailed and prices are free to adjust, markets will be 
able to allocate capacity efficiently and provide resources to the country suffering 
from capacity shortage. 
Clearly, the ensuing costs will have to be recovered. Market mechanisms prices will 
do that, thereby providing the allocative mechanism for sharing costs and benefits 
when capacity is missing in one power system. 
 
5.3.3 Under the pillar of ‘Solidarity beyond Costs and Benefits’ 
Cases of capacity shortage raise the issue of solidarity because of the profound 
negative impact a blackout has on society and because markets are not always able 
to cope with such situations, especially when the lack of capacity is significant and is 
extended to more than one power system at the same time. 
During these ‘electricity crises’, solidarity is needed and improvements to the current 
state of affairs have to be realised, if the EU wants to fulfil the aspirations set in the 
Treaties and reaffirmed in numerous Council conclusions.  
One of the major concerns that undermines the ‘spirit of solidarity’ in this area is the 
possibility that a Member State is prevented, in the time of need, from relying on 
resources located in neighbouring countries (the electricity shortage in January 2017 
shows how this possibility is far from remote). Indeed, the fact that resources located 
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‘abroad’ could be out of reach when most needed is one of the reasons why 
adequacy assessments traditionally do not consider capacity located outside 
national borders. 
If a crisis affects only one Member State, then every other neighbouring Member 
State has the duty to help the State in trouble by providing full access to its own 
resources. Capacity on interconnections should not be curtailed, even if this can 
imply a stark increase in electricity prices in the country providing solidarity. As said 
in the previous section, solidarity is not for free in this case but comes at a price 
defined by market forces which are still able to allocate efficiently scarce resources. 
European States have already moved some steps in this direction, with national 
governments expressing formal commitment to respect firm cross-border contracts 
even at times of scarcity and to allow market transactions to freely occur and allocate 
resources, even to consumers located beyond national borders. A good example of 
this can be found in the Joint Declaration for Regional Cooperation on Security of 
Electricity Supply in the Framework of the Internal Energy Market that 12 European 
Energy Ministers signed at the margin of a Council meeting in June 2015. Among 
other things, they stressed that “we will not restrict cross-border trade of electricity 
including in times of high prices reflecting market scarcity and we will follow EU-
regulations on cross-border trade also with respect to ensuring secure system 
operation”.146 
Of course, such statements of intents should become binding rules to be applied 
during a real electricity crisis. Enforceability must then be ensured, with a 
mechanism to be defined. Nevertheless, such general principle agreed at the highest 
political level by the Member States of the European Union is a typical case of how it 
is possible to unpick a lock in the common operation of the European power system. 
It is one of the ways in which actions by the NRAs gathered at ACER and by the 
TSOs gathered at ENTSO-E are headed in the right direction by deleting former 
national priorities or national veto rights, when they unduly block the common 
operation of the EU power system and market. 
On the contrary, when a crisis is multilateral, i.e. scarcity affects simultaneously two 
or more neighbouring countries, markets may stop working properly and 
governments have an even stronger temptation to act unilaterally, closing borders 
and not providing any help to the neighbours. This ‘every man for himself’ tendency 
worsens the situation and must be avoided. Therefore, TSOs have to receive a clear 
and strong mandate for coordinating and sharing among Member States the scarce 
available resources during multilateral crises, with the aim to minimise the overall 
risk of blackouts and the impact on the most vulnerable electricity consumers, i.e. 
households and small enterprises that cannot easily switch to other sources of 
energy for satisfying their needs. 
                                            




Thanks to their long lasting experience in providing continuous and secure system 
operation, TSOs, under the supervision of NRAs, are the most suitable entities for 





The integration of European power markets is often considered a never ending story. 
Anytime it seems the endpoint is on the horizon, a new challenge suddenly emerges 
and new solutions must be implemented in order to overcome it. 
Ten to 15 years ago it seemed that unbundling national incumbents and establishing 
independent NRAs would be the definitive breakthrough to establishing a level 
playing field at European level and a functioning internal market for electricity. 
However, as this research report extensively shows, several issues, mainly related to 
coordination, cost and benefit sharing, and solidarity, were in reality not properly 
addressed. Some of them have become even more relevant due to the deep 
transformations the electricity industry is currently witnessing. This calls for renewed 
efforts and for new actions that finally tackle the long overdue questions. 
Focusing the attention on the two specific problems highlighted in Chapter 4, the 
report confirms that three crucial pillars are missing and offers seven different 
recommendations that can help to unlock the process towards a more integrated and 
decarbonised power system. These recommendations are not comprehensive 
technical solutions to complex issues that require advanced engineering expertise; 
rather, they identify some key tasks and suggest entities that could perform them, 
thereby providing some answers to the long pending questions presented in the first 
part of the report. These answers could then be transposed into the current EU 
legislative process, if the aim is to further the Europeanisation of the electricity 
sector. 
With regard to redispatching actions, the report highlights the need to solve, on the 
one hand, an issue of coordination (who should review the coordination between 
market operation and system operation through the redefinition of the bidding 
zones?) and, on the other hand, two issues of sharing costs and benefits (what 
regulatory principles should be adopted for sharing the costs and the benefits 
resulting from the reconfiguration of the bidding zones? How are redispatching costs 
computed and allocated between the TSOs?).  
With regard to capacity adequacy and crisis management, the report similarly singles 
out a coordination issue (how are policies for ensuring capacity adequacy assessed 
and coordinated?), a sharing issue (how should the additional costs for coping with 
energy shortages be allocated?) and a solidarity issue (how should solidarity be 
provided during a crisis?). 
Key tasks for national governments, TSOs, NRAs and their European associations 
are then coherently identified. 
Obviously, other solutions for handling the roadblocks mentioned above are possible 
as well. For instance, both redispatching actions and security of supply concerns can 
be dealt with, in the long run, through the expansion of the network and the 
development of a truly integrated European power grid, adapted to the physical 
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distribution of generation and load. However, the report does not further elaborate on 
this issue, which could be explored in another research project. 
Our present report does not even provide a systematic analysis of the many 
legislative proposals made public in November 2016 by the European Commission. 
The aim is, more modestly, to provide a methodology that any practitioner, decision-
maker or scholar could follow while pursuing her own vision or interest. To test that 
the contribution of any proposal is consistent with the Europeanisation of the 
electricity market and the power system, she should check how the missing pillars 
are addressed. By doing that, she will improve the overall quality of the policy debate 
and better assess the outcome of the whole decision-making process. 
The only salient point that we would like to underline again in this conclusion is that 
technical experts, as the TSOs grouped at ENTSO-E are, cannot alone address the 
barriers to the truly European operation of the market and system for power, when 
the regulatory framework has not been adeqately clarified in terms of ‘sharing the 
costs and benefits’ and ‘solidarity beyond costs and benefits’. 
Better coordination of TSOs and ENTSO-E at EU level requires an improved 
regulatory framework for ‘sharing’ and ‘solidarity’ at EU level. If each European 
country (either as national regulator or national government) retains all of its existing 
national preferences and priorities, and all of its national veto rights on any change 
affecting national players or interests, the TSOs cannot reach, at EU level, the best 
coordination framework needed by the single market and the European power 
system. National authorities (either NRAs or governments, or both) have to open and 
clear the regulatory path towards the best coordination tools and processes at EU 
level. We have seen in this chapter that the Member States did it at the margins of 
an EU Council in order to unpick some national locks in power crises. Similarly, the 
current debate on the Winter Package offers another excellent occasion for national 
authorities to clarify the regulatory landscape in which TSOs and ENTSO-E operate.  
Greater Europeanisation of the market and the system is really needed when cross-
border interactions between national players have already outpaced the capability of 
securing and framing the common market and system only at national level. No one 
in any country should think that keeping the existing situation is without costs. 
Avoiding a decision at national level on what has to be decided at EU level (i.e. 
‘sharing’ and ‘solidarity’) does not ensure the continuation of a reasonable and 
balanced situation. On the contrary, the current status quo is a source of many 
inefficiencies (i.e. it is expensive) and of unfair, or even dangerous, situations 





In the three first chapters of this report, the Florence School of Regulation revisited 
the developments of the last three decades and identified several basic policy 
questions that were not comprehensively addressed or were avoided altogether. In 
turn, the absence of adequate policy decisions in the several energy packages 
adopted so far has contributed to failings in three core areas which are essential to 
the completion of a single European electricity market and the transition to a low-
carbon economy. 
These core ‘missing pillars’ are: 
• Coordination of actions and decisions; 
• Sharing of costs and benefits; 
• Solidarity beyond costs and benefits. 
The negative impact of these weaknesses on the achievement of European goals in 
the electricity industry has been elucidated through the assessment of 12 critical 
issues that may block the establishment of a seamless European electricity market, 
the cross-border integration of an efficient and secure system operation, the timely 
development of an interconnected network, and the smooth and least expensive 
decarbonisation of the generation mix. 
Our report does not aim to provide a list of technical solutions for those ‘blocking 
factors’. Our aim is to show, with the help of a ‘check-list’, the significance of the 
identified missing pillars and the necessity of tackling them in order to further the 
integration of markets and accelerate the energy transition without an excessive 
increase in costs. 
To illustrate how the analytical framework developed in the report can be useful in 
the current debate over the Winter Package, two specific critical issues were 
discussed in more detail and some concrete recommendations presented in 
chapters 4 and 5. The two issues, according to us (the authors), represent real 
roadblocks on the path towards a fully Europeanised electricity system with a low-
carbon generation mix. They are: 
1. Dealing with redispatching actions; 
2. Capacity adequacy and crisis management. 
The recommendations we propose for removing these two hurdles do not constitute 
a fully-fledged roadmap. Rather, we illustrate how basic decisions on roles and tasks 
can, and should, be taken before the definition of any specific technical solution. 
Fundamental and coherent choices in terms of coordination, sharing and solidarity 
must be rendered explicit by Member States and European institutions. This is a 
preliminary requirement for any further step in the integration and decarbonisation 
process of the electricity sector. 
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To end our report, we would like to draw attention to nine points. 
1) Policy-makers must explicitly and comprehensively address basic questions 
related to coordination, sharing, and solidarity, if they want to avoid slowing down the 
completion of the Internal Energy Market and increasing the costs of the transition to 
a decarbonised energy system. 
2) The liberalisation and the integration of national electricity systems in Europe 
require the revision and the coherent upgrade of coordination mechanisms at 
national and supra-national level, to ensure the achievement of consistent 
infrastructure development, reliable system operation and efficient commercial 
transactions. The subsidiarity principle should be applied with care, given the 
relevance of coordination mechanisms in the electricity sector and the difficulty of 
developing satisfactory solutions in a decentralised way. 
3) Clear principles on how to share the costs and benefits of the integrated electricity 
system and the energy transition must be agreed upon. This can be a sensitive 
political issue, since it may require an agreement defining short-term winners and 
losers among different categories of market actors and network users. Different 
Member States may similarly win or lose. Nonetheless, outlining such principles is 
imperative in order to accelerate the decision-making process and foster the 
adoption of efficient and effective solutions. 
4) Solidarity in the electricity sector is currently underdeveloped from a formal point 
of view, especially in comparison to natural gas. Ex-ante roles and operational rules 
for the management of emergency situations must be established to ensure that no 
country will be left alone, when abnormal conditions materialise and continuity of 
supply becomes the main concern. 
5) As we have shown, at least a dozen critical issues are currently challenging the 
European Union with reference to the completion of the single power market and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy. In our view, two of them deserve particular and 
immediate attention. As stated above, they are, firstly, redispatching actions and, 
secondly, capacity adequacy and crisis management. Regarding the first issue, the 
need for redispatching actions and their cost for the system have grown significantly 
in recent years due to the fast deployment of intermittent renewables, the increase in 
cross-border trade and the inadequate coordination between market and system 
operation. The call for a legal and regulatory framework enabling stronger 
coordination among TSOs and appropriate cost-sharing mechanisms is evident here. 
Regarding the second issue, the deployment of intermittent renewables and the 
interdependency among interconnected electricity systems are making the traditional 
methods for assessing system adequacy of limited value. Moreover, such methods 
could lead to wrong conclusions, like overinvestment and distortions to the IEM, 
when performed in isolation at national level in order to judge the need for capacity 
remuneration mechanisms. The national liability of TSOs and a common distrust of 
neighbours when security of supply is at stake explain why solidarity is not always 
shown in the management of crises and cooperation across borders remains fragile. 
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6) The removal of the roadblock attached to redispatching actions requires that 
TSOs gathered in ENTSO-E improve the coordination mechanisms between system 
and market operation by periodically assessing the configuration of market bidding 
zones and redraw them in case they do not adequately reflect structural congestions. 
Similarly, NRAs shall take the responsibility to develop within ACER a common 
methodology for the calculation and the allocation of redispatching costs, ensuring 
fairness and efficient signals for the TSOs and for network users, both short-term 
and long-term.  
7) In order to remove the obstacle attached to capacity adequacy and crisis 
management, TSOs shall develop, at ENTSO-E level, a common methodology for 
assessing capacity adequacy and valuing it cross-border. Its use by the Member 
States and the European Commission, to assess the need for capacity remuneration 
mechanisms, will expand transparency and mutual trust. Besides, countries shall 
demonstrate solidarity during crisis situations. When a crisis affects a single country, 
its neighbours shall provide support by granting full access to their domestic 
resources at market prices (i.e. market transactions shall not be curtailed). On the 
contrary, in case of a multilateral shortage, the involved TSOs shall act according to 
pre-established rules in order to minimise service disruptions and the impact on the 
most vulnerable consumers, by pooling and coordinating the scarce available 
resources. 
8) Bodies acting at European level, like ENTSO-E and ACER, can propose technical 
or regulatory solutions to solve the issues of coordination, sharing and solidarity. 
However, they cannot entirely remove the current roadblocks on their own. They 
need first a clear agreement by Member States and EU institutions on the regulatory 
framework for sharing the costs and the benefits of the integrated power system, and 
for solidarity under abnormal circumstances. If this agreement on fundamental 
principles is absent because of diverging national interests and the veto rights of 
Member States, then technical European bodies cannot do much more than slowly 
develop piecemeal, suboptimal and temporary solutions. 
9) Different stakeholders may have and most probably will have alternative and even 
opposing views on the recommendations proposed in this report. This depends on 
their specific interests, skills and resources, or their current understanding of the 
complicated problems under discussion. However, we believe that any practitioner, 
decision-maker or scholar wishing to propose her own solutions should address, at 
least, the missing pillars identified in the present report and provide his or her 
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